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African Military Geoscience:  
Military History and the Physical Environment
Traditionally,	 military	 activities	 strongly	 depend	 on	 the	 physical	 environment	
of	 the	 operational	 theatre	 where	 a	 conflict	 transpires.	 The	 field	 of	 military	
geosciences	study	the	relationship	between	these	different	physical	environments	












to	 create	 a	distinctive	operational	 environment.	The	 elements	 that	 render	 an	
operational	environment	unique	provide	a	useful	background	for	the	study	of	
the	historical	impact	of	climate	and	terrain	on	warfare.
The	 physical	 environment	 likewise	 shaped	 the	 course	 of	wars	 in	 Africa.	 The	
continent	 is	well	known	 for	 its	 large	variation	 in	physical	environments.	This	
makes	it	an	ideal	theatre	for	investigating	the	impact	of	different	environments	
on	military	activities.	Despite	 this,	 the	 interrelationship	between	 the	physical	
environment	 and	 military	 operations	 in	 Africa	 is	 not	 well	 studied.	 This	








in	 this	 chapter	 date	 to	 the	 pre-colonial	 and	 colonial	 eras,	 and	 focus	 mainly	
on	 military	 operations	 during	 conventional	 and	 semi-conventional	 warfare.	
Subsequent	chapters	are	arranged	in	chronological	order.
The	second	chapter	studies	the	impact	of	geology	on	coastal	naval	operations	
against	 the	 physical	 backdrop	 of	 Saldanha	 Bay,	 on	 the	 south-west	 coast	 of	












Chapter	 3	 discusses	 the	 invasion	 of	 the	 Dutch	 settlement	 at	 the	 Cape	 on	
11 June	1795	by	a	British	 fleet.	The	settlement	was	small,	but	 the	 formidable	




defenders	 to	 use	 the	 favourable	 geography	 to	 maximum	 effect.	 Similarities	



















northern	 Abyssinia,	 the	 East	 African	 climate	 and	 terrain	 served	 as	 crucial	
determinants	during	the	planning	and	execution	of	the	South	African	and	Allied	
military	operations	throughout	the	campaign.







The	 Geological	 Section	was	 also	 involved	 in	well-drilling	 in	 order	 to	 develop	




during	 their	 invasion	of	North	Africa,	and	supported	 their	effort	with	various	
geological	expeditions.	Chapter	6	looks	at	the	work	of	Wehrgeologenstelle 12,	the	
military	geology	team	that	aided	and	supported	General	Erwin	Rommel’s	forces	
during	 the	Western	Desert	 campaign.	They	prepared	 information	on	off-road	




The	 concluding	 chapter	 investigates	 the	 Cuvelai-Etosha	 Basin	 that	 connects	
southern	 Angola	 and	 northern	 Namibia.	 This	 was	 essentially	 the	 theatre	 of	
the	 1966-1989	war	 for	Namibian	 independence.	 The	 Cuvelai-Etosha	 Basin	 is	
characterised	by	a	gentle	topography	covered	with	savannah	vegetation.	During	
the	rainy	season,	much	of	the	area	is	transformed	into	a	deltaic	marsh,	which	
makes	 it	difficult	 to	navigate	by	vehicle.	Knowledge	and	understanding	of	 the	
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operational	 environment	 are	 essential	 components	 of	 military	 operations,	
and	 this	 chapter	 demonstrates	 the	 importance	 and	 influence	 of	 geography	
on	conflict.
African Military Geosciences: Military History and the Physical Environment 
illustrates	 the	 inescapable	 effects	 of	 geology	 and	 geography	 on	 selected	
military	operations	conducted	on	the	African	continent	over	a	period	spanning	
more	 than	 five	 centuries.	 Lessons	 learned	 in	 the	 study	 of	 these	 activities	
are	 essentially	 timeless;	 they	 are	 as	 relevant	 today,	 and	will	 be	 in	 future,	 as	
during	 the	 past	 500	 years.	 The	 chapters	 in	 this	 book	 investigate	warfare	 on	
the	African	continent	–	military	actions	and	a	military	environment	that	have	
not	 been	 addressed	 adequately,	 or	 at	 all,	 in	 previous	 similar	 compilations.	 It	
should	therefore	be	of	great	 interest	 to	 the	 international	military	geosciences	
community.	 Furthermore,	 it	 contains	 chapters	 dealing	 with	 naval	 warfare,	 a	
subject	 rarely	 addressed	 in	Military	 Geology	 and	 Geography	 research.	 It	 will	





Figure A Map of the areas covered by the eight chapters in African Military Geoscience: 
Military History and the Physical Environment
Source: Map by B. Mtshawu
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Ian van der Waag, Department of Military History, Faculty of Military Science 
Stellenbosch University, South Africa
CHAPTER 1
The influence of terrain and climate on military 
operations in South Africa
Ian van der Waag 
Introduction
The study of the military history of Africa and its relationship to the physical 
environment is in its infancy. Here, as elsewhere, warfare formed part of longer 
term patterns of behaviour with deep roots in social structure and the physical 
environment. The physical environment, attitudes and perceptions, and 
technological innovation combined to form the conditions of conflict and shape 
the nature of the warfighting. This chapter considers this interface between 
geography and military planning and operations, and the study of military 
history within the southern African context. The value geographic knowledge 
holds for military commanders – something that is often ignored, and with 
disastrous results – is discussed with a focus on the ways in which water, or 
water scarcity, impact upon military planning, strategy and tactics. A four-zone 
typology for politics and warfare in southern Africa is proposed. The four-zones 
or environments are described and, using specific battles and battle spaces as 
illustration, the ways in which spaces shaped patterns of human settlement, the 
development of military organisations, and the conduct of military operations 
during the pre-colonial and colonial eras are considered.
Ian van der Waag
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Reconnoitring the landscape
The central theme of this chapter is the spatial patterns of military activity 
during the past 1 000 years of southern African history. Three factors have 
determined these patterns: the physical environment or total physical setting in 
which military activity took place; the attitudes, perceptions and forms of social 
and military organisation of the people who occupied that environment; and, 
lastly, the technologies developed and military innovations made by their armed 
forces. These three factors – place, people and technology – interact in a variety 
of ways. Some environments encourage, others permit; and yet others restrict 
military activity. Conversely, as technologies improve, man comes to dominate 
his environment, which might be tamed and shaped according to military 
planning and the pursuit of desired military and security outcomes. Perceptions 
and attitudes, although ever-present variables, are fickle and unpredictable, and, 
unsurprisingly, the relationship of armed forces with the environment, modified 








Figure 1.1 The relationship between the physical environment, military activity,  
and technological innovation 
Source: Developed from N.J.G. Pounds, An Historical Geography of Europe, p. 1
A considerable body of literature has developed on the relationship between 
the environment, peoples more widely, and the diffusion of technologies. The 
term “frontier”, usefully defined by Howard Lamar and Leonard Thompson as ‘a 
territory or zone of interpenetration between two previously distinct societies’, 
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has, for example, been used by historians to explain some of these processes.2 
Fernand Braudel, French historian of the Annales School, went much further. 
For Braudel there are perhaps ‘a hundred frontiers, not one, some political, 
some economic, and some cultural.’3 His first book, on The Mediterranean 
and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II (1949 in French), was 
his most influential. In it, Braudel argued for three levels of time. The first is 
environmental or geographic time (the longue durée), where change is almost 
imperceptibly slow, with repetition and cycles. While change on this timescale 
may be slow, it is also irresistible. The longer term social, economic and cultural 
history, focussing on discussions of economy and of social groupings, empires, 
and civilisations, is Braudel’s second level of time. While change at this level 
is much more rapid than that of the environment, it may still take several 
hundred years to detect patterns. The third level (histoire événementielle) is the 
time of short duration – the time of politics, events, and of individual people 
who might be identified by name. He expounded on the longue durée in his 
final book, L’Identité de la France (The Identity of France), which was published 
posthumously in 1986. France, he argued, was ‘the product not of its politics 
or economics, but rather of its geography and culture’ and, therefore, time and 
place had to be integrated into the broad sweep of history. His concern remained 
with centuries and millennia rather than specific events, years and decades.4
This debate resonates within the domain of military history. Most notable 
among scholars in the field is perhaps John Keegan, the eminent British 
military historian who drew together some of these arguments in his History of 
Warfare (1993). In this well-informed and broad sweep of global military history, 
Keegan addresses wide-ranging aspects – stone, flesh, iron, fire – and places 
these within the framework of the history of warfare. Alongside the chapters 
he included four interludes, the first of which addresses the ‘limitations on 
warmaking.’ Keegan follows something of a Braudelian line. These limitations, 
he argues, are imposed in part by legal and moral restraints. Yet, by far the most 
important constraints belong to the domain of the physical environment, or what 
the Soviet General Staff called “permanently operating factors”. Beyond human 
jurisdiction, these factors include weather, climate, terrain and vegetation, and 
serve to ‘affect, inhibit, or sometimes altogether prohibit the operations of war.’5 
These “permanent” factors affect other, “contingent” factors – such as difficulties 
in the raising, supplying, training and quartering of armies – and combine to 
constrain the scale, intensity, and duration of combat. Growing prosperity and 
technological innovation may reduce, or perhaps even largely overcome, some 
of these limitations. Nevertheless, concludes Keegan, no single limitation ‘can be 
said to have been eliminated altogether.’6
Ian van der Waag
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Keegan’s thesis is controversial. His argument that the “permanent” and 
“contingent” factors impose severe restrictions on the nature and scope of 
offensive or defensive operations – to the extent that ‘most of the globe’s dry 
land has no military history’7 – has drawn critical comment. John Thornton, 
for example, has taken him to task for oversimplifying the complexities of 
African warfare and succumbing to a greater problem of African invisibility in 
world and comparative history.8 Keegan’s map, which divides the world into 
“military” and “non-military” zones, is unfortunate. Yet, what is clear (and 
what Thornton himself develops further) is that some environments – desert, 
rain forest, mountain ranges – remain inhospitable, often lacking good water 
resources and good road and rail networks, which severely limits strategic and 
tactical options. In many cases, warfighting in these areas may be limited to 
skirmishes between small groups of well-equipped soldiers.9 Keegan’s point, 
that the physical environment might increase the likelihood of strife or impose 
limitations through vegetation, the physical environment and, most importantly, 
the presence or absence of water, is well made.
The physical and historical geography of South Africa illustrates these arguments. 
Situated at the southern extremity of the African continent, South Africa 
stretches from Cape Agulhas northwards to the Limpopo River and covers a 
total surface area of some 1 223 000 square kilometres. This is larger than the 
combined land surface of the United Kingdom, France and Germany. The country 
has seven ecosystems, ranging from subtropical for most of the country to the 
Mediterranean climes of the Western Cape. Physically, the country takes the 
form of an upturned saucer: a large plateau enclosed by an escarpment, quite 
precipitous in places, that separates the Highveld from an often broad coastal 
plain. There is a rich diversity in the landscape: fertile valleys and fine beaches, 
but also vast arid and semi-arid areas, beneath which lie some of the oldest 
archaeological and human fossil sites in the world as well as great quantities of 
precious and semi-precious stones and precious metals.10
The provenance of this mineral wealth is ancient. The heart of the country 
overlies the Kaapvaal Craton, which dates back some 3,7 billion years, to the 
Achaean era. This is perhaps the most ancient of continental crusts. The craton, 
or “Golden Arc”, was once a large inland lake and stretches from Johannesburg to 
Welkom. Silt and deposits from at least six rivers brought alluvial minerals that 
settled in the area to form rich deposits. Jan Smuts, in reference to this mineral 
wealth, once said: ‘God emptied his pockets over this southern continent, and 
scattered on our land not just gold and other mineral wealth but beauty and 
something to appeal to the human spirit.’11 The trove of gold, diamonds, platinum, 
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coal, and many other metals and minerals, the richest discovered in any one 
country, transformed South Africa from a collection of small, colonial states into 
the largest industrialised powerhouse on the African continent.12 The ownership 
and control of these precious metals and minerals, and the strategic value they 
accorded, first to Kruger’s Republic, then to Britain, and in the twentieth century 
to an independent South Africa, was the cause for military conflict. Transvaal 
gold and a devastating total war fought at the end of the nineteenth century, 
introduced the boundaries of modern South Africa. The forging of a South African 
nation would, however, wait another hundred years.13 Importantly, however, 
these conflicts, or wars of South African unification, were unevenly distributed 
across the terrain of modern South Africa. In fact, as figure 1.2 shows, most of 
the warfighting occurred in the eastern half of the country. This raises many 
important questions regarding the relationship between armed forces and the 
physical environment in southern Africa.
Figure 1.2 The physical features of the landscape and zones of conflict14
Source: Drawn by E.P. Kleynhans, 2018
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The nature and importance of geographic knowledge
The physical geography of South Africa was, of course, not always an open book. 
The logic of waterways and river systems is often difficult to understand. There 
were no maps as such for South Africa during the pre-colonial period. Much as 
was the case in North America, ‘tribal neighbours were more often enemies than 
friends, inclined to take and torture an interloper rather than help him on his 
way.’15 Nevertheless, for trade, and during periods of upheaval and migration, 
Africans carried the physical patterns of the landscape in their heads and, no 
doubt, marked specific trails with motifs on trees and rocks, having learned 
something of the terrain from the tracks beaten by larger game. Although this 
did not amount to a “key” to the subcontinent, Africans knew the shape of the 
environment they inhabited.16 However, there were no known maps for any 
part of southern Africa when the Portuguese, and later the Dutch, began their 
early surveys.
Reports of copper and later gold in the interior spurred exploration in the 
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. However, until at least the mid-nineteenth 
century, the vision of the travellers, adventurers, and scientists remained patchy 
and superficial. They knew of the Indian Ocean and the coastal plains of the 
modern Eastern Cape and KwaZulu-Natal, which had first been probed by the 
Portuguese in the late fifteenth century, and then by the Dutch, the French and 
later the British in the ensuing centuries. But they had little idea of the existence 
of the Drakensberg, no comprehension of the river systems of the Highveld, no 
knowledge of the vast central plateau and its well-watered eastern zone, and 
certainly no apprehension of the existence or extent of the vast interior of the 
subcontinent. The task, no simple venture, would only be completed in the 
twentieth century.
The explorers and adventurers who travelled southern Africa came and went. 
Some were men of means. Some were government-funded. Some were sponsored 
by geographic societies. Some, like Simon van der Stel (1639-1712), set out in 
search of mineral wealth. All professed a desire to contribute in some way to the 
expansion of scientific knowledge, the description of fauna and flora, and, in a 
paternalistic fashion, of the local, African peoples. Some, like William Burchell 
(1781-1863), who focussed on the natural history of the region, held narrow 
interests. Others, like John Barrow (1764-1848) and Karl Lichtenstein 
(1780-1857), travellers who left accounts showing their wider concerns, held 
more diverse interests.17 Published works by generalists and specialists alike 
proliferated during the nineteenth century. George Thompson (1796-1889), who 
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explored the Cape Colony and its eastern and northern frontiers during the 1820s, 
noted in the preface to his Travels and Adventures that because ‘southern Africa 
has been traversed during the last fifty years by so many travellers, whose works 
are familiar to the public […] that it is a common notion in England that there 
is nothing relating to that country of any general interest which is not already 
sufficiently known.’18 Not subscribing to this view, Thompson told his readers 
that the majority of travellers who had penetrated the hinterland were natural 
scientists aiming to search out the plant and animal life of the subcontinent.19 
But, since the day of Barrow and Burchell and the others, greater attention was 
given to geography, agriculture, and commercial networks. These aspects spoke 
to the strategic value of an area.
British travel writer, Jan Morris (born 1926) has described the British Empire 
of the late nineteenth century as a vast ‘development agency’, an international 
structure geared to the distribution of ‘technical knowledge around the world, 
and [the erection of] what economists were later to call the infra-structure 
of industrial progress – roads, railways, ports, posts and telegraphs.’20 This is 
a rather flattering image of empire, but one that draws interest in the context 
of this chapter. The Empire was mapped, much of it for the first time, often 
by soldiers, sometimes by private enterprise. The Royal Geographical Society 
brought military men and privately-funded explorers together and linked them 
to government officials and agencies. Imperial defence and strategy remained 
the primary drive for the surveying and charting of imperial territories, with an 
emphasis on areas identified for pacification or further expansion.21
The result was a rather patchy system that neglected much of South Africa. When 
formed in 1912, the Union Defence Forces (UDF) lacked maps in respect of more 
than half of the surface of the country. With few exceptions, there weren’t any 
maps of the South African coast suitable for operations, and the only good military 
maps were for the ‘old trouble spots’, including the eastern Orange Free State, 
Basutoland, and the Kalahari south of the Orange River to latitude 31 degrees.22 
As F.S. Malan, a member of the Botha cabinet, noted during the unrest in the 
Transkei in November 1914, knowledge of the terrain and good infrastructure 
allowed ‘the timely concentration of the district’s troops and the conduct of 
politics of investigation and diplomacy.’23 Much trouble was taken in the ensuing 
years to fill the cartographic gaps. In January 1923, the HMSAS Protea surveyed 
St Helena Bay, which was then identified as the most likely beachhead for a 
German invasion force.24 Further north, in 1921, Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, a surveyor 
by profession, had charted the headwaters of the Okavango and Kwande rivers 
and the Lunge-Vungo River to within 160 kilometres of the Northern Rhodesian 
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frontier, as well as parts of the Zambezi River basin. These surveys, although 
commissioned by the Department of Agriculture, were vitally important to the 
UDF and planning for potential war against the Portuguese colonies.25 Military 
men, seeking adventure during times of peace, played key roles as scientists and 
mapmakers, sometimes consolidating the work of others, occasionally striking 
out, as Leipoldt did.26
In the story of the contacts between Europe and Africa, and among Africans 
themselves, there are numerous examples of formal military campaigns. Yet far 
more frequent was the low-level warfare that occurred continuously between 
communities as part of the constant birth, growth and disintegration of social 
and political entities. For most Africans, and the later Afro-Europeans, warfare 
was a way of life and, defining social role and function, formed part of longer 
term patterns of behaviour with deep roots in social structure and ecology. 
Climate and, by implication, natural disaster added to the conditions that both 
created and inhibited war. Long cycles of wet and dry weather, with years of 
plenty and of drought, was highly destabilising and triggered migrations that 
fed the slave trade and enhanced both the appeal of the social bandit and power 
of the warlord. Terrain and climate, as John Thornton has argued convincingly, 
therefore created or prevented conflict in regions where nature increased the 
likelihood of strife (through an abundance of water for example) or imposed 
limitations through vegetation, the physical environment and disease, as well as 
lack of water.27 
Geography and the physical environment impacted greatly on the conduct 
of operations. This impact varied from terrain that supported large-scale 
operations to landscapes that limited operations or even prevented large-scale 
operations entirely. Knowledge of both the climate and terrain was (and still is) 
crucial for the conduct of successful operations – something many somewhat 
myopic European commanders learned to their detriment, suffering defeat or 
losing large proportions of their forces to tropical diseases and the hot and humid 
African climes. In 1872, on the eve of his departure for Ashanti, Garnet Wolseley, 
one of the more far-sighted of Victoria’s generals, issued a pamphlet on jungle 
warfare and the health risks imposed by exposure to excessive humidity and 
the monsoons to his troops; and on their voyage out, his staff and he studied 
meticulously both the nature of the Ashanti army and, as importantly, the nature 
of the terrain on which they would engage.28
Most nineteenth-century commanders did not plan with Wolseley’s 
thoroughness, and all were blinkered by the lack of published knowledge. 
This the Duke of Devonshire (1808-1891), an original founder of the Royal 
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Agricultural Society and a trustee of the British Museum, acknowledged 
when in 1877 he warned of Britain’s deplorable knowledge of the physical 
geography of regions in her national interest.29 Such concerns, together with 
the growing body of personal accounts, gave rise to several publications on a 
variety of related topics, from the conduct of colonial operations to the impact 
of geography on imperial military planning.30 The classic primer for colonial 
warfare was Colonel C.E. Callwell’s Small Wars: Their principles and practice, 
which was first published by the War Office in 1896 and reprinted several times 
until 1914.31 Europeans possessed both the technological edge and substantial 
knowledge of their African opponents, yet victory in small wars, as Callwell and 
others knew, was far from automatic. Superior technology provided European 
forces with a tactical advantage in battle, but, as was all too often the case, 
African opponents enjoyed a strategic advantage and could control the pace of 
war by maximising their knowledge of the terrain and climate, refusing battle, 
and adopting guerrilla strategies.32 The counter-guerrilla operations European 
powers adopted in response demanded increasingly accurate knowledge of 
the nature of the opposing African forces, as well as more detailed information 
about the terrain on which those forces would be encountered. This gave rise to 
works such as The Native Tribes of the Transvaal (1905)33 and Captain D.H. Cole’s 
Imperial Military Geography, which appeared for the first time in January 1924.34 
Cole’s tome was expanded in July of that year and saw nine revised editions to 
the eve of the Second World War. Imperial Military Geography, the first volume 
to treat imperial geography globally, provided the British colonial administrator 
and his military counterpart with a 398-page introduction to ‘the resources of 
the various parts of the Empire as well as a guide for further reading. Power, they 
realised, subsists on knowledge production.
The impact of climate on military operations became a primary concern 
for Victorians. The lack of forethought regarding weather, and of rainfall 
more especially, was noted to have defeated armies. In Africa, climate and its 
associated diseases killed more men than did gunfire, necessitating ‘constant 
and increasingly efficacious measures on the part of army commanders to 
counteract them.’ Cole identified three ways in which climate influences warfare. 
Firstly, it influenced the health and efficiency of the troops. European troops 
were susceptible to tropical diseases, including malaria and yellow fever, which, 
along with heat and humidity and the lack of a good water supply, impaired 
their physical condition and military efficiency. The colonies were synonymous 
with death, and Africa was characterised in both memoirs and fiction as ‘the 
white man’s grave.’35 The gathering pace of advances in medical knowledge and 
infrastructure development, which resulted in improved hygiene and sanitation, 
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more appropriate clothing and better provisioning, and the increased use of 
pipelines to secure reliable water supplies, eventually countered such notions.36 
Secondly, Cole highlighted the impact of climate on movement, whether by land, 
sea or air. Movement overland in undeveloped tropical countries depended 
greatly on tracks, which, for portions of the year, became roaring torrents or 
quagmires impassable to horses and gun carriages. Gradually European soldiers 
mastered African rivers and overcame the effects of the rains. Gunboats were 
placed on the Nile and the Lakes of East Africa;37 and the railway locomotive, 
utilising water in another form for propulsion, provided increased circulation of 
a more sophisticated range of provisions.38 Yet technology went only so far, and 
even Jan Smuts, an Afro-European master at manoeuvre warfare, had to rest his 
East African troops during the 1916 rainy season.39
The third impact of climate is on production. Some regions can support large field 
armies, while others, for want of water and arable land, necessitate sophisticated 
logistic arrangements whereby every morsel of food and can of water has to be 
conveyed to the front. Climate (and most particularly the availability of water) 
therefore also determines whether a place has value as a base of supply for a 
campaign in another theatre.40
A commander, about to operate in a region, must therefore ask a variety of 
critical questions, which range from the expected temperatures and the impacts 
of humidity on efficiency to whether there are any periods of the year when 
movement may be impeded by an abundance or lack of water. In order to 
answer these questions, every commander ought to have sufficient information 
about the climate (and geography more generally) of the theatre of operations, 
and arguably most of all information on temperature, wind systems, rainfall 
and humidity.41 Yet, until recent times, the information available to military 
commanders was often limited to general rainfall statistics. The South African 
commanders who planned the German South West and East African campaigns 
of the First World War, for example, had scant knowledge of the water sources in 
either German colony.42 Recognising the problem, Smuts tasked his intelligence 
officer, Major Johann Leipoldt, with gleaning this information from captured 
German documentation and creating a reliable rainfall and water resource 
database. This work was extended after the First World War to other areas of 
strategic interest to South Africa. As we have noted, Leipoldt, a surveyor by 
profession, also journeyed to the source of the Cunene in 1920, where he tested 
the water capacity of the Etosha Pan and the Cunene River and examined the 
western scheme of the headwaters of the Okavango (“Cubango” on the Angolan 
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side of the border) and Cuando rivers, and the Lungue-Bungo River.43 This was 
followed in 1921 by a survey of the Kalahari water supply and a study of the 
Okavango and Nkarikari rivers.44 Suitably qualified, and no doubt seeking a 
post-war role for himself in the Union Defence Force, Leipoldt argued in 1921 
for the creation of a Survey Corps for the UDF. This never materialised, and, 
disappointed, he resigned from the UDF in 1923. His dream was partly realised 
when the 1st Field Survey Company was established as a Citizen Force unit of the 
South African Engineer Corps with effect from 1 April 1938, staffed by personnel 
from Trigonometrical Survey offices across the country.45
Water and the levels of war
Water influences operations at practically every level of war. Cole identified 
five strategic frontiers, all of which are associated with water: the sea, swamps 
and rivers relate to an abundance of water; deserts to a dearth of water; and 
mountain ranges to watersheds (table 1.1). Zones of low habitation, such as arid 
and semi-arid regions, mountain ranges, swamps, tropical forests and jungle, 
and, of course, the sea itself, provide strategic strength and limit the defence to 
a few vital points.
Table 1.1 Natural frontiers hold strategic advantage
Strategic frontiers Defensive value Offensive value
Sea Prevention of overland invasion
Projection of sea power by a 
maritime nation
Rivers
Obstacles if across the path 
of advance




Refuges for the tactically weak Safe bases for raiders
Source: Developed from ideas contained in D.H. Cole, Imperial Military Geography: 
General Characteristics of the Empire in Relation to Defence, London: Sifton Praed, p. 192
The land frontier of South Africa, formed for the most part by the arid and 
semi-arid regions of the Kalahari and Namib, provide considerable protection 
against invasion from the north. This natural barrier largely limited an invader’s 
path to the Lebombo bottlenecks between the arid region on the one side, and 
the sea on the other. The battlefields of many centuries that dot modern-day 
KwaZulu-Natal and the eastern Highveld bear witness to the defensive power 
exercised by the Kalahari. 
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Such a barrier, protected by the absence of supplies and particularly of water, 
compels any army moving across the region to keep to definite and easily 
anticipated routes.46 Here the South African invasion of German South West Africa 
in 1915 is another good illustration. The South Africans, facing the Namib Desert, 
were confined to a choice of three approach routes at most, and once their 
decision was made, they could not shift the point of attack, due to a complete 
lack of lateral communications.47 However, recent developments in engineering 
lessened the protective power of the Namib: Railways were constructed from 
the coast along the three lines of advance, enabling the South African forces to 
keep in touch with their base and obtain supplies. Pipelines for the transmission 
of water or fuel, roads and motor transport, and the use of wire netting laid 
on the sand as a car track reduced the difficulties of movement; while aircraft 
allowed for easier and more effective reconnaissance.48 Yet, even with modern 
engineering skill and in the face of an inferior retreating force, the heat and a 
lack of adequate water supplies, confinement to one or a few definite lines of 
advance, and the blocking of rails by sand combined to make operations a matter 
of time and considerable difficulty.49
Deserts, which per definition lack water resources, pose the greatest of military 
obstacles, but not by any means the only ones. Regions of water abundance, 
such as swamps, marshes and good rivers also provide barriers to penetration. 
As Colonel Hugh Wyndham, South Africa’s first intelligence chief, noted to his 
mother in 1916, excessive flooding made it impossible to relieve the British 
forces in Mesopotamia, and Smuts, at the same time, was also delayed by the 
rainy season in East Africa; therefore, on two fronts an abundance of rainwater 
brought ‘a muddled position’.50 Swamps, Cole thought, were more difficult to 
cross than a moderate range of mountains; and, it would appear, they were an 
even greater obstacle to the use of tanks than are deserts, mountains or even 
rivers. But, as Lord Cobham noted during the East African campaign of the Great 
War, marshes could have an offensive military value: ‘It looks at last as if we are 
just seeing the last of the Boshes in Africa. Only 1 000 left in E. Africa, & they are 
cooped up in a marsh where they will die of fever in 3 weeks. Let them – if we 
attack them we shall lose 20 good men, worth more than 1 000 scoundrels.’51
Rivers, although visible and easily recognisable, make poor frontiers. They do 
not separate peoples, but rather form a means of communication and therefore 
of trade. The valley on both sides tends to become single economic entities 
and, as a result, nations tend to build themselves around rivers, rather than be 
separated by them. As military obstacles, they offer defensive lines which have 
been exploited by all great commanders. However, their use depends on whether 
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they are parallel to the direction of attack or across it. They can therefore either 
form defensive moats or, parallel to the advance, provide a greater choice of 
routes, all of which must be watched by the defenders.52 The defensive or 
offensive use of a river naturally depends too on the number of tributaries, 
the possibility of navigation, and the presence of bridges, fords, roads and rail 
communications. Still, rivers that lie across the direction of attack do not confer 
the same defensive strength as a moderate mountain range. Moreover, lateral 
communication by rail and road parallel to a river is normally good, as it tends 
to follow the valley, and forces can be quickly moved from one point to another 
to attempt a crossing. Armies, as the Belgian forces in the Congo River Basin 
showed during the late nineteenth century, are therefore not confined to a few 
definite (and often ill-suited) roads.
The offensive value of a river is naturally great when it runs along or parallel to 
the line of advance, especially if navigable. It then relieves the congestion of traffic 
on the roads and railways. Illustrations are not found in South Africa, although 
good examples are found elsewhere in Africa: Dodd’s Dahomeian campaign and 
Kitchener’s Sudanese expedition are classics.53 Other important determining 
factors of the defensive strength of a river are its width, depth and speed, and 
the height of its banks; whether it is lined by marshes or passes through gorges; 
bridges, ferries, communications leading to bridgeheads, and so on. Climate, too, 
is a consideration, for if a river freezes over it may destroy its defensive value; in 
southern Africa this was, however, never a possibility.54
The use of water in another form produced steam power, which was harnessed 
both for ships and river boats, as well as the rail locomotive. This brought a 
wider network of penetration, which could now also be achieved more quickly. 
In southern Africa, due to the absence of good rivers, steam-powered rail was 
always more important for moving troops and supplies across the subcontinent, 
supplying and re-supplying them, and (sometimes) providing them with 
additional firepower. Broadly speaking, European colonisation in Africa was 
successful because the Europeans had mastered water by the projection of 
power over the seas and oceans and then into Africa herself, using her river 
systems – as Kitchener did on the Nile, the French did on the Senegal and the 
Niger, and the Belgians did on the Congo.
Rivers and seas attract and separate people in equal measure, and both provide 
axes of advance. The sea, having served as a great divider and defensive zone for 
the British Isles, was transformed by the advent of steam power into a means of 
uniting regions and continents. It enabled the British and continental powers 
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to move with relative ease to almost any part of the globe. Sea power allowed 
European states to land troops at undefended or weakly defended points on an 
enemy’s coast, and enabled them to conduct campaigns concurrently in Europe, 
the Americas, India, and Africa. It made, as Cole noted, ‘the enemy’s coastline 
the frontier of Great Britain.’55 And the same could be said of France, Germany, 
Belgium and Portugal.
Four environments for politics and warfare
Water not only created opportunities for, and obstacles to, warfare; it also shaped 
the terrain as well as the nature of the states formed and the armies fielded. The 
warfare waged, in turn, reflects both the geographies and natures of these states 
and armed forces.
Figure 1.3 South Africa and the four environments for politics and warfare
The general physical features of the South African theatre, as shown in figure 1.3, 
comprise a coastal plain, an interior plateau (the arid and semi-arid regions in 
the west and Highveld grasslands in the east), and an escarpment that marks the 
transition between the two. South Africa’s varied geography makes for a diverse 
climate; mostly semi-arid, but subtropical along the east coast. The Highveld, 
on account of its altitude and remoteness from the sea, is subject to marked 
temperature variations between winter and summer. These extremes of heat and 
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cold, and the general tendency of the temperature to rise in summer and fall in 
winter, are shown in table 1.2. Cautious commanders, throughout South African 
history, have taken cognisance of climate and topography in the planning of 
operations. Shaka and Mzilikazi planned all major operations for the harvest 
season, when food was plentiful. The Boers likewise timed their ultimatum 
to the British in October 1899 to coincide with the start of the summer. This 
was crucial, as much of the coastal region – through which the British troops 
had perforce to move – burns up almost to a desert during the hotter months. 
The moment the British broke through the escarpment north-east of Cape Town 
and moved beyond Ceres, they were exposed to severe heat and lack of water, 
and found little to sustain them in the countryside: perhaps only some sheep, 
goats, and ostriches.56







January (summer) 74,1 73,4 59,5
July (winter) 68,4 47,3 54,3
Variation in average 
in temperature
5,7 26,1 5,2
Source: I.J. van der Waag, ‘South Africa and the Boer Military System’ in P. Dennis and J. Grey 
(eds.), The Boer War: Army, Nation and Empire. Army History Unit, Canberra 2000, p. 52
Belligerents in southern Africa encountered several scenarios defined largely 
by the presence or absence of water. The greatest political and military contrast 
was between the extensive and powerful Sotho and Nguni kingdoms anchored in 
the basins of the Limpopo, Crocodile and Tugela river systems, and the elusive, 
fleet nomads of the desert. The deserts and semi-arid regions of the west; the 
Highveld, which forms the core of central South Africa; the coastal plains and 
the escarpment formed four environments for politics and warfare (table 1.3).
The central plateau lies at 1 000 to 2 000 metres above sea level. It is flat or 
undulating, broken only here and there by solitary rounded hills (koppies) and 
mesas. It comprises terrain ranging from the rolling, fertile plains of the highveld 
and the wide open bushveld (savannah) of Mpumalanga to the red sands and 
scrub grassland of the Kalahari Desert. With an average altitude of 1 000 metres, 
the veld slopes down gradually from east to west, and all the major rivers thus 
flow across the plateau to the Atlantic, where there are no ports of consequence. 
In the north-east, the highveld plateau descends to the bushveld and Limpopo 
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river valley. The 400 millimetres rainfall line demarcates the two warfare zones: 
a western arid zone, and an eastern grassland zone.
Table 1.3 Natural frontiers and the four‑zones of warfare in southern Africa
Zones of warfare Strategic frontiers Nature of armies
Arid and semi‑arid regions Sea, desert Light infantry
Highveld Desert, mountains Heavy infantry
Escarpment Mountain ranges Light infantry 
Coastal plains:
 eastern zone Swamps, rivers, mountains Heavy infantry 
 western zone Rivers, mountains, deserts
Light infantry & 
mounted infantry
It must, however, be stated clearly, and from the outset, that these zones 
were permeable. They shaped the ways in which polities formed and armies 
were raised, but they did not preclude the passage and later growth of those 
states and armed forces across several of these zones. The Dutch colonists, for 
example, showed a surprising ability to survive the British occupation: either by 
acculturation into the new structures, or by avoidance and trekking away further 
into the hinterland. This migration – later historicised by Afrikaner historians 
as ‘The Great Trek’ – was set in motion in the 1830s and eventually led to the 
establishment of a series of small, fractious Boer republics on the Highveld and 
eastern coastal plain. The commando system survived the British occupation 
and was transposed to Natal, the Orange Free State and the Transvaal, where 
it served as the military system for the Voortrekker communities. Without 
exception, all Voortrekker leaders (the wealthiest of the immigrants) were 
experienced commandants.57 After a period of internecine squabbling and 
several setbacks, a commandant in charge of all commandants was deemed 
necessary. This eventually gave rise to the ranks of commandant general and 
chief commandant (hoofkommandant).58 The small republics survived through 
accommodation with the local African polities, backed on several occasions by 
demonstrations of their superior firepower. Soon bankrupt and facing military 
defeat and possible annihilation, each of these republics in turn was absorbed 
by a larger neighbour, until ultimately all were annexed to the British Empire. 
Yet, this historicisation is a misnomer. Several treks were taking place at the 
same time.
Possibly the greatest treks of all were happening elsewhere in South Africa. This 
was part of the process known as the Mfecane (“crushing”), which from the late 
eighteenth century transformed the African polities on the Highveld and along 
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the eastern coastal plain. In essence, the Mfecane was a series of wars triggered 
by drought and commercial competition, and exacerbated by the migration 
of Nguni groups escaping the violence on the eastern coastal plain onto the 
Highveld. Low-level warfare with periods of intensification was a way of life in 
Africa, defining both social role and function. Ecological disaster and the mass 
migration it triggered was part of the longue durée. Destabilisation and migration 
supplied the slave trade, and enhanced the appeal of the social bandit, as well as 
the power of the warlord. The latter seized the opportunity to assimilate large 
numbers of new clients into the warband, giving rise to new states.
What made the Mfecane different was the intervention of colonial groups (both 
slavers and trekkers). Slave raids were conducted from the Portuguese base at 
Delagoa Bay in the north, and by some Griqua groups from the south, across 
the Orange River. The impact of these raids, coupled with continued drought 
and insecurity within, led thousands of Africans to migrate across the central 
Highveld during the 1820s. Faced with similar circumstances in their new homes, 
some sought refuge as clients of relatively powerful, or at least defensively 
astute, chiefs, such as Moshoeshoe I (c.1788-1870) of the Sotho.
Zone 1 warfare: Arid and semi-arid regions
Thinly populated, with unfavourable agricultural conditions and open country, 
the arid and semi-arid regions of southern Africa – from the Kalahari Desert 
to the semi-arid West Coast – precluded long violent clashes between large 
numbers of people. Moreover, the death of a hunter inevitably meant loss of 
food and ‘a fight once begun is feared almost like atomic warfare.’59 The San,60 
who peopled southern Africa from time immemorial, avoided conflict whenever 
possible.61 They were organised in small groups or bands, each comprising no 
more than 25 people. Wealth, which was seated in access to hunting grounds 
and adequate water rather than lordly obedience, induced supporters to follow. 
Military power relied on the voluntary enlistment of free people with their own 
equipment. The region was therefore more or less permanently led by people 
whose strength and prestige was largely achieved through their own merit, with 
followers whose numbers waxed and waned with the seasons. 
Marshall (1960) described the San as a ‘present-orientated people who make no 
great effort to hold the past in memory or teach their history to their children … 
no one remembers a time when things were very different’; as a result, ‘the 
history and origin of settlement and of individual bands is lost in the past.’62 
However, over the past decades, the interface between history, archaeology and 
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social anthropology has pushed back the occupation of southern Africa by several 
millennia. The pre-colonial populations have traditionally been distinguished as 
hunters, herders and farmers, but more recently, scholars have suggested that 
the criteria defining these groups should be considered as relative rather than 
absolute. Increasingly, the evidence suggests intensive interaction between the 
three types.
Pastoralists, who called themselves Khoikhoi, and hunters and gatherers who 
domesticated stock, moved into the subcontinent and occupied the veld of the 
western zone by 1 000 AD. The main invasion routes were along the western and 
eastern margins of the Kalahari basin, and through the river and water systems 
of the wetter veld zones. Contacts between the San and Khoi ranged from 
economic and cultural interaction to open warfare. The Khoi regularly fought 
each other and the San for access to resources (chiefly water) and gradually 
pushed the hunters out of territory suitable for their pastoralism. Forced into 
the more arid fringes of the veld, the San in response raided Khoi cattle and 
sheep. It was natural for the San, attempting to keep own-force battle casualties 
to an absolute minimum, to adopt a strategy that allowed them to deny battle 
and focus on the enemy’s weakness.
The San used a variety of materials – ranging from stone and shell to plant fibres 
and animal products – and they fashioned, to a minor extent, their environment 
to make living easier. Yet, the areas they occupied were not uniform. Hunters in 
the drier territories migrated, while those in the wetter coastal areas were more 
sedentary. The patterns of migration conformed to the needs of the group: the 
presence of water or tracking game. Some San communities acquired domestic 
livestock from pastoralists some 2 000 years ago. The Khoi and San used the 
same weapons and tools, between which there was also little differentiation. 
Both possessed bows and arrows, bone-tipped spears and snares, and traps and 
digging sticks, which might be used to hunt and gather or defend territory. The 
effective range of the bows was limited – perhaps only 25 yards – but both the 
Khoi and the San were excellent field craftsmen.
European seafarers and shore parties – most notably the Portuguese and 
Dutch – made contact with Khoi groups all along the southern African coast 
from the Swakop River (at contemporary Swakopmund) to the Buffalo River (at 
contemporary East London). Further inland, in the mountains of the Western 
Cape and along the barren Northern Cape coast, they encountered San groups. 
European visitors recorded the relatively peaceful co-existence of the San with 
the western Khoi. C.F. Brink, who spent six months in the western hinterland in 
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1761, noted that the ‘Namaquas … live scattered in small kraals or villages and 
for the rest live without any captain, always in peace with one another. Their 
wealth consists only in cattle which they have in abundance.’63
Khoi villages comprised a circle of 30 to 50 huts, sometimes surrounded by 
a perimeter fence of brushwood. Some Khoi chiefs welded larger groups into 
more rigid polities. The Cochokwa (or Saldanhars), for example, are described 
by Dapper as living in a constellation of fifteen or sixteen camps comprising a 
total of 400 to 450 huts, and they were reported in 1659 to number more than 
16 000. The absence of fortifications and the element of surprise saw their 
defeat at the hands of a combined Charingurikwa-Namakwa force on the shores 
of Saldanha Bay in 1689.64 Unlike the San, the Khoi clans, though independent, 
formed such military alliances. While Van Riebeeck estimated that Khoi clans 
ranged from 300 arms-bearing men among the Gorinhaiquas to as many as 
8 000 among the Cochoquas, Kolb one hundred years later reckoned that the 
Great Nama could field an army of 20 000.65
Yet, with ample land, and Khoisan wealth situated in human life and 
livestock, flight made more sense to a nomadic people than putting up static, 
time-consuming ramparts or risking valuable human life. In any event, meagre 
enemy forces – Dutch expeditions, for example, seldom numbered more than 
25 men – could not round up a scattered objective. Ensign J.T. Rhenius, who 
commanded an expedition to the north of the Orange River in 1724, was told by 
four Amaqua spies that, upon seeing the Dutch, their people planned to ‘drive 
their cattle into the high mountain range and come with their fighting men to see 
if by night they could surprise us and kill us, making them master of our goods.’66 
In the face of a superior enemy, the Khoi defence was therefore one of dispersion 
rather than concentration in a fortified position.
With limited human resources, the Khoi avoided combat whenever possible 
and preferred strategies of migration. Yet, on two occasions, the Khoi adopted 
a persisting strategy: during the 1st (1659-1660) and 2nd VOC-Khoi Wars 
(1673-1677). On the first occasion, the Kaapenaars attempted to expel the Dutch 
from Table Bay; on the second, the Cochokwa of Saldanha waged war on the 
Dutch, again over land rights.67 Unfortunately, the Khoi left no written record of 
these clashes, and European soldiers who did, took little trouble to write about 
Khoi tactics. As a result, a number of critical questions remain unanswered; for 
example, how did Khoikhoi tactics fare against the Liesbeeck forts? Khoi oxen 
were trained for war, and by driving their cattle between themselves and an 
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enemy, the Khoi used their livestock as a moving rampart. This protective buffer 
not only shielded the Khoi troops, it was also used offensively to confuse the 
enemy and disrupt their battle order.
Yet, like the San, the Khoikhoi preferred to avoid close combat and in favour of 
long-range missile weapons (bow and arrow and throwing spear). The Khoi, all 
light infantry, were unable to storm the well-gunned castle. For their part, the 
Dutch lacked the information and mobility to locate the dispersed Peninsulars 
and force them to do battle. Neither side was able to defeat the other. The Khoi 
adhered to a successful raiding strategy, but were unable to dislodge the Dutch 
from their fortified positions. As such, the Dutch fortifications had as strategic 
rather than tactical value, and both wars had ambiguous outcomes.68
In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, in the manner of their forefathers, the 
Khoisan – by now groups of mixed descent, and known as the Kora or Koranna, 
Nama, and Griqua – migrated northwards, away from European expansion in 
the west and Nguni expansion from the east. Small and insecure, they embraced 
new technologies and soon possessed firearms and horses, which made them 
formidable adversaries along the Orange River.69 The advance of the Cape colonial 
frontier from the Berg River to beyond the Orange River during the course of the 
eighteenth century, and the impact this had on local Khoisan communities, is 
narrated by Nigel Penn.70



















300‑500 7 1,75 Victory
Zone 2 warfare: The eastern region of the central plateau
The 400 millimetres rainfall line forms a convenient border, from a military point 
of view, between the arid and semi-arid region of the western half of the country 
and the second zone. The eastern region of the central plateau is geographically 
centred on the highveld grasslands, an upland area that was the origin of the 
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west-flowing Vaal and Orange rivers as well as the eastward-flowing Limpopo 
and Crocodile systems. Much of the terrain is flat and cut by rivers that attracted 
dense settlements. It was the political and military opposite of zone one, where 
light infantry (chiefly bow and arrow) was the primary weapons system. In zone 
two, with adequate water and denser populations, larger states were formed. 
They were hierarchically organised and varied in size and strength. Although 
this was ideal cavalry country, the pre-colonial states of this region fielded large 
armies of spear-wielding, heavy infantry and tended to adopt combat strategies 
that manifested in pitched battles.
Most of the sources for this period are European in origin, with the attendant 
caveats. Several factors defined the African way of war and obscured European 
understanding of it. Writing in 1822, William Burchell described Tlhaping 
warfare as follows:
Their warfare consists rather in treacherously surprising their enemy, 
and in secretly carrying off their cattle, than in open and courageous 
attack or in any regular combat. Their stratagems have in view, rather 
to fall upon the objects of their hostility during their sleep, to invade 
their country unexpectedly, or to outnumber them, than to meet 
them in open day face to face, or to fight bravely on equal terms. But 
if neither honour or glory, agreeably to European notions of them, 
attend these petty wars; neither do streams of human blood stain 
their fields of battle: in their humble way, they boast as much of 
having killed six men in a single rencounter [sic], as civilized nations 
do, of as many thousands.71
Setting aside his obviously Eurocentric perspective, Burchell was accurate in his 
general observation that warfare in Africa assumed a wholly different character 
to warfare in Europe. Different concepts defined war and peace. Objectives were 
different. And the means to achieve them were unique. The understanding of 
African warfare, Malyn Newitt has argued:
… assumes a different dimension when one perceives that the formal 
manoeuvrings and clashes of armies or navies are but one end of a 
spectrum of violence which encompasses banditry, the enforcement 
of feudal power, forcible exaction of contributions or tributes, the 
enforcement of monopolies and other restrictions, raiding for slaves, 
cattle or other booty and even the crude competition for resources by 
starving peoples on the one hand and powerful vested interests on 
the other.72
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Utilising the full spectrum of violence, African forces occasionally defeated 
technologically superior European enemies. Reckless European commanders 
were rendered vulnerable by the skilful use of terrain, bush craft and surprise at 
which indigenous troops were past masters. 
Unlike the Nguni and their scattered homesteads, the Sotho generally lived in 
large, compact villages: Moffat saw ‘innumerable vestiges’ towns, some ‘miles 
in circumference’ and ‘entirely built of stones.’73 The first European eyewitness 
accounts of the Sotho date from 1801, when the British government at the Cape 
sent a cattle-seeking expedition under Truter and Somerville to the north. After 
1801 travellers and missionaries to the Sotho were numerous, and several left 
detailed journals describing large settlements with stone hut foundations and 
enclosing walls.74 Each household had its own compound comprising one or 
more huts and granaries in a courtyard surrounded by a reed fence or earthen 
wall (in Somerville’s time, a hedge), with a single narrow entrance. This fence, 
according to Burchell:
… was constructed of straight twigs and small branches, placed 
upright and parallel to each other, but so carefully interwoven, or 
connected, that they formed a defence so close and firm, that they 
were impenetrable to a hassagay and, at their lower part, even to a 
musket‑ball. … This fence from its solidity and strength, might rather 
be called a wall, than a hedge.75
Inside the courtyard, Somerville goes on:
… stands the hut with pillars of wood in front supporting the thatch 
roof, which extends over the mud wall forming a sort of portico or 
gallery. Within the house is also a second or inner mud wall enclosing 
a circular space – in which the master sleeps and above the more 
valuable movables are deposited. … The Huts are much superior in 
accommodation to those of the [Sotho] which are only a little more 
than a shelter from the rain.76
Barrow, another member of the 1801 expedition, reported that the houses of 
Dithakong, some 3 000 in number, were ‘walled up with clay and stones, to the 
height of about five feet.’77 Somerville described Dithakong’s situation ‘on the 
declivity of a bank greatly sloping to the margin of a small stream which runs 
along the bottom of it.’78 Campbell, who visited Kaditshwene, another Tswana 
town, in 1820 reported: ‘We were led … to an extensive enclosure surrounded 
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by a stone wall, except at the gate by which we entered … Every house was 
surrounded, at a convenient distance, by a good circular stone wall.’79
Stone was largely used for protection against lions, rather than to counter the 
attack of an enemy force. Fortifications assumed the place of many soldiers 
on the defence and, requiring neither rations nor fodder, vastly simplified the 
defenders’ supply problems. Although by their nature immobile, fortifications 
could support the attack by so economising on soldiers defending one place as 
to allow a superior concentration for offensive action elsewhere.80
The concentration of settlement on hilltops reflected both the degree of 
stratification in Sotho society as well as the military advantage of higher ground. 
Kay described Kaditshwene as standing ‘on the very summit of a mountain, 
on every side of which access is extremely difficult’; while Campbell described 
Maseu as being sited on ‘an eminence’.81 The position of Dithakong upon a 
slope bound by a river, combined with the firepower of Griqua allies, saved the 
Tlhaping and Tlharo during a concerted southern Sotho attack in June 1823. 
In 1878, the ridge and stone walls of Dithakong again protected the Tlhaping 
defenders; on this occasion against the colonial forces under Lanyon and 
Warren. Lanyon opened the engagement with an artillery bombardment and 
for three hours shells rained down on the Tlhaping entrenchment. This was 
followed by an assault on two fronts: Lanyon attacking with the cavalry on the 
left, and Warren leading the infantry across the open ground and up the ridge. 
Chiefs Jantjie and Luka and their men offered stiff resistance, undoubtedly aided 
by their defensive positions.82
Like the Sotho and Tswana, the Venda built both in stone and in inaccessible 
places for protection. According to Monica Wilson:
The capital Dzata, built by the incoming chiefs, though in ruins by 
1930, clearly showed stone walling of two types, and some of the 
mountain villages had stone walls and passages ‘built by the veterans 
still living in them.’ In 1931 Professor Kirby watched the building of 
a new capital for Sibasa, the Venda chief, with stone retaining walls 
for terraces and stone stairways and walls enclosing passages. The 
village’s plan was ‘a kind of maze in which a stranger could easily 
lose his way’, and the walls had breast‑high loopholes through which 
spears could be thrust.83
These towns may have seemed well protected, but there were techniques to 
take them, time and circumstance permitting. Besiegers sometimes built their 
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own earthen field fortifications around enemy strong points. Such lines of 
circumvallation not only helped besiegers resist sorties by the besieged, but 
also fully interdicted the besieged town’s communication with the outside. If the 
besiegers could effect a complete blockade, they could eventually starve it out, 
on condition of course that they could supply their own army for long enough. 
A successful siege required a great superiority in strength, sufficient to overcome 
the defenders, ensure an adequate flow of supplies, and still defeat or at least 
ward off a relief force. Besiegers often had to contend with an army attempting 
to rescue the town and sometimes protected themselves with fortified camps 
or lines of circumvallation, a second ring of field fortifications facing outward to 
fight off the relieving army.
Mzilikazi and his Ndebele had a different experience regarding defence. Moving 
into the Marico district, he and his people settled a vast territory with fewer 
features. Nonetheless, he developed a sophisticated area defence by fortifying 
the district. The frontiers were protected by a chain of garrison towns: Mosega 
in the south (under the command of Mkalipi), Tshwenyane, Koppieskraal and 
eGabeni, the most northern. Each of these was a relatively large settlement that 
protected the surrounding countryside and guarded a section of the frontier. 
To the west, where climate and terrain provided protection and the broken 
Bechuana tribes posed no threat of invasion, Mzilikazi relied on natural defence 
and therefore posted smaller numbers of warriors on the frontier. The bulk of 
the population lived and kept their cattle within this circle, often in the most 
inaccessible places. Kraals were sited on sloping, dry ground in the proximity of 
water and firewood, good pasturage and arable ground. A division under Kampu 
was maintained to range this central area and occasionally the banks of the 
Marico River. Each year, after the first fruits ceremony, Mzilikazi despatched his 
warriors on raiding expeditions.84
In January 1837 a Boer-Sotho coalition force attacked the Matabele kraals 
around Mosega. They attacked at first light: Hendrik Potgieter lead a frontal 
attack on Mkalipi’s kraal, while Gerrit Maritz turned its flank, from where he 
could fusillade the fugitives. Both Mzilikazi and Mkalipi, however, were at the 
royal kraal of eGabeni. The same strategy was followed at Tshwenyane, Marapu’s 
kraal. Then the Boers proceeded to an isolated hill where Kampu commanded 
a powerful Matabele garrison, and where, unbeknown to the Boers, Mzilikazi 
had assembled the remainder of his army. Here, anticipating Mzilikazi’s tactics, 
the Boer horsemen formed a long line, with extra weight on the flanks. They 
advanced slowly. Then the Matabele charged, the horns of the force spreading 
out to envelop the Boers, whose flanks galloped forward to meet the tips of 
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the horns and ‘blasted them asunder before they could meet in their encircling 
movement.’ The entire commando then concentrated its firepower on the chest of 
the formation, which soon collapsed. The warriors fell back to eGabeni, where a 
final battle was fought before Mzilikazi’s departure for modern-day Zimbabwe.85
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Zone 3 warfare: The mountainous escarpment
The nearly continuous escarpment of mountain ranges – sometimes gradual, 
but generally abrupt – between the coastal region and the plateau commences 
near the Tropic of Capricorn in the north-east and runs parallel to the coast. 
This is zone three. In effect, it encircles the central plateau to the west, south 
and east. As it passes southward, it gradually becomes more precipitous, with 
peaks rising to heights of over 3 000 metres in KwaZulu-Natal. From the south-
west end of the Drakensberg, the escarpment takes a westerly course, running 
along mountain ranges like the Stormberg, the Sneeuberg, the Nieuwveld and 
the Kornsberg, where for a time it becomes merged in the parallel ranges north 
of Cape Town.
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The mountainous escarpment provided refuge, first for the San in the face 
of the Nguni advance, and then, amidst the devastations of the Mfecane, to 
various scatterings, and became a place where new nations were forged. 
Here total destruction could be averted through sophisticated fortification 
and area defence. Moshoeshoe I (c.1788-1870), then still a petty chieftain of 
an insignificant clan of Sotho-speaking cattle breeders, skilfully utilised the 
terrain of the Maluti Mountains. In the early years of the Mfecane, Mantatisi had 
attempted to oust Moshoeshoe from his mountain stronghold at Butha-Buthe 
(‘place of lying down’). But, having survived, the young king realised that sooner 
or later Mtiwane and Mpangazita, the conquerors of Zululand, would besiege 
him, and that his chances of preventing the penetration of his defences were 
remote. He therefore moved to Thaba Bosiu (‘mountain at night’), a flat-topped 
mountain that overlooked the Caledon River valley. It was easily defendable, 
with the summits forming an almost unbroken chain of precipices and the base 
giving way to vast fertile plains. Piles of boulders were placed along the ridges 
overlooking the passes. Food supplies were replenished from the plains or by 
raids against enemy rearguards. Even the mighty Mzilikazi, after an unsuccessful 
and rather costly siege in March 1831, was convinced that Thaba Bosiu was 
impregnable.86 A more sedentary life could be enjoyed in zone three and, in this 
part of the escarpment, the constant trickle of refugees that joined Moshoeshoe 
eventually led to the birth of the Basotho nation.
In the next generations, following the Great Treks and then the expansion of 
British interests north of the Orange River, the escarpment proved a useful 
barrier to Boer strategists. In the Anglo-Boer War of 1880-1881, the Boer armies 
invested the British garrisons of the Transvaal, assumed the strategic offensive 
in the Natal Drakensberg, and then waited for the British to attack northwards 
into the precipitous northern apex of the colony. The strategy paid off. The 
distraction in the Transvaal drew the public and official gaze in Britain, while 
the relief army dispatched under Major-General Sir George Pomeroy Colley 
met with a trio of disasters, at Laingsnek, Schuinshoogte, and Majuba. The 
three battles saw an escalating British casualty rate (table 1.6) – Colley himself 
was killed at Majuba – and the British government, having lost the taste for an 
escalating, distant war, opened peace negotiations. A similar strategy by the 
Kruger government in 1899 held off larger British armies for several months.87
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Zone 4 warfare: The variety of the coastal plains
South Africa has a coastline of some 2 798 kilometres. The coastal plain rises 
gradually to an upland country, narrow on the east and west coasts, with 
terraced country or a gradual slope running up to the escarpment that marks the 
beginning of the expansive central plateau. The coastal zone has probably been 
the most vulnerable to external influence, both from the north and from across 
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the seas. It is therefore the zone most influenced, first by Asia and then from 
Europe, having been the site for trading posts and small garrisons, all offering 
spaces from which to penetrate the hinterland. As such, as historian Gail Natrass 
notes, ‘The coastal parts of South Africa have been the meeting place of diverse 
people for at least 500 years.’88
The country could not easily be invaded from the north-west. Historically, 
landward invaders were forced to use the bottlenecks on the north-eastern 
flank, making modern Mpumalanga and KwaZulu-Natal the scene of much 
military activity. Seaborne invasion took place at several sites along the coast, 
where secure bases were established for landward operations. However, these 
operations only saw sustained success when the military command took 
adequate notice of the military geography. Consequently, information on water 
resources – both for consumption and movement – gained in importance. The 
combination of these factors, and the creation of a meeting place for diverse 
peoples, ensured that zone four would be one of greater variety.
The coastal plains really formed two sub-zones: a western sub-zone, where 
cavalry predominated; and an eastern sub-zone, where infantry (mostly heavy 
but sometimes light) played a more important role. The western sub-zone, 
centred on a burgeoning Cape Town and an expanding frontier, was most 
affected by European influence. Here European settlers established ports and 
towns, from where the embryonic colony grew. Expansion most often took place 
through the parallel valleys of the southern Cape, yet neither firearms nor their 
perceived superior art of war conferred on them any sort of overarching power. 
Only the development of an Afro-European way of warfare, anchored in the 
commando system, brought success.89
For much of the eighteenth and nineteenth century, small African states were the 
rule in the eastern sub-zone. This remained so until the Mfecane, South Africa’s 
‘time of troubles.’ This part of the coastal zone is covered in part by a thick 
tropical rainforest, broken here and there by drier, more open country, and 
in part by lagoons, swamps and marshes. Able to support large numbers of 
people, the coastal plain accommodated large, densely populated states. Along 
the wide coastal plain numerous peoples found homes, large settlements were 
established, and there were good water supplies. However, as the Mpondo king 
Faku a Ngqungqushe (c.1780-1867) found during the violent convulsions that 
spread out in concentric circles during the forging of the Zulu nation, the plains 
remained vulnerable to further migrations from the north. As William Beinart 
has shown, peoples threatened by the Zulu and people displaced by them 
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concentrated for defence, resulting in increased chiefly control. The Mpondo, 
who were attacked continuously throughout the 1820s, were, under their chief 
Faku, victorious in many of these clashes. Executing a fine Fabian strategy, Faku 
withdrew into the dense coastal forests and refused battle, only counterattacking 
when the invaders least expected combat. By concentrating against weaker 
elements of the invader, the Mpondo managed to inflict several defeats. But, by 
the time of the second Zulu invasion in May 1828, Faku and his people were 
forced to flee, their settlements devastated and their harvests and herds seized. 
To the west of the Mzimvubu, they concentrated their settlements around 
Faku’s great place on the Mngazi and in river valleys nearby. Close settlement 
in prepared positions, possible only because of the absence of cattle, provided 
security, and the Mpondo remained in these valleys until at least 1838.90
As noted, terrain provided opportunities for warfare, but also set limits to human 
and, more specifically, military activity in both sub-zones. Cycles of wet and dry 
weather, resulting in periods of abundance or scarcity, destabilised proto-states 
and prompted migrations up or down the coastal zone or from the coastal zone 
into the hinterland. But there was a variation in weapons systems too, for in 
addition to this geographical gradient, there was a temporal one that witnessed 
the introduction of gunpowder and horses, which to southern Africa was an 
entirely new weapons system and weapon platform that threatened to change 
both the traditional method of waging wars and indeed also the very nature of 
the pre-colonial African state. Gunpowder weapons first played a role in the 
coastal waters when the Portuguese fired at startled Khoi in 1488. From here 
firearms gradually moved into the interior, but were not adopted by the Zulu and 
other Nguni for fear of the social and political change they would bring.91
The armies of the eastern zone of the coastal plains comprised almost solely of 
infantry. The main weapons were the throwing spear, and the knobkierie (wooden 
mace) and stabbing spear for shock action. Shaka and his predecessor, as we 
shall see, changed the face of warfare in southern Africa with the introduction of 
regiments of shock-action spearmen. The sometimes watery environment and 
thick vegetation made keeping horses impractical, and the wooded countryside 
made cavalry less attractive. Here infantry armies, armed mostly with shock 
weapons, predominated. Only in the far east, along the lower reaches of the 
Crocodile and Limpopo rivers, did marine forces exploit the water routes for 
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mobility and surprise. Here the Tsonga – employing watercraft – enjoyed a 
different vehicle for strategic mobility and tactical surprise.92
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Conclusion: Breaking camp
While South African history is written to a large extent with a red pen, the 
processes of state formation and patterns of warfighting differ greatly across 
the region, dependent upon historical time and geographic location. The general 
physical features of the country comprise a coastal plain, an interior plateau 
(the arid and semi-arid regions in the west and Highveld grasslands in the 
east), and an escarpment that marks the transition between the two. The varied 
geography makes for a ranging climate, mostly semi-arid, but subtropical along 
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the east coast. The veld, on account of its altitude and remoteness from the sea, 
is subject to marked temperature variations between winter and summer. There 
are extremes of heat and cold, and a general tendency for the temperature to 
become hotter in summer and cooler in winter. As this chapter shows, cautious 
commanders, throughout South African history, have taken cognisance of 
climate and topography in planning operations as well as in defence of their 
inhabited environment.
The effect of the physical environment in shaping strategy and military operations 
may be illustrated from African warfare. There are, as elsewhere, numerous 
crossing points between geography, society, military technology, and strategy and 
warfighting. These crossing points, or frontiers, include military differentiation 
(the nature and design of armed forces), considerations of strategy and tactics 
(including offensive and defensive operations), and the impacts of disease 
and ecological factors, as well as the boundaries marking perceived social and 
cultural differences. Such frontiers all interact within spatial locations, where 
human activity is influenced by a range of geographic variables, from terrain, 
soil and vegetation to precipitation, contours and catchment areas. These 
variables define ‘the carrying capacity and attractiveness of land’, something 
that varies considerably. In South Africa, in terms of water and habitability, it 
changes from near zero in the case of the Kalahari Desert to the most favoured 
regions of the Eastern Cape, KwaZulu-Natal, Mpumalanga, Limpopo, and the 
eastern stretches of the Free State. Water defined the differences in carrying 
capacity and ultimately also the attractiveness of territory.93 This attractiveness 
created competition for the natural resources and, in turn, fashioned the nature 
and style of resulting conflict.
As we have seen, the physical environment and its attractiveness for settlement 
produced four environments for war and politics. The armed forces of pre-colonial 
and colonial southern Africa varied from west to east and were defined by both 
the nature of the state and technological innovation, as well as the degree to 
which they were favoured by the physical environment. The western central 
plateau could support only minimal bands. Here merit ranked high and, although 
warfare was avoided, they could never field more than a few light infantry. Their 
political and military opposites were found on the eastern plateau, marked 
as it was by large polities, civil and military bureaucracy, and heavy infantry. 
The escarpment was a traditional refuge for small and medium-sized polities 
that in times of danger fielded medium-sized, sometimes coalition armies, 
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comprising mostly light infantry but also heavy infantry. This combination of 
weapons systems, with the early addition of mounted infantry emanating from 
the European settlements in the Western Cape, was found on the coastal plain. 
And so the interplay between water and the physical terrain helped define both 
the nature of the pre-colonial southern African state as well as the nature of the 
armies they fielded. These four environments are summarised in table 1.8.
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Combat Defensive: siege Combat
The armed forces of the coastal plains, and later a wider southern Africa, varied 
gradually from west to east depending on the nature of the state and the degree 
to which technologies were available, on the one hand, and on the other, the 
degree to which the physical environment favoured these technologies. Thus, 
as one moved westward from the arid and semi-arid regions, where there were 
no waterways and many combatants rode on horseback, one met land of cavalry 
mixed with infantry, an increasing number of rivers, and heavy precipitation. 
Going further east toward and across the escarpment, the infantry component 
became larger, and as one approached the coast, watercraft plied the navigable 
stretches of the Limpopo and Crocodile rivers.
Although the study of the military history of Africa is in its infancy, historians gain 
much by working at the crossing points to military geography. An exploration 
of the interplay between warfare and environment in southern Africa, for one, 
highlights processes and patterns, always difficult at best when treating a 
broad sweep of history without the benefit of insights from other disciplines. 
South Africa may be centred on the populous, wealthy Highveld, at the heart 
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of which lies the basin of the ancient Kaapvaal Craton and the rich rewards its 
rocks and soils yield. But equally so, South Africa is the desert, the mountains, 
and the coastal plains. There is clearly no single South Africa. This is a country 
of many zones and environments; a vast, complex region that has sustained and 
supported life for millennia. People travelled and traded, they hunted, and they 
fought wars. In this way, life on the Highveld grasslands interconnected with the 
coastal plains and the vast continent to the north. Life in these environments 
was diverse and complex, constantly challenged and enriched by intrusions, 
both cultural and economic, from regions exterior to it.
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CHAPTER 2
Saldanha Bay: The influence of underlying geology 
on military and naval history in the age of sail
Jacques Bezuidenhout & Thean Potgieter 
Introduction
Saldanha Bay is a remarkable natural harbour on the west coast of South Africa, 
about 100 kilometres north-northwest of Cape Town. The unique geological 
setting gave rise to the formation of a large, deep and sheltered bay and an 
excellent natural deep-water port. Ignimbrite eruptions dated at ~500 Ma 
resulted in a protective granite barrier that was superimposed on the less 
resistant older granite bedrock. These ignimbrite protrusions define the present 
coastline around the entrance of Saldanha Bay, with the Saldanha and Postberg 
ignimbrite complexes to the north and the south, respectively. Subsequent 
shales and sandstone deposits on the granite systematically eroded, forming 
the current coastal plain and Saldanha Bay. The inner part of Saldanha Bay and 
the Langebaan Lagoon was eroded on the inland side of a break in the coastal 
ignimbrite barrier.
Due to its location and usefulness to shipping, Saldanha Bay was one of the 
best natural harbours along the South African coast on the long sea route to 
the East in the days of sail. This was recognised even before the Dutch created 
a settlement at Table Bay in 1652. The Dutch were well aware of the unique 
attributes of the bay, but never developed it further, mostly due to its insufficient 
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sources of fresh water. During the next century and a half, Saldanha Bay was a 
valuable haven to shipping and also saw naval skirmishes. After conquering the 
Cape, the British realised the potential of Saldanha Bay as a naval base, but again 
it was not developed due to the lack of fresh water.
This chapter reviews the underlying geology of Saldanha Bay and demonstrates 
how it dictated the formation of the bay and impacted on the maritime and naval 
importance of the bay in the age of sail.
The geology of the Saldanha Bay area
The geology of the Saldanha Bay area is dominated by the so-called Cape Granite 
Suite, which outcrops amongst older Malmesbury shales and younger Cape 
Supergroup sandstones, from St Helena Bay in the west and almost to Knysna in 
the east (figure 2.1).1 These granitic rocks were emplaced between 560 to 520 Ma 
as part of a greater Saldania belt, during a global Pan-African orogenic event when 
drifting tectonic plates merged into the Gondwana-Pangea supercontinent. The 
western part of the Cape Granite Suite (figure 2.1) was emplaced within three 
NW-SE trending terranes, separated by major tectonically faulted boundaries, of 
which the most prominent, the Colenso fault zone, runs just NE of Saldanha Bay, 
from Trekoskraal in the NW to Franschhoek in the SE. For some yet unknown 
reason, the Colenso fault zone also acts as a boundary between two different 
sub-types of granitic rocks, referred to as more northeasterly located I-types 
and more southwesterly located S-types on the basis of geochemical, and other, 
characteristics, where S-type magmas are likely derived through partial melting 
of a sedimentary crustal source.”2 For all practical purposes, S-types tend to be 
more aluminous than I-types, as reflected by the presence of aluminous mafic 
minerals, and are consistent with a more clay-rich (pelitic) source, such as the 
Malmesbury shales that the granites are hosted in.
As displayed by Cape Town’s Table Mountain, the Cape Granite Suite was relatively 
soon after its emplacement deeply eroded to a peneplain, before the ~500 Ma 
onset of the deposition of a thick cover of fluvial sandstones, constituting the 
Cape Supergroup.3 The Chapman’s Peak drive is built primarily along such an 
unconformity between the older Cape Granite Suite and the Cape Supergroup. 
However, no Cape Supergroup are exposed within the Saldanha area, where 
the Cape Granite Suite is instead eroded even further, and unconformably 
overlain by much younger raised beaches and sand dunes deposited during 
Pleistocene interglacial high sea levels. This is very well illustrated at Hoedjies 
Point, where a sub-horizontal top surface of a weathered coarse-grained S-type 
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granite, ~2-4 metres above the current sea level, is overlain by large rounded 
beach boulders amongst sea shells, exactly as can be observed on the lower lying 
active beach. This obvious beach deposit is then overlain by several layers of 
finer grained sand dune deposits, all of which have been weakly lithified into 
the Pleistocene deposits that cover large parts of the Saldanha area’s underlying 
Cape Granite Suite (figure 2.1), together with even younger and more loose 













Figure 2.1 A geological map of the Cape Granite Suite in the western part of the 
Saldania Belt (compiled from various sources)
Source: Based on Theron et al. (1992), Belcher et  al. (2003) and compiled by Villaros (2010)4
Jacques Bezuidenhout & Thean Potgieter
50
As mentioned, S-type granite intrusions dominate the more coastal Tygerberg 
Terrane of the Cape Granite Suite, located SW of the Colenso fault zone.5 In 
greater detail, however, the most seaward part of the bay area is dominated 
by a very special granitic unit, known as Saldanha-Postberg ignimbrite (or 
quartz porphyry), which gives rise to the prominent hills that protect the 
inner bay. This ignimbrite is distinctly different from the otherwise coarser 
grained S-type granites with typically up to five-centimetre-large rectangular 
feldspar megacrysts, which appear to weather and erode more easily. The 
Saldanha-Postberg ignimbrite is exposed farther inland, behind the protective 
ignimbrites. Although similar quartz porphyritic rock types are also found 
elsewhere as obvious dyke-like intrusions – for example, at Cape St Martin 
(Otto, 1957)6 – Scheepers and Poujol (2002)7 were the first to propose that the 
Postberg peninsula was made up of ignimbrites, and Clemens and Stevens (2016)8 
followed this up by including the Saldanha portion as part of a larger ignimbrite 
complex, possibly related to a coinciding volcanic caldera. In several places, the 
ignimbrite is observed in contact with the coarser feldspar megacrystic granite, 
which relationships consistently indicate to be an older host rock.9
Ignimbrites have a very specific volcanic origin. They form after very explosive 
plinian eruptions collapse upon itself and its hot pyroclastic material (mainly 
consisting of glassy ash particles, but also unfragmented pumice clasts) is 
deposited within topographical depressions as so-called pyroclastic density 
currents. Thus, Saldanha’s coarser feldspar megacrystic granite must have been 
eroded to the current outcrop level for it to have been overlain by an ignimbrite. 
Moreover, if these currents are hot enough, a thick flow can eventually fuse 
together into a welded ignimbrite, which is much stronger than a non-welded 
ignimbrite tuff. In fact, this could be the underlying lithological reason why the 
Saldanha-Postberg appears to be so much more resistant to mechanical erosion 
than the area’s other granites. Under the microscope, the rock is characterised 
by more or less broken larger crystals of mainly quartz and feldspar, set in a 
very fine-grained matrix, which is thought to have been welded together 
with the pre-existing phenocrysts. In outcrop, the rock is also characterised 
by the presence of more or less flattened enclaves, which are interpreted as 
representing non-fragmented pumice clasts that were hot and soft enough to 
deform beneath the weight of the flow.
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Figure 2.2 A geological map of the Saldanha Bay area (originally by Scheepers & 
Armstrong, 2002, and modified by Clemens & Stevens, 2016)10 indicating the 
distribution of various pre-volcanic S-type granitic intrusions and the outcrop 
areas of the volcanic ignimbrites of the Postberg and Saldanha peninsula




Figure 2.3 Geology along the Bomsgat contact. (a) Stitched image overview, looking 
SSW, across the Bomsgat locality, the Saldanha Bay inlet and the Postberg 
peninsula on the horizon (see figure 2.2). Note the youngest Pleistocene 
deposits overlie the area’s oldest granites to the left, and the sharp and 
moderately SW-dipping contact between the older granite and a more 
competent ‘ignimbrite’ to the right. Both contacts are roughly correlated by 
yellow dotted lines, and, in the latter case, to another exposed contact across 
Marcus ‘island’. Also note the two prominent SW-NE-trending gullies, along 
which possible major fault zones may have been preferentially altered and 
eroded. (b) Detail of the lowermost raised beach deposits, 2-4 metres above 
similar current beach deposits of large rounded ignimbrite boulders and 
seashells. (c) Detail of older granite, with its characteristic larger pale feldspar 
megacrysts, as well as one of many and variable types of enclaves that are 
typically hosted within this rock unit. (d) Detail of ignimbrite contact against 
the older host granite, locally made up of (i) a lower aphyric and very fine-
grained contact zone, (ii) a porphyritic banded zone, and (iii) an upper, more 
massive porphyritic rock that characterises the rest of this unit.11
As one accepts that the Saldanha-Postberg ignimbrite is more resistant to 
mechanical erosion, and possibly also chemical weathering, than all other 
rock types in the area, it becomes obvious that Saldanha Bay’s natural harbour 
formed as coarser grained, yet less competent, inland megacrystic granite was 
more deeply eroded behind the ignimbrite’s protective barrier to the ocean. 
The reason why there is a harbour entrance right through the middle of such a 
‘barrier’ is more speculative, but is consistent with the Postberg and Saldanha 
areas being two separate ignimbrites. However, if these two areas are parts of the 
same coherent unit, then it is also possible that the rock was locally weakened by 
tectonic faults, where the harbour entrance could then have been eroded by the 
sea. Such NE-SW-trending faults, at right angles to the coast line, are observed 
in outcrops along the harbour entrance and could intensify towards the deeper 
part of the channel.
Within the wide erosional depression that formed behind the ignimbrite barrier, 
a locally deeper inner bay is probably being maintained through oceanic forces 
and the sedimentary outlet provided by the outer bay channel. The continuous 
curve of the inner bay beach is likely shaped by diffraction of ocean swells 
as these move through the outer narrow channel inlet between Elands Point 
(originally “Eilands”) and the Hoedjies Point to Marcus Island barrier. Similar 
wave diffraction may also be responsible for other characteristically curved 
smaller beaches along the sides of the outer bay. Otherwise, the inner bay 
area only exposes some sporadic coarser grained granite outcrops amongst 
predominantly younger sedimentary deposits, including both more lithified 
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Pleistocene calcretes and unconsolidated recent beaches and dunes. Only 
four small granite protrusions of coarser feldspar megacrystic granites (the 
Hoedjiespunt granite in figure 2.2) interrupt the inner bay beach at Leentjiesklip 
1-3, and Lynch Point; whereas three different granite types (Langebaan, 
Trekoskraal and Seeberg granites, figure 2.2) have been mapped farther inland. 
Even though all of these inland intrusions appear to be less competent than the 
Saldanha-Postberg ignimbrite, there also appears to be some subtle competence 
that allows some to outcrop as more resistant hills than others.
Farther south, the shallow lagoon is apparently not located behind any protective 
ignimbrite, but is still separated from the sea along a narrow barrier of both 
lithified Pleistocene and more recent sand dunes and beaches. This might still be 
a consequence of the ignimbrite protrusions, however, as prevalent northward 
coastal drift along Sixteen Mile Beach has linked up with the Postberg ‘island’ as 
a narrow peninsula.
The geological features around Saldanha Bay provide protection for ocean-going 
vessels against various weather conditions. The bay is mainly divided into three 
parts, each with its own unique features. These parts are the outer bay, the inner 
bay and the lagoon, as marked in figure 2.4. The outer bay is at the entrance from 
the Atlantic Ocean, between the Saldanha and Postberg ignimbrite complexes to 
the north and south, respectively. The shores of the outer bay are consequently 
lined by weathered ignimbrite due to its constant exposure to the Atlantic 
Ocean swells. The passage from the outer bay to the inner bay runs between 
Hoedjies Point to Marcus Island and Elands Point (see figure 2.4), which is 
roughly on the contact of the Saldanha ignimbrite against the older host granite 
(Hoedjiespunt granite). The shores of the inner bay are mainly lined with sandy 
beaches, with occasional S-type granitite protrusions of the same origin of that 
at Hoedjies Point.
The inner bay provides protected anchorage from both southerly and northerly 
winds. The southerly winds occur during spring and summer. They can reach 
gale-force strength and usually blow for protracted periods. Strong northerly 
winds that are associated with winter frontal systems can also gust up to storm 
strength and higher.12 The granite outcrops to the north and the islands to the 
south of the inner bay consequently provide shelter for ships all year round. The 
southern part of the inner bay forms a channel between the Postberg complex 
and the Langebaan granite porphyry into the lagoon. The Langebaan Lagoon is a 
large saltwater wetland with sand banks that are generally exposed during low 
tides. The northern part of the lagoon, around the islands, is deeper and allows 
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for navigation by smaller ocean-going vessels. There are no perennial fresh 
water sources apart from a few small fountains that occasionally last through 
the dry and warm summer.
 
Figure 2.4 A geological map (adapted from figure 2.3) indicating the outer, inner and 
lagoon parts of Saldanha Bay, as well as major granite protrusions (islands 
and points are indicated in italics, and hills with arrows) in and around the bay
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The importance of Saldanha Bay to shipping in the age of sail
The Cape of Good Hope is located at the southern tip of Africa, literally halfway 
to the East, which made it not only a valuable refreshment post for in- and 
outbound ships along the sea route, but also a base of strategic importance to 
maritime empires. Though it is usually associated with Table Bay (or Cape Town), 
the winter anchorage in Simon’s Bay and the Simon’s Town naval base, the term 
Cape of Good Hope implies much more than just the Cape Peninsula. It refers to 
the southern tip of Africa, with Cape Town at its centre; the west and southern 
Cape coasts, with anchorages and locations for provisioning ships; as well as the 
interior, with its agriculture and resources crucial for the shipping service and 
for sustaining this strategically important settlement.
Of note for this discussion is Saldanha Bay. It is certainly evident that the 
strategic importance of the bay was recognised by seafarers even before the 
Dutch settlement was established in Table Bay (later Cape Town) in 1652. 
However, this acknowledgement resulted from its unique natural history and 
geological features and their associated value to shipping, rather than its human 
and socio-economic history and value.
The bay was named Aguada de Saldanha (the watering place of Saldanha) 
after the Portuguese seafarer Antonio de Saldanha, on the mistaken belief that 
it was here that De Saldanha had watered his three ships in September 1503. 
However, De Saldanha had actually watered in Table Bay, which was referred 
to as the Aguada de Saldanha until November 1601, when the Dutch explorer 
Joris van Spilbergen on his route to the East sailed past Saldanha Bay, believing 
that it was the Aguada de Saldanha. Van Spilbergen did not anchor in Saldanha 
Bay but in Table Bay, and thinking he had ‘discovered’ a new bay he called it 
Table Bay after the impressive flat-topped Table Mountain on the southern 
shore of the bay.13 Despite its barrenness and lack of fresh water, in error the 
name Saldanha Bay remained. 
After 1652, when the Dutch East India Company (Verenigde Oost-Indische 
Compagnie, or ‘VOC’) established a post at the Cape of Good Hope, Saldanha Bay 
became an important replenishment post on the route to the East. However, 
the bay only gained true strategic value during the late eighteenth century, 
essentially due to the British conquest of India, the exponential expansion of the 
British Empire in the East, and the British preoccupation with the security of the 
vulnerable sea route linking Britain to the Eastern wealth (as the rich maritime 
trade had to round the Cape).14
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Figure 2.5 Johannes Vingboons, Kaart van de Saldanhabaai, Tafelbaai, Houtbaai en de 
Baai Fals (circa 1665)15
The defence of the Cape rested on two variables. On the one hand, the Cape 
Peninsula was a naturally fortified position, thanks to the inhibiting coastline and 
windy conditions that posed a challenge to shipping and amphibious operations; 
on the other, its defence was improved by a system of man-made fortifications 
and a standing military force, as the VOC placed much emphasis on defending 
the Cape Peninsula against a foreign attack and landing.16 With the expansion 
of the VOC colony at the Cape, outposts were established along the extensive 
coastline at locations such as False Bay, Hout Bay, Saldanha Bay, St Helena Bay, 
Mossel Bay and Plettenberg Bay. When foreign or enemy ships were sited, 
soldiers at the outposts had to inform the Cape authorities and in times of war 
had to move livestock, draught animals and wagons into the interior. However, 
enemy landings at Saldanha Bay, St Helena Bay or Mossel Bay were considered 
unlikely, as it would be very difficult to wage a campaign over the long distances 
with poor roads and without sufficient draught animals, wagons and horses.
From a shipping, military and defensive point of view, the VOC recognised the 
excellent properties of Saldanha Bay: it provided good anchorage and could be 
defended by placing strong fortifications on both sides of the entrance and on 
Marcus Island (in the middle of the entrance to the inner bay). However, Saldanha 
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Bay was not utilised and developed as a harbour, because it had little fresh water 
(specifically in summer, when very little rain would fall) and insufficient wood, 
as there were virtually no trees in the area. Wood was of great importance as fuel 
on land and at sea, and also crucial for ship repairs.
Figure 2.6 A Dutch chart of Saldanha Bay based on a French chart drawn from 
information provided by French seamen in 1666. Though it is not very 
accurate and more accurate maps and charts of the bay were produced soon 
afterwards, of note is the nautical importance of Saldanha Bay already at 
this stage, with a clear indication of where to anchor and where water could 
be found.17
Due to the interest of other European countries, notably the French, in Saldanha 
Bay, VOC soldiers were intermittently posted there from 1666, and in 1685 
the VOC outpost “Saldanha Baaij” became permanent. The post holder had to 
despatch a mounted messenger to the Cape to report the arrival and departure 
of ships. If foreign ships put into the bay in need of provisions, they would receive 
just enough (excluding wheat or flower), to reach Table Bay or False Bay.18
As the VOC did not fortify the entrance of Saldanha Bay, it was virtually impossible 
to prevent an amphibious landing along its shores due to its size and long calm 
beaches. Its greatest defence however, was in its near desert-like surroundings 
with its lack of fresh water and its distance from the Cape, which, it was believed, 
would dissuade aggressors. Nonetheless, if enemy warships entered the bay in 
wartime, the post holder and his men had to remove all livestock and destroy 
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all the provisions they could not remove. The post holder was also ordered to 
ensure that, should such an eventuality arise, burghers living in the area were 
also instructed to move their livestock, wagons, draught animals, food and all 
material that might be of assistance to an enemy, into the interior.19
From a shipping point of view, Saldanha Bay was excellent. Nearly enclosed by 
land, it provided a number of safe anchorages in all weather conditions, and due 
to a relatively narrow and deep entrance, in normal conditions there was no 
large swell inside the bay. The standing sailing orders that the VOC issued to its 
ships’ captains contained detail on the sea conditions around the Cape, prevailing 
winds, instructions on the use of Table Bay, navigating into Saldanha Bay, the 
situation in Hout Bay, and sailing directions for entering False Bay and anchoring 
in Simon’s Bay.20 It was commonly known and understood that in bad weather or 
when strong southerly winds blew ships out of the roadstead in Table Bay, they 
could hide in Saldanha Bay.21
As early as 1683, VOC instructions to their skippers indicated that ships using 
the southerly anchorages in Saldanha Bay (Salamanderbaai or close to Meeuwen 
Island), should enter the bay by sailing close to the southern shore, and keep 
Jutten and Marcus Islands to port until reaching the anchorage at Salamanderbaai, 
close to Meeuwen Island (now Meeu Island), or to the north of Schaapen Island 
(now referred to as Skaap Island). Ships anchoring in Hoedjies Bay were to keep 
Marcus Island to starboard and Hoedjies Point to port (thus entering between 
the two).22 However, VOC ships used the anchorage at Salamander and Meeuwen 
more often due to its proximity to the VOC post and the fresh water supply.
Ships often anchored in Saldanha Bay to hide in bad weather, or from gale force 
winds, before continuing their voyage. Some ships were despatched there from 
the Cape to overwinter, or for repairs.23 During the summer months, ships en 
route to the East might find it difficult to make headway upon reaching the 
coast to the north of Saldanha Bay due to strong southerly winds coupled with 
the northward flowing Benguela current. One such example was the VOC East 
Indiaman Voorschoten: in April 1688 she could not reach the anchorage in 
Table Bay due to strong headwinds and had to disembark the French Huguenots 
she had on board in Saldanha Bay.24
Many ships had to put into Saldanha Bay due to an emergency. These ranged 
from storm damage to the rigging, leaks or damage to the hull, and a shortage 
of food and water, to a lack of crew on board due to illness, diseases or deaths 
during a voyage. Moreover strong headwinds, currents and bad weather could 
Jacques Bezuidenhout & Thean Potgieter
60
make it difficult to continue to Table Bay. From the data provided by Roux and 
Sleigh it is evident that during the VOC era (1652-1795), roughly 140 ships had 
to put into Saldanha Bay after experiencing some or other emergency at sea. 
However, the list is not exhaustive and does not include vessels that the Cape 
authorities sent to Saldanha to overwinter, for repairs, or due to war in Europe.25 
Thanks to its calm waters and three flat beaches (on its northern, eastern and 
western shores) damaged ships were often sent to Saldanha Bay for repairs, 
with the Hoedjies Bay beach especially well-suited for caulking and careening 
of ships. During the VOC era, an estimated 61 damaged ships were sent to 
Saldanha Bay for repairs: nineteen between 1750 and 1795 alone,26 and about 
70 ships between 1653 and 1805.27 Repairs consisted mostly of patching up 
leaks below the waterline, repairs to the hull; and in some cases ships were 
caulked. Repairs to smaller vessels were done mostly along the eastern shore 
of the bay, to the south of Schaapen Island. Larger vessels such as flute ships 
(‘fluitskepe’), East Indiamen and frigates were repaired in Hoedjies Bay, because 
the deeper draft of these ships made it difficult for them to navigate the narrow 
and shallow channel between Schaapen Island and the eastern shore of the bay.
As Saldanha Bay had no dry-dock, quay or onshore repair facilities, ships were 
caulked on the beach. With the spring high tide the ship destined for caulking 
was brought as high up onto the beach as possible, and when the tide went 
out, she would be pulled over to her other side, if necessary. She could then 
be floated again with the next spring high tide. In September 1799 the sloop 
HMS Rattlesnake was damaged in a skirmish with the French frigate Preneuse 
in Algoa Bay. As the Rattlesnake required urgent repairs, she was sent to 
Saldanha Bay to be caulked. The whole process from preparing the ship, rigging 
her down to floating, and then rigging her up again was recorded in detail in the 
journal of one of her officers. It provides an interesting record of how the process 
unfolded, the experiences of the crew, while it is also a good topographical 
description of the bay.28
Though the potential of the Saldanha Bay for shipping and from a military 
strategic perspective was evident, water was an obvious problem that prevented 
further development. The best source of water along the shores of the bay was 
the fountain on the eastern shore of the Langebaan Lagoon (‘Oostenwal’), which 
was utilised to provide a sustainable supply of fresh water in the late eighteenth 
century, but this source too proved inadequate.29
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Figure 2.7 Isaak van Es, Kaart van de Saldanhabaai (circa 1792)30
After the British conquest of the Cape in 1795, the strategic potential of Saldanha 
Bay as naval base was emphasised, specifically as it provided good protection 
against gale-force winds. Barrow (an official and writer closely associated with 
the first British occupation and a strong proponent of British control over the 
Cape) considered Saldanha Bay as ‘one of the best harbours, perhaps, in the 
whole world … [many] ships may lie in perfect security at all seasons of the 
year.’31 Barrow made a number of suggestions to solve the fresh water problem, 
including deep wells and a channel from the Berg River to Saldanha Bay. As an 
easier option, he suggested that the British install a pipeline from the spring at 
Witteklip (at the current Vredenburg) ‘about six miles distant.’32 The Royal Navy 
commander at the Cape, Admiral Curtis, saw piping fresh water as only part of 
the solution, and emphasised that creating a naval base at Saldanha Bay would 
require extensive shore facilities, proper fortifications, a garrison and a water 
reservoir.33 However, for nearly a century and a half, these ambitious ideas came 
to nought.
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The Battle of Saldanha Bay, 1781: Disaster for the VOC
Due to its strategic location at the southern tip of Africa, the Cape of Good Hope 
was a crucial link in the maritime communication chain with the East during the 
late eighteenth century. As British interest in India grew, Britain became anxious 
about the security of the sea route. Specifically, should the Dutch and the French 
become allies in a war against Britain, the French presence at the Cape had the 
potential to be very problematic, as traffic could be interdicted and power could 
be projected from the Cape to the East. Moreover, it would deprive Britain of an 
important replenishment post.
Britain recognised that control of the Cape was central to its strategic interests, 
but as it was in Dutch hands and usually well defended in time of war, it would 
have to be taken by force. This implied despatching a strong naval contingent 
with troops and supply ships from Britain, establishing local sea control at the 
Cape, landing troops and equipment on enemy soil, and conducting operations 
ashore – a considerable undertaking, especially considering the distance over 
which power had to be projected.
The Dutch remained neutral during the Seven Years’ War, but on the 20th of 
December 1780, during the American War of Independence, Britain declared 
war on the Dutch Republic (the Fourth Anglo-Dutch War, 1780-1784). Even 
before Dutch involvement in the conflict, the VOC had reminded the Governor of 
the Cape of Good Hope, Baron Joachim van Plettenberg, that defending the Cape 
against enemy ships was extremely important,34 and ordered him to improve 
the artillery, fortifications and magazines of the Cape.35 However, with no naval 
force, insufficient fortifications, and only a small garrison (530 regulars), the 
local militia and a locally raised Khoi unit to defend it, the Cape defences were 
underfunded and wholly inadequate.
Given this precarious situation, the Netherlands requested French assistance 
after the outbreak of the war with Britain. The French acceded, and when French 
intelligence reported that a British expeditionary force (under Commodore 
George Johnstone) had sailed for the Cape in March 1781, Admiral Pierre 
André de Suffren was despatched with a naval force and troops to prevent the 
Cape from falling into British hands. At Porto Praya, in the Cape Verde Islands, 
De Suffren stumbled upon Johnstone’s force while the British were at anchor 
and replenishing. De Suffren immediately went on the attack, damaging some of 
the British ships and throwing Johnstone off balance. This made it possible for 
the French to be the first to arrive at the Cape, on 20 June 1781.36
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Johnstone arrived in Cape waters a month later, and, upon capturing the ship Held 
Woltemade off Saldanha Bay, learned that De Suffren had already disembarked 
French troops.37 As De Suffren’s ships were also at the Cape, Johnstone decided 
not to attack it, but to rather focus on the five richly laden VOC East Indiamen 
that, according to the Held Woltemade, were at anchor in Saldanha Bay. On 
21 July, Johnstone sailed into Saldanha Bay and immediately attacked the ships.
The Captain of the Hoogcarspel, Gerrit Harmeijer, was appointed as Commodore 
of the VOC squadron and instructed to make defence preparations to safeguard 
the ships.38 These preparations included anchoring the ships close to each other 
in a line-ahead formation to the north of Schaapen Island, the between-deck 
spaces and cabins had to be cleared for guns, and all the guns had to be mounted 
on the seaward side of the ships to create a strong defensive battery. The spars 
and topmasts had to be slashed together and secured with light anchors in a 
semicircle to the seaward side of the ships, to defend them against fire-ships 
and make it difficult for other vessels to come alongside and board them. They 
also had to remove the sails from the ships, take various measures to ensure 
that the ships were not immediately ready to sail and that it would take major 
repairs to get them seaworthy, and they were instructed to rather destroy 
their ships than surrender them to an enemy.39 In addition, they had orders 
to create fortifications in the entrance to the bay. Though the record indicates 
that Harmeijer and his captains did create a makeshift battery with thirteen 
light guns close to ‘Hoedjiespunt’, it was of no real military value, and they also 
anchored the ships in ‘Hoedjiesbaai’ and not to the north of Schaapen Island, as 
they had been instructed.40
The Dutch lookout hoisted the warning flag from De Uitkijck, Postberg, at 09:30. 
The British ships initially flew French flags, but at about 10:30, with sixteen ships 
already in the bay, they hoisted British flags.41 Many members of the Dutch crews 
were ashore, and as their captains realised that they could not defend their ships 
against Johnstone’s heavy warships, they chopped off anchor cables, hoisted the 
foretopsails (left on board to beach the ships), and, in some cases, set their ships 
alight.42 The Dutch offered no resistance: within thirty minutes of receiving the 
message that the British were coming Commodore Harmeijer set the example by 
fleeing from his ship without firing a shot or setting his ship alight.43 The British 
fired a few salvos at the Dutch, which only increased the speed of their flight. By 
12:00, the leading British ships reached the VOC ships, anchored, lowered boats 
and took possession of the Dutch ships before the remaining defenders had time 
to damage or destroy them.44 The British were able to quickly extinguish the fires, 
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except on the Middelburg, whose Captain, Justinus van Gennep, took his orders 
seriously and made sure that his ship would be destroyed.45 The Dutch crews 
who had to ensure that their ships were set alight were ashore at about 12:00.46
Figure 2.8 Capture of VOC ships in Saldanha Bay (21 July 1781), by Lieutenant 
D’Auvergne of HMS Lark. The map provides considerable operational detail, 
including the position of ships.47
The loss of the ships was a severe blow for the financially struggling VOC. They 
severely reprimanded the Cape Governor, Van Plettenberg, for leaving the ships 
unprotected in Saldanha Bay instead of sending them to Cape Town or False Bay, 
where they would have been under the protection of De Suffren’s ships.48 As a 
whole, the Anglo-Dutch War accelerated the ruin of the VOC and was disastrous 
to the Dutch state. It also illustrated that sea power would determine the fate of 
the Cape in times to come.
The Battle of Saldanha Bay, 1796: British defensive triumph
In 1792 the French Revolutionary War commenced, as France declared war first 
against Austria and Britain, and in 1793 against the Netherlands. The Cape of 
Good Hope was in Dutch hands, but due to its strategic location on the sea route 
to India, Britain regarded it as vital for the security of the shipping that carried 
Eastern riches to Britain. Late in 1794, France invaded the Netherlands, and 
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the new Dutch State (the Batavian Republic) became an ally of France and an 
enemy of Britain. This caused considerable anxiety about the security of British 
shipping, as the Cape could become a base for French privateers.49
Figure 2.9 Capture of the Dutch East India Company fleet in Saldanha Bay in 1781, by 
Thomas Luny (1759-1837). Though Luny was a prolific maritime painter of the 
period, it is evident from the dramatic and fanciful painting that he was not 
present at the event and had not been to Saldanha Bay.50
Thus, in early 1795, zealous preparations were put in motion for an expedition to 
capture the Cape. Vice Admiral Sir George Keith Elphinstone (later Lord Keith), 
an experienced and capable naval officer, was appointed as commander of the 
task force and “Commander in Chief in all the Indian Seas”, with full powers to 
fight or negotiate, depending on the circumstances.51 The Army commanders 
were Major Generals Sir James Henry Craig and Alured Clarke. The British 
arrived in False Bay on 11 June 1795 and tried to negotiate a Dutch surrender. 
When negotiations failed, a military campaign ensued, with the Dutch offering a 
poor defence and finally capitulating on 16 September 1795.
Britain established its authority firmly at the Cape and also established a naval 
base at Simon’s Town. The British were very concerned about the security of the 
Cape: they feared a French-Dutch attack, and the situation in the interior was 
also far from calm. Although General Craig improved the fortifications around 
Cape Town, Elphinstone still emphasised to the Admiralty that the first line 
in the defence of the Cape was the Royal Navy as ‘the safety of this place must 
depend on the Fleet …’52
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This was the heyday of the Royal Navy. It was a well administered, well trained, 
experienced and extremely competent force, crucial for securing Britain and 
her global interests.53 By comparison, the navies of France and the Netherlands 
were inferior, having lost much of their proficiency due to the removal of many 
capable aristocratic officers following revolution and political changes. The 
Batavian Republic did not enforce proper naval policy, and, due to their political 
affiliation, many inexperienced junior officers were quickly appointed and 
promoted in the place of more experienced officers of the old regime. The result 
was a lack of esprit de corps, poor discipline, distrust between officers and crews, 
poor maintenance, logistical problems and financial difficulties.54
In January 1796, British intelligence reported that the Dutch were equipping a 
squadron at Texel to recapture the Cape (with possible French assistance). The 
British government immediately reinforced the Cape with additional warships 
and troops to place it on a strong defensive footing.55 The nine ships of the Dutch 
squadron (two ships of the line, three frigates, three smaller warships and one 
transport) departed from Texel on 23 February 1796, under the command of 
Rear Admiral Engelbertus Lucas. On 6 August, after a long and taxing voyage, 
they anchored in Saldanha Bay, to the north of Schaapen Island. They had very 
little water, many crewmen were ill, and due to much dissent amongst the crews, 
operationally they were in poor shape. When Lucas tried to gain intelligence 
about the military situation at the Cape, the locals warned him about the strong 
British force and suggested that he leave immediately. In spite of this, the Dutch 
took down their sails to be repaired and commenced with the long process of 
watering their ships from the sparse water supply on hand. Despite a strong 
southerly wind, Lucas even ordered the frigate Bellona around the treacherous 
Schaapen Island and anchored her opposite Stompe Hoek on 11 August to provide 
fire support at the watering place. He was labouring under the false expectation 
that a French squadron would arrive soon, when in fact a squadron under Rear 
Admiral De Sercey had already rounded the Cape bound for Mauritius.56
When Craig received news that Dutch ships were seen in the vicinity of Saldanha 
Bay on 3 August, he immediately alerted Elphinstone and dispatched cavalry 
to Saldanha Bay. Elphinstone thought the Dutch would round the Cape, and so, 
despite terrible weather conditions, he directly sailed out in a southerly direction, 
hoping to intercept them.57 In the meanwhile, Craig learned on 6 August that the 
Dutch were at anchor in Saldanha Bay. Fearing that they might move into the 
interior, he issued proclamations prohibiting contact with the Dutch (on pain of 
death) and ordered all cattle and horses to be moved into the interior.58 He also 
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dispatched an advance force to Saldanha Bay, and marched with his main force 
(2 500 soldiers and eleven guns) on 14 August, leaving 4 000 troops to defend 
the Cape.
On 12 August, Lucas received word that about 600 British soldiers (Craig’s 
vanguard) were approaching. With no reliable intelligence on the movements 
of the British squadron, some of his officers feared that they might be trapped, 
and urged him to sail for Mauritius immediately.59 Lucas dithered, but eventually 
decided to depart on 14 August, once his ships were watered.60
When Elphinstone arrived back in Simon’s Bay on 12 August, he learned that 
the Dutch were at anchor in Saldanha Bay. He wanted to sail to Saldanha Bay 
immediately, but this was impossible, due to storm damage to most of his ships in 
what he described as ‘the most tempestuous weather I have ever experienced’61 
and the fierce south-easterly gale that still raged.62 The next day saw more 
damage while numerous ships even dragging their anchors (HMS Crescent 
beached, HMS Trident struck a rock, and HMS Tremendous was nearly lost. 
However, after urgent repair work on 14 August, and when the wind allowed it 
on 15 August, Elphinstone straightaway put to sea with thirteen ships (including 
seven ships of the line).
As Craig’s main force approached Saldanha Bay around noon on 16 August, 
they saw Elphinstone’s ships at sea ‘with all … sails crowded advancing with a 
fair wind directly to the mouth of the harbour.’63 It was indeed a swift passage 
and excellent sailing from Simon’s Bay to Saldanha Bay. It is interesting to note 
that Craig (an army officer) refer to a ‘fair wind‘, while it was recorded as strong 
winds and gale force conditions by naval officers on both sides.
By late afternoon Elphinstone had blocked the channel to the north of Schaapen 
Island and immediately requested Lucas to surrender ‘to spare an effusion 
of blood’, warning him that ‘otherwise it will be my duty … of making serious 
attack … the issue of which is not difficult to guess.’64 Lucas met with his officers. 
Some argued for taking advantage of the strong southerly wind from astern to set 
sail and attempt a fighting escape, while others preferred to destroy their own 
ships rather than surrender to the British. However, most of the captains argued 
that the British had overwhelming force, and as their exit was blocked, it would 
be better to negotiate a good capitulation.65 After a long discussion they decided 
to prevent a massacre, and Lucas ignominiously surrendered the following day.
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Figure 2.10 This interesting contemporary depiction by J.C. Friderici shows British troops 
on the south-eastern shore of the bay, Dutch ships at anchor, and British ships 
sailing into the bay.66 Clearly visible is the peninsula (referred to as Schier 
Island), with Postberg to the left and Konstabelberg to the right, and Meeuwen 
and Schaapen islands to the far right. In the extreme right of the picture are 
the northern shore and the entrance to Saldanha Bay.
The Lucas expedition had no real chance of success: it was not kept secret, 
was poorly organised, inadequately prepared, and lacked unity. In Lucas it 
had an incompetent commander who never acted decisively. The failure of 
Batavian-French diplomacy sealed the fate of the expedition, as it was doomed 
without French assistance. By comparison, the British had adequately reinforced 
the Cape, their energetic defensive efforts were crucial to their success, and in 
Elphinstone and Craig they had capable commanders that acted with vigour.67 
Britain had illustrated the virtual impossibility of retaking the Cape by force of 
arms and – as was a common feature of the colonial struggles between Britain 
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Figure 2.11 The disposition of naval forces in Saldanha Bay and the surrender of the Dutch 
ships, 16-17 August 1796: (a) is a drawing from the journal of Admiral Lucas,68 
and (b) an interpretation of data from ships logs and other sources of the time
Saldanha and the second British occupation of the Cape, 1806
In accordance with the stipulations of the Peace of Amiens (signed on 
5 March 1802), Britain had to hand the Cape of Good Hope back to the 
Netherlands. As the VOC did not exist anymore, the Cape would fall under the 
direct control of the Netherlands, now known as the Batavian Republic.69 In 
February 1803 the Dutch reassumed control of the Cape.70
General J.A. Janssens, the new Governor of the Cape, saw Saldanha Bay as 
militarily significant and considered that the bay might be used by the British 
in case of another attempt to capture the Cape. After visiting Saldanha Bay and 
St Helena Bay (in May 1804), Janssens instructed soldiers to be posted at these 
locations and stipulated the actions they should take in the event of an enemy 
force arriving on these shores.71 In his report, Janssens described Saldanha Bay 
as an important location, even suggesting that the capital could be moved there 
in case of a strong attack on the Cape. However, forts had to be constructed to 
defend the entrance to the bay, while the lack of sufficient fresh water remained 
a serious problem. The report suggested constructing a channel from the 
Berg River; however, conceding that this might be too expensive, it proposed 
that water be collected in reservoirs during winter for the dry summer months 
as an immediate solution.72
The Peace of Amiens was short-lived, and hostilities between Britain and France 
recommenced in May 1803. Again the British emphasised the value of the Cape 
Jacques Bezuidenhout & Thean Potgieter
70
for the prosperity and security of the imperial project: it lay at the centre of 
the western and eastern parts of the empire, and it could be regarded as the 
‘grand outwork’ of India as it secured the ‘political and commercial interests 
in the East Indies.’73 To British thinking, it would be ‘truly dangerous’, and very 
difficult to keep a watchful eye on the enemy if the French were to establish 
themselves at the Cape. As Britain feared that Napoleon’s real focus might be 
India – the ‘Jewel in the Crown’ – the Cape had to be captured to ‘crush in the 
cradle, the designs of the French upon India.’74 Thus, in July 1805, the Royal Navy 
received orders to equip an expedition to take control of the Cape. Commodore 
Sir Home Popham was appointed as naval commander and Major General Sir 
David Baird as army commander. The expeditionary force comprised of nine 
warships, seventeen British East Indiamen, thirty-nine other transport ships,75 
and around 7 000 soldiers.76
The British commanders did not wish to attack the network of fortifications 
around Cape Town directly from the sea, and Muizenberg was also out of the 
question, because the British themselves had made its defences ‘absolutely 
impregnable’. An attack therefore had to ‘be attempted from a different quarter.’77 
It was decided that they would land about 26 kilometres north of Cape Town, 
at Losperdsbaai (now known as Melkbosstrand). In the meanwhile, Brigadier 
General Beresford would be despatched to Saldanha Bay with the 38th Infantry 
Regiment and the 20th Light Dragoons to acquire provisions, horses and cattle. If 
conditions were too adverse at Losperdsbaai, or if the Dutch opposition was too 
strong, the whole task force would land at Saldanha Bay.78
The first British attempt to land at Losperdsbaai (on 5 January 1806) failed 
due to a strong wind and rough surf. The following day, the weather improved 
and they accomplished the landings with only slight opposition from a Dutch 
patrol that was quickly forced to retire by gunfire from the supporting British 
naval vessels.79 By nightfall, 4 000 troops, artillerists, about 500 to 600 sailors, 
and a number of artillery pieces were ashore.80 The Dutch had lost a golden 
opportunity to frustrate the British landings, and now, instead of staying behind 
the fortifications of Cape Town with his inferior force, Janssens marched north 
to meet his enemy on the field of battle with only 1 951 men under arms.81 He 
deployed his force to the east of the Blaauwberg on 8 January, but the superior 
British force dislodged the Dutch line and forced a retreat.82
In the meanwhile, Beresford and his troops had arrived in Saldanha Bay and 
managed to land despite some difficulties due to strong winds and problems with 
disembarking the horses. As burghers living around the shoreline immediately 
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moved their cattle into the interior, Beresford directly advanced to the Dutch 
post at Theefontein (about 30 kilometres from the Saldanha Bay), where he 
managed to capture horses, cattle and considerable other provisions.83
Janssens managed to preserve his force after the retreat at Blaauwberg, and 
considered conducting a prolonged guerrilla-style campaign from the interior. 
General Baird, however, warned Janssens that this would leave him (Baird) with 
no choice but to devastate the colony, ‘which must entail misery and ruin …
[and] further Effusion of Blood’.84 Negotiations commenced shortly afterwards, 
and Janssens surrendered with his troops on 18 January. For the second time in 
about a decade, the Cape was conquered due to its strategic importance and the 
imperial interests of Britain.
Concluding remarks
In the case of Saldanha Bay, a natural harbour located on the south-west coast of 
South Africa, just over 100 kilometres north of Cape Town, geology and natural 
history created the ideal conditions to provide the bay with an interesting 
military-strategic history spanning more than three centuries. The bay was 
shaped by unique geological events that can be traced back to the Pan-African 
orogenic event, when drifting tectonic plates merged into the Gondwana-Pangea 
supercontinent. The geology of the bay is dominated by granite rock, with several 
of the protrusions in excess of 60 metres above mean sea level. These resistant 
granite outcrops significantly influenced the erosional formation of the natural 
harbour, which from a shipping point of view resulted in an ideal haven with 
calm waters and a number of safe anchorages along its shores.
Due to the geological characteristics, the potential military-strategic importance 
of the bay was quickly recognised. Despite the fact that shipping and navies 
frequented the bay from time to time, it was never fully developed as a port due 
to a shortage of fresh water. As a result of its natural features, obvious value from 
a nautical point of view, and ideal location on the important sea route to the East 
during the age of maritime empires, much of the recorded history of Saldanha 
Bay after the arrival of the Dutch definitely has a military-strategic slant.
The historical record indicates that the unique attributes of Saldanha Bay made 
it a place of value to shipping in the days of sail. Ships that were damaged or 
sought shelter from wind and weather found a safe haven in the bay, as its unique 
geological attributes provided safe anchorage, protection against the weather, 
and good conditions for caulking ships. After a difficult voyage at sea, many 
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falling into Dutch hands. These events clearly illustrate the important role of sea 
power and maritime power projection in shaping greater historical processes 
and influencing world history in the age of maritime empires.
Though Saldanha Bay is good example of how geological characteristics 
can create a unique port, it is also an example of how climatic and geological 
conditions inhibited the further development of a harbour and port city due to a 
lack of sufficient supplies of fresh water. In fact; this aspect inhibited the military 
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the history of Saldanha Bay took a new turn during the twentieth century.
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CHAPTER 3
Wasted geography: The British annexation  
of the Cape in 1795
Thean Potgieter & Hennie Smit 
Introduction
In the year 480 BC, the Greeks and Persians gave the world a name for bravery 
against vastly superior odds, as well as for the force-multiplying effect of 
geography (in this case a narrow pass): Thermopylae.
Fast-forward 2 275 years to the Dutch settlement at the Cape. As British interests 
in India expanded substantially during the late eighteenth century, eastern 
trade became important for British prosperity. However, the sea route that 
linked Britain with India was vulnerable, because the rich maritime traffic had 
to round the Cape of Good Hope, located at the southern tip of Africa, literally 
halfway to the East. The Cape was in Dutch hands from 1652, and under the 
control of the VOC. In accordance with its charter, the VOC had a monopoly on 
Dutch-Asia trade and had the sovereign right to maintain troops and garrisons, 
fit out warships, appoint governors over foreign (Asian) populations, conduct 
diplomacy and conclude treaties.1 Though the VOC appointed and controlled its 
own military and executive staff, VOC officials had to swear an oath of allegiance 
to the States-General of the United Provinces (Dutch Republic).2
The Cape was usually well defended during the oft-fought wars of the 
eighteenth century, and from the Seven Years’ War (1756-1763) onwards it 
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gained considerable strategic importance. In wartime, Britain was therefore 
very anxious about its valuable trade with the East and the security of the 
Cape sea route. In 1781 a large British expedition was dispatched to capture 
the Cape, but it failed due to the intervention of the French naval and military 
force. The result was that the British war effort in the East was impeded by the 
French-Dutch alliance and their control of the Cape. With the outbreak of the 
French Revolutionary War in 1792, Britain was anxious to prevent the Cape from 
falling into French hands, and when the Netherlands became an ally of France in 
1795, Britain immediately dispatched a joint expeditionary force to capture the 
Cape of Good Hope.
Taking the Cape from the sea would entail an amphibious operation. Though 
amphibious warfare posed serious challenges at the time, proper planning, 
preparations and sufficient force under experienced command were important 
prerequisites. In addition, the navy and army components had to cooperate 
operationally and tactically, with naval support being crucial during and after 
landings. Operational guidelines (dating from 1763) available to British officers 
stipulated that, upon deciding on a landing site, ‘the whole command is given 
to a Sea Officer who conducts them to the place of landing …’3 Once the men 
were out of the boats and actually set their feet ashore, the Army commander 
took command of the soldiers. But as a military force on foreign soil had to be 
supported from the sea, a good working relationship between the commanders 
remained crucial.
The British faced many difficulties in their quest to capture the Cape. Cape Town 
was well fortified, but landing at other locations would be difficult as the British 
had an inadequate force, no transport and would face geographic challenges. 
In addition, weather conditions at the Cape were often adverse and posed 
challenges to sustained naval operations. To the British advantage were the 
political divisions in the Netherlands and at the Cape, and the fact that it had 
only a small garrison, with no Dutch or French naval forces at hand to defend 
it. Moreover, due to their distance from Europe, the Dutch at the Cape lacked 
intelligence about recent political and military developments in Europe. Yet, in 
the end, the British would prevail, despite the geographical and other advantages 
enjoyed by the Dutch.
This chapter places geography central to the British occupation of the Cape of 
Good Hope in 1795, and investigates the reasons why the favourable geography 
was not used to better effect by the defenders.
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The physical geography of the Cape Peninsula  
and surrounding area
The Cape Peninsula is situated on the south-western extremity of Africa, in 
South Africa figure 3.1). The physical geography of the area is dominated by 
the mountains of the Cape Peninsula. This mountain range forms the western 
boundary of the area under discussion, starting with Table Mountain in the 
north, with a series of peaks stretching south to Cape Point. Bordering the 
Cape Peninsula to the east is a relatively flat area of loose, unconsolidated sands, 
the Cape Flats. The Cape Flats connect the Cape Peninsula to the mainland, with 
the Hottentots-Holland Mountains bordering the area in the east.
Figure 3.1 The Cape Peninsula and surrounding area
Source: Map by T. Flügel 
The area is bounded by two bays, the larger of which is False Bay, to the south 
of the Cape Flats and bordered by Cape Point to the west and Cape Hangklip 
to the east. This south-facing bay is where the British force dropped anchor in 
1795. To the north, a smaller bay, Table Bay, forms the northern border of the 
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area. Cape Town is situated east of Lion’s Head and Signal Hill and north-east of 
Table Mountain, with the north-facing Table Bay forming its northern boundary.4
The Cape Peninsula and surrounding area is characterised by three main 
types of exposed rocks: the metamorphic rocks of the Malmesbury Group, the 
Cape Granite Suite that intruded into the Malmesbury Group, and the younger 
sedimentary rocks of the Table Mountain Group. The Malmesbury shale is 
the oldest rock in the area. These shales were intruded by the Cape Granite 
Suite about 545 Ma.5 The granites can be seen near sea level in various places 
around the Cape Peninsula, most spectacularly along Chapman’s Peak Drive on 
the Atlantic seaboard, but also near Simon’s Town and between Kalk Bay and 
Muizenberg, among many others.6 On this platform, the sediments of the Cape 
Supergroup developed. The Graafwater and Peninsula formations, the two 
lowermost formations of the Cape Supergroup, are exposed on Table  Mountain, 
as well as further south towards Muizenberg and Cape Point.7 The Graafwater 
Formation consists of sandstones and mudstones, and is responsible for 
the lower, gentler slopes in some areas of the Peninsula.8 Stratigraphically 
overlying the Graafwater Formation, and forming most of the surface area of the 
mountains of the Cape Peninsula, are the course-grained, light grey, quartsitic 
sandstones of the Peninsula Formation.9 These quartzose sandstones are highly 
resistant and produce the spectacular steep cliff faces typical of the mountains 
of the Peninsula.10
The Cape Flats, to the east of the Cape Peninsula, is a low-lying, relatively flat 
area consisting of unconsolidated Holocene and Quaternary sands underlain 
by Malmesbury Group shales. The Cape Flats link the Cape Peninsula to the 
Hottentots-Holland Mountains of the mainland. These mountains share a similar 
geology with the mountains of the Cape Peninsula.11
To the east of Muizenberg is a lake and swamp system (the lakes are called 
‘vlei’ in the local vernacular) consisting of a series of permanent small, shallow 
(approximately 1-2,4 metres deep) freshwater and estuarine coastal lakes with 
extended swampy areas in between. These lakes drain into False Bay.12 Closer to 
Muizenberg, the Sandvlei (also sometimes spelled Zandvlei) system consists of a 
small, well-mixed estuarine lake.13 The vlei has a surface area of approximately 
121 hectars, and the main vlei is approximately 2,5 kilometres long with a mean 
depth of 1,5 metres.14 Situated on the edge of a relatively flat sandy plain of 
recent marine origin, it was reputedly named by Jan van Riebeeck in recognition 
of its situation on this coastal plain. The vlei is fed by three streams, the Sand, 
83
Wasted geography
Westlake and Keysers, and together with the surrounding marshy area forms an 
almost impenetrable barrier to movement on foot.15
The physical geography of the area between Simon’s Bay and Cape Town was 
considered a major obstacle in the way of any invading force. Behind Simon’s Bay, 
the sandstone cliffs of Red Hill rise to 255 metres above sea level, while the 
Simonsberg to the south reaches 547 metres above sea level.16
Only one road to Cape Town existed, running along the coast past Muizenberg 
and then across the peninsula. The passage was specifically difficult between 
Kalk Bay and Muizenberg. From Kalk Bay the route was sandwiched on a narrow 
strip of land between the sea and the almost vertical sandstone cliffs of Kalk Bay 
Mountain and Muizenberg Peak. Past present-day Muizenberg, the topography 
flattens out, providing multiple positions from which to attack Cape Town. So 
good was the obvious defensive strength of the area between the cliffs and the 
sea, that Elphinstone called it the ‘Thermopylae of the Cape Peninsula.’17 Here 
the defenders of the Cape had the sea to their one side, and the steep slopes 
and almost vertical cliffs of Kalk Bay Mountain, Muizenberg Peak and Steenberg 
Mountain on the other. To the east, the Sandvlei marshes – the large area of 
surface water and waterlogged soil on the Cape Flats, stretching from the beach 
near Muizenberg a few kilometres inland and extending eastwards for a few 
kilometres – made a flanking attack by the British virtually impossible.
The wind regime of the Cape Peninsula and its influence on 
shipping in the age of sail
The Cape Peninsula and surrounding area has a Mediterranean climate, 
characterised by what Van Doorn, O’Riain and Swedell termed ‘extreme 
seasonality.’18 This seasonality is not only reflected in rainfall regimes (the area 
receives about 75 per cent of its annual rainfall during winter),19 but also – and 
which is more important for this investigation – in the seasonal reversal of winds.
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Figure 3.2 The wind regime of Cape Town in June20
From figure 3.2 it is clear that, in winter, the wind blows from a northerly direction 
(between NE and NW) more than 50 per cent of the time. These northerly winds 
also blow the strongest, with wind speeds exceeding 11 metres per second 
during a sizable proportion of the time. In a comparison between the wind fields 
of Cape Town, Port Elizabeth and Durban, Schumann and Martin concurred with 
this; they also suggested that higher energy was recorded over longer periods at 
Cape Town, and that the maximum energy is considerably higher at Cape Town 
than at the other two sites.21
Figure 3.3 The wind regime of Cape Town in December22
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Figure 3.3 depicts the wind field in Cape Town in December. This summer 
situation clearly indicates a complete reversal of the winter winds. During 
December the winds blow predominantly from the south. The total percentage 
of south-westerly to south-easterly winds over the period exceeds 70 per cent, 
as also found by Schumann and Martin.23 The higher wind speeds of above 
11 metres per second are found exclusively for the southerly winds.
In the days of sail, and without sheltered man-made harbours at the Cape of 
Good Hope, the wind regime had an obvious effect on the regulation of shipping 
at and around the Cape. Table Bay, the main anchorage at the Cape, had a large 
and commodious anchorage that was safe for ships during the summer with 
its prevailing southerly winds, but it was open to the north and unsuitable as a 
winter anchorage due to prevailing northerly winds in winter. Severe northerly 
gales often blew ships onto the shore of Table Bay, and many richly laden VOC 
ships perished at the Cape, often with all hands. The western shore of False Bay 
provided good protection against the winter winds, and Simon’s Bay could even 
shelter a small number of ships in summer.
The VOC took possession of Simon’s Bay in 1671, but though ships anchored 
in False Bay from time to time, it was difficult to provision them. After another 
ferocious storm on 20 May 1737 wreaked havoc with shipping in Table Bay 
(only one of the ten ships at anchor survived), an alternative arrangement had 
to be made. In 1742 a post to provision ships was established in Simon’s Bay, 
and by 1753 all ships were instructed to use Simon’s Bay from mid-May to 
mid-August.24 The standing orders issued to VOC captains included, among 
other, information about the sea conditions and prevailing winds around the 
Cape, as well as instructions on the use of Table Bay, entering False Bay, and 
anchoring in Simon’s Bay.25 By the 1760s captains were sternly ordered not to 
be at anchor in Table Bay between mid-May and mid-August, on pain of a fine 
of three months’ salary.26 By 1792 VOC ships had to anchor in Simon’s Bay from 
10 April to 1 September, and Simon’s Town developed, as warehouses, a large 
hospital and a stone pier were erected. Although VOC anchorages had to be 
covered by coastal fortifications, this was not the case in Simon’s Bay.
86
Thean Potgieter & Hennie Smit
British attempt on the Cape: strategic setting  
and opposing forces
Late in 1794 France invaded the Netherlands. The Dutch Stadtholder (William V, 
Prince of Orange) fled to England and the new Dutch State (called the Batavian 
Republic) became an ally of France and an enemy of Britain. Because the British 
feared that the Cape of Good Hope might fall into French hands and become 
a base for French privateers, much anxiety existed amongst the directors of 
the English East India Company (EEIC). On 4 January 1795, Sir Francis Baring, 
Chairman of the EEIC, emphasised the importance of the Cape for refreshment of 
EEIC ships, affirming that whoever is ‘master of the Cape will be able to protect 
or annoy our ships.’27 He requested the Secretary of State for War, Henry Dundas 
(later Lord Melville), to consider annexing the Cape, as they might surprise 
the defenders and win an easy victory; for if the Cape were lost, there was no 
substitute.28 The idea enjoyed firm support in the British establishment, as it was 
feared that the ‘feather in the hands of Holland’ would become a ‘sword in the hands 
of France.’29 At the insistence of British politicians, the exiled Prince William of 
Orange wrote a letter to the VOC authorities at the Cape on 7 February 1795, 
requesting that they welcome British warships and allow British troops into the 
castle as ‘Troops and Ships of a Power in Friendship and Alliance’ coming to 
prevent the ‘Colony from being invaded by the French.’30
The British immediately commenced preparing in earnest to take the Cape. 
Sir George Keith Elphinstone (later Lord Keith, and known as such in the 
Royal Navy annals) was appointed as naval commander of the task force and 
‘Commander in Chief in all the Indian Seas,’ with full powers to fight or negotiate 
depending on the circumstances (figure 3.4).31 Elphinstone studied Cape affairs,32 
made the naval arrangements, prepared for a winter campaign, and arranged for 
assistance from the EEIC as well as the Governor-General in India. Due to the 
anticipated winter weather conditions around the Cape at their expected arrival 
time, the Army Commander, Major-General Alured Clarke, and the bulk of the 
soldiers were dispatched to São Salvador (da Bahia, in Brazil) to await orders. 
Elphinstone also arranged with the Portuguese governor of Salvador for Clarke’s 
reception. His organisational and command capacity ‘strikingly manifested’ in 
the preparations for the expedition.33
The expeditionary force sailed in three groups. Captain John Blankett (with 
three third-rate ships of the line and a sloop) departed on 16 February with 
Major-General Sir James Henry Craig and 515 soldiers of the 78th Regiment on 
board. On 3 April Elphinstone’s squadron of six ships (three third-rate ships 
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of the line, a frigate, a sloop and a cargo ship) set sail for the Cape. The main 
body of 3 000 troops under Major-General Alured Clarke departed on 15 May 
to Salvador.34 Clarke’s orders were plain: if Elphinstone and Blankett were not 
successful, he was to make ‘an immediate and vigorous attack on the Cape to 
take possession of the Colony in His Majesty’s name.’35 Elphinstone and Blankett 
rendezvoused off Cape Point on 10 June 1795 and arrived in Simon’s Bay at 
about 16:00 the next day.36
Figure 3.4 Sir George Keith Elphinstone37
As a result of the financial plight of the VOC, the defences of the Cape were 
depleted. After the Württemberg Regiment (previously stationed at the Cape) 
left for Batavia in 1792, the garrison comprised only 1 302 full-time officers and 
men, which included a regular infantry battalion (571 officers and men), the 
locally raised Pandoer Corps (about 200 strong), 57 infantrymen at the depots 
of the Meuron and Württemberg Regiments, 44 sipahis (Malay infantry), and an 
Artillery Corps (430 officers and men). As burghers between 16 and 60 were 
obliged to do military service, the burgher militia added about 2 300 men, which 
raised the total number of defenders available to about 3 600.38
The Cape had an extensive system of fortifications. The Castle in Cape Town 
was the main fortification, but doubt existed about its effectiveness as it was 
an out-dated fortification that could be outflanked, and it had a limited arc of 
fire. Numerous batteries and smaller forts were therefore erected around the 
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Cape and in Table Bay to create a system of defensive lines. The Amsterdam, a 
casemate battery armed with sixty-six 24-pounders and six 12-inch mortars, was 
considered the most formidable fortification in Table Bay.39 Camps Bay had an 
entrenchment and a battery, and Hout Bay had three batteries.40 In total, around 
400 artillery pieces (of which some were not properly mounted), and nineteen 
ovens capable of producing 450 rounds of red-hot shot in fourteen minutes, were 
available to defend the Cape Peninsula.41 Although many fortifications were far 
from formidable, as a whole, they served as a major deterrent. In the 1790s, a 
certain Captain De Jong (a Dutch naval officer) expressed the opinion that with 
2 500 soldiers to defend the Cape, it would be very difficult to take it from the 
sea.42 However, in False Bay the defences were lacking. Only two small batteries 
(armed with four 24-pounders and four 4-pounders each) with a limited field of 
fire were erected in Simon’s Bay. Hence, as British intelligence reports indicated, 
False Bay was the ideal place for a hostile force to conduct a landing.
Figure 3.5 Fortifications around Cape Town, 1793.43 This contemporary depiction of the 
formidable fortifications around Cape Town makes it evident why the British 
chose to rather land in False Bay.
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British arrival at the Cape and negotiations
A few hours after Elphinstone had anchored off Simon’s Town (on the evening 
of 11 June 1795), the news reached A.J. Sluysken, the VOC Commissioner at 
the Cape and the highest politico-military authority.44 The Council of Policy 
met immediately and decided to send Lieutenant-Colonel C.M.W. de Lille 
with 200 infantrymen and 100 artillerists to Simon’s Town to strengthen the 
garrison of 110 infantrymen and 50 gunners. The burgher militia from the 
outlying districts were also called up to assist with the defence, but the response 
was poor.45
The Cape government had no reliable news of the latest events in Europe. Though 
they considered Britain and the Netherlands to be allies, recent information 
suggested that the Netherlands might have changed sides. Matters were made 
worse by the gross dissatisfaction with the VOC control, local political divisions, 
internal strife, and turmoil in the interior. Many of the burghers and soldiers 
were opposed to the stadtholdership and supported the Dutch Patriotten, while 
the officers and VOC officials were mainly loyal supporters of the Oranje Partij. 
In the light of the pro-British sentiments of Colonel Robert Jacob Gordon, the 
Commander of the Garrison, the British assumed that he might welcome a 
British take over and persuade the garrison to change sides.46
Figure 3.6 Colonel Robert Jacob Gordon in the uniform of Commander of the Garrison at 
the Cape of Good Hope47
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Negotiations commenced, providing some British officers with the opportunity 
to visit the Cape, inspect the fortifications, and as Elphinstone stated to ‘gain as 
much intelligence possible.’48 The first to visit the Castle were two officers who 
delivered the letter from the Prince of Orange and a report from Elphinstone 
and Craig on 14 June.49 Gordon tried to convince the Council of Policy that the 
British were allies, but the other members stressed that as their loyalty was to 
the Netherlands, not a Prince, the British should not be allowed to land at the 
Cape.50 The Council replied that British assistance would be appreciated in case 
of a French attack, but that the Cape was capable of defending itself.51 On 19 June 
Craig visited Cape Town and tried to convince the Council to hand over authority, 
but they repeated that under the lawful constitution of the Netherlands the Cape 
must be defended.52
With the Cape refusing to capitulate, the British position became more precarious 
by the day: they had no foothold ashore, there was a desperate shortage of 
water and provisions on some of the ships, and many men were suffering from 
scurvy.53 Though this was somewhat alleviated by the Dutch allowing the sick 
ashore for medical care, and by some provisioning to the squadron, supplies 
were still very low.54 Yet, in the light of the geographic realities, and without 
draught animals, field guns, artillerists, engineers and a substantial infantry 
force, it would be very difficult to capture the Cape by force if the Dutch used 
their geographical advantage and retreated behind their fortifications.55 
Well aware of this, Elphinstone summoned Major General Clarke from Salvador 
on 18 June.56
On 22 June Elphinstone and Craig issued a proclamation offering British 
protection to Cape citizens and inviting them to negotiate directly with the 
British.57 In response, the Council of Policy ceased negotiations with the British, 
stopped supplying the squadron, and removed all horses, oxen and other draught 
animals from Simon’s Bay and Fish Hoek. Elphinstone reacted by capturing three 
VOC ships at anchor in Simon’s Bay. Due to the weak fortifications at Simon’s Town 
and the strong British naval force, the Dutch evacuated Simon’s Town and 




Figure 3.7 Map and chart of the Cape of Good Hope, 178159
Attack on Muizenberg: assaulting a natural defensive position
In the late eighteenth century, amphibious operations were difficult and the 
attacker was exceptionally vulnerable during the attempted landing. The British 
had no specialised vessels, and the landing of troops, ammunition, equipment 
and supplies would have to occur from open ships’ boats, which would be 
difficult under sustained fire. The lack of proper defences in Simon’s Town was a 
grave Dutch military error – even though, in this case, it would have been difficult 
to hold the town in the face of a large-scale amphibious attack and the naval 
gunfire support available to the British. The Dutch evacuation of this important 
position was therefore a blessing, as it allowed the British to easily achieve a 
crucial operational objective: to establish a beachhead on foreign soil.
Both Elphinstone and Craig realised that if their offensive was to succeed, it 
had to force the Dutch position at Muizenberg. It seemed that Muizenberg was 
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the pivot of the whole land campaign, as it blocked the route to Cape Town. 
The coastline to the north of Simon’s Bay offered access to the-low lying area 
between Kalk Bay and Noordhoek (see figure 3.5). Here a west-east striking fault 
allowed the resistant sandstones to be eroded, and it was possible to reach the 
Atlantic Ocean through this gap in the mountains. Unfortunately for the British, 
a series of high peaks to the north of this area blocked their access to Cape Town. 
Starting with Chapman’s Peak (592 metres) in the west and extending all the 
way to Kalk Bay Mountain (515 metres) above Kalk Bay, these mountains all 
but cut off any access to Cape Town. To the north of these peaks, Muizenberg 
(507 metres), Steenberg Peak (537 metres) and Noordhoek Peak (689 metres) 
completed the formidable barrier to any invading army.60 To sail around Cape 
Point, land in Hout Bay and access Cape Town via Kloofnek was a possiblility, 
but Hout Bay had well-armed fortifications guarding the entrance to the bay.61
During July, Elphinstone and Craig planned the assault on the Muizenberg 
position and pondered on how to force the Dutch from it. They even considered 
a large strategic turning movement through the mountains from the direction 
of Constantia (or the present-day Tokai, to be more exact) to threaten the Dutch 
rear, cut off their communications, and compel them to abandon Muizenberg.62 
It was a fanciful manoeuvre that posed massive challenges and would be very 
difficult to execute in the rugged terrain of the Steenberg Mountains. The element 
of surprise would be crucial, and soldiers would have to be very fit to execute 
it swiftly; moreover, they would have to find trails over the mountain. The idea 
was discarded and it was decided that a direct assault on Muizenberg remained 
the best option, but that it had to be a joint operation, with the advance ashore 
supported by naval gunfire.
Though naval gunfire support would be crucial to the assault on Muizenberg, 
Elphinstone was concerned about the ‘shallowness of the water, the uncertainty 
of the wind,’63 and the effectiveness of his gunnery due to the effect of the long 
rolling swell. The Navy then took soundings to establish whether the ships could 
approach to within three-quarters of a mile from the beach,64 and Elphinstone 
reassured Craig that, given ‘a westerly wind with a smooth sea’, his ships would 
be on their post.65 The landing of seamen with boats at Muizenberg was also 
considered, but it was disregarded as the commanders were convinced that the 
Dutch would not stand.66
Military specialists of the time identified Muizenberg as a point of strategic value 
and a good defensive position. Though strong Dutch defence would make it 
difficult for the British to take, only a portion of the Cape defenders (200 infantry, 
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120 artillery, 200 mounted burghers and 150 pandours) were deployed there.67 
Despite requests from Dutch officers to improve the Muizenberg position, 
Gordon considered it unnecessary.68
The British attack on Muizenberg commenced on 7 August. While troops and two 
battalions of seamen (roughly 1 600 men)69 marched from Simon’s Town, four 
warships and a small gunboat sailed to Muizenberg, providing gunfire support 
along the route. The British drove the Dutch from their picket at Kalk Bay, and 
simultaneously to the land attack on Muizenberg the ships fired full broadsides, 
‘thundering showers of shot’ at the Dutch positions.70 De Lille and his infantry 
fled in great confusion, leaving everything except five field guns behind, 
and retreated to Lochner’s Farm. Only a few gunners with two 24-pounders 
conducted some sort of defence. Though the guns embedded themselves into 
the sand and had to be redirected after every salvo, the Dutch succeeded with 
a number of hits on the British warships. Eventually the artillerists were forced 
to retreat by the overwhelming gunfire. However, around the mountain and out 
of range of the ships’ guns, some artillerymen and burghers made a stand and 
drove the British van back to Muizenberg.71
The British were astonished that the Dutch did not properly defend the strong 
Muizenberg position and by De Lille’s hasty retreat. Captain Robert Percival, 
a British officer, remarked that the Dutch ‘neither behaved with courage or 
prudence, nor took a proper advantage of their strong positions … and with a 
degree of folly scarcely to be accounted for … abandoned the important place 
which they should have defended to the last extremity.’72 Very telling is Percival’s 
remark that the natural defensive position at Muizenberg struck him ‘with 
wonder at its strength’, and the British reflected ‘with a mixture of surprise and 
contempt on the Dutch troops who allowed ours so easily to take possession 
of it, while it is so exceedingly strong that a very few men with field pieces 
might defend it without any risqué to themselves, and arrest the progress of a 
whole army.’73
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Figure 3.8 Attack on the Muizenberg position, August 179574
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Figure 3.9 Battle of Muizenberg, August 1795. The painting depicts the naval vessels 
providing gunfire support to the attacking forces ashore.75
There was also much discontent amongst the Cape burghers, further fuelled by 
the fact that De Lille took a defensive position behind Sandvlei, and promptly 
retreated to Wynberg when Craig resumed his advance on 8 August.76 De Lille 
was removed from his post, as many in the Dutch camp called him a traitor and 
considered the defence of the Cape sabotaged.
Final operations and Dutch surrender
Major B.C. van Baalen was in command at the Dutch position at Wynberg. 
However, his superior officer, Gordon, kept himself busy with improvements on 
the Mouille Battery at Cape Town, while the real threat was from Muizenberg.77 
The Cape burghers now saw their government as incapable of organising an 
adequate defence and believed that they should be allowed to organise the 
defence of the Colony.78 Sluysken assured the population that the Cape would be 
defended as best as possible, and the Council of Policy again refused a request 
from Elphinstone and Craig to surrender the Cape to the British.79
The British now dug in at Muizenberg, but, as the assaulting force, their hold 
was precarious. They did not have access to agricultural products and were in 
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urgent need of supplies; they also lacked equipment, military reinforcements, 
field guns, cash, and transport – without which their advance through the 
difficult terrain would be extremely laborious. Their predicament was eased 
by the Dutch lethargy. If the Dutch had performed persistent, well-organised 
attacks on the British beachhead, things would have been very difficult for them. 
When the East Indiaman Arniston arrived from St Helena Island on 9 August 
with 400 additional troops from the EEIC, nine field guns and cash, they were 
much relieved.80 Yet, provisions and ammunition were still running very low, 
and on 1 September Elphinstone and Craig decided to wait six more days for 
Clarke’s reinforcements before either risking battle or retiring to their ships.81 
At the insistence of the burghers and some of the officers, the Dutch authorities 
agreed to an attack on the British position, but before such an attack could occur, 
Clarke’s long awaited reinforcements sailed into False Bay on 3 September.82 The 
British immediately prepared for attack, and on 14 September they advanced on 
Wynberg with 4 000 to 5 000 men that included sappers and artillery.
The impetus of the British attack forced the Dutch to retreat. The situation seemed 
hopeless, and Gordon and Sluysken stressed that the Cape could no longer be 
defended against an overwhelming British force.83 Negotiations commenced and 
Clarke agreed to a 24-hour truce at midnight on 14 September. The surrender 
documents were signed on 16 September. Many of the Dutch soldiers and 
burghers blamed their officers, and specifically Gordon, for the poor defence of 
the Cape. The situation threatened to get out of hand, and the Dutch leadership 
urged the British to come to their aid as soon as possible.84 On the same day, the 
British occupied the batteries outside Cape Town, while 1 400 men marched 
into the town. As the Dutch garrison marched out of the Castle to surrender, the 
soldiers jeered and swore at their officers, calling them traitors.85 
News of the capture of the Cape caused considerable relief in Britain.86 
The First Lord of the Admiralty, Earl Spencer, referred to the Cape as a ‘very 
valuable acquisition … obtained for this country at so little expense of lives 
and money … one of the most advantageous we have ever made.’87 Dundas 
congratulated Elphinstone on ‘the surrender of Cape Town’ and for placing such 
an ‘essential establishment under the dominion of Great Britain.’88 Neither the 
House of Orange nor the interest of the Netherlands was mentioned, and it is 
clear that the conquest was purely in the interest of Britain.
Elphinstone was later honoured with a peerage. Gordon, on the other hand, was 
of no more use to the British, and at the Cape he was regarded as a traitor: he 
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was ostracised, attacked and discredited. On Sunday morning 25 October 1795 
he committed suicide in his garden.
Concluding remarks: wasting geographic advantages in defence
Commanding an expeditionary force and conducting defensive operations at this 
time were demanding endeavours. Commanders needed a clear strategic grasp 
and had to be able to make independent command decisions. It was not possible 
for both sides at the Cape to regularly consult with higher authority on important 
decisions, and the Dutch authorities also lacked up-to-date information on 
events in the Netherlands. Though Elphinstone had received guidelines from 
the British government beforehand on policy and strategic matters, he made 
independent decisions at short notice and then explained them in his reports to 
his political masters. A good example is his timely decision to summon Clarke to 
the Cape, which quickly and decisively caused the Dutch capitulation.
The success of the Elphinstone expedition was due in large measure to the 
clarity of purpose of the British: both the political establishment and the 
military commanders had a clear understanding of what the objective was, and 
all effort was concentrated on maintaining that objective. Elphinstone and Craig 
initially thought that the Cape authorities would welcome the British force, but 
when they realised that this would not occur, they exploited the military option 
to achieve the objective. British military planning, preparation, intelligence 
and organisation was very good, especially considering the brief timelines 
and relative haste with which such a vast undertaking was realised. This could 
only be achieved successfully with first-rate command and control, and a good 
working relationship between the naval and military commanders (Elphinstone 
and Craig). Such a relationship was evident: their correspondence is proof of an 
open, co-operative spirit and the emphatic trust that existed between them.
Operationally and tactically the British were initially at a disadvantage. They 
had no foothold ashore, and they lacked overwhelming force, supplies, draught 
animals, artillery and engineers. In geographical terms they were far from the 
centre of power and faced seemingly insurmountable obstacles. However, the 
Dutch did not use this to their advantage. Elphinstone knew that the ‘hazardous 
weather conditions … severe storms, fog, and particularly strong north-west 
gales caused numerous ship tragedies and severely affected shipping around 
the Cape.’89 His knowledge of the prevalent wind regime of the Cape influenced 
his decision to anchor in False Bay and not Table Bay in June 1795. By sheltering 
in False Bay, Elphinstone escaped the winter storms that could wreck his ships 
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in Table Bay. Simon’s Bay was also not nearly as well defended as Table Bay and 
surrounds, with only two small batteries guarding the bay.90 Having said that, 
the Dutch had the opportunity to move a greater force (more arms and men) 
to assist with the defence of Simon’s Bay; yet they did not seem to consider 
contesting a landing. The Dutch abandonment of Simon’s Bay and retreat to 
Muizenberg provided the British with a beachhead from where they could 
launch an attack against Cape Town at a time of their choosing. In addition, it 
was a secure anchorage in the potentially adverse winter weather conditions of 
the Cape of Good Hope, and gave them the opportunity to replenish their water 
supplies and repair their weather-beaten ships.
British success was not only due to their military prowess, but was aided by 
the weak Dutch defence: indecision, disunity, low morale, poor command 
decisions – and the fact that they did not use the geography of the battle space 
to maximum advantage. A specific example of this is their failure to adequately 
strengthen the chokepoint at Muizenberg and conduct a vigorous defence of this 
ideal geographical position. Allowing the British free access to Cape Town and 
its surroundings to observe the geography and defences of the Cape, and thus 
gain valuable intelligence, is another. Geography can help or hinder the attacker 
and the defender in equal measure, and the geography of the Cape was wasted 
by the Dutch defenders, contributing in no small way to their defeat.
When the Netherlands became an ally of France, the alliance had access to bases 
around the world. As some of these bases, such as the Cape of Good Hope and 
Ceylon, were of much strategic importance and, from the British point of view, 
threatened India, Britain had to act quickly to occupy them in order to protect her 
strategic and economic interests. Through their success, the British effectively 
illustrated the strategic gains to be made from properly executed exploitation 
of maritime power projection. Though British efforts were bolstered by Dutch 
mistakes and apathy, maritime power made the swift execution of the expedition 
possible, while through good command and control the objective was achieved. 
Britain therefore effectively utilised military power as a policy instrument. 
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to acknowledge the support of the South African Weather 





1 Gaastra, F.S. De Geschiedenis van de VOC 
(Zutpen: Walburg, 2002), p. 20.
2 Knaap, G. & Teitler, G. (eds.),  
De Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie 
(Leiden: KITLV, 2002), p. 2.
3 Quoted in S. Foster, Hit the Beach 
(London: Rigel, 2004), p. 13, from a 
1763 publication, J. MacIntire, A Military 
Treatise on the Discipline of Marine 
Forces when at Sea, Together with Short 
Instructions for Detachments Sent to 
Attack on Shore, p. 225.
4 South Africa 1: 50 000 sheet 3418AB & 
AD Cape Peninsula (Cape Town: Chief 
Directorate of Surveys and Mapping, 
8th edition, 2010).
5 Clemens, J.D. & Stevens, G.  
‘The Saldanha Bay volcanic complex: 
Clarifying the Cambrian geology of 
the Postberg-Saldanha Area, West 
Coast, South Africa’, South African 
Journal of Geology, 119(2) (2016), 
pp. 347-358. https://doi.org/10.2113/
gssajg.119.2.347
6 Whitfield, G. 50 Must-see geological sites 
in South Africa (South Africa: Penguin 
Random House, 2015).
7 Compton, J. ‘Table Mountain and the 
Cape Peninsula’, in C.R. Anheusser, 
M.J. Viljoen & R.P. Viljoen (eds.), 
Africa’s top geological sites (Cape Town: 
Struik Nature, 2016).
8 Cowling, R.M.; Macdonald, I.A.W. & 
Simmons, M.T. The Cape Peninsula, 
South Africa: Physiographical, biological 
and historical background to an 
extraordinary hot-spot of biodiversity’, 
Biodiversity and Conservation, 5 (1996), 
pp. 527-550. https://doi.org/10.1007/
BF00137608
9 Rust, I.C. ‘Environmental geology 
of the coastal zone: A South African 
Perspective’, South African Journal 
of Marine Science, 10 (1991), 
pp. 397-405; Killick, A.M. ‘The 
geological structure of the Muizenberg 
Block, Cape Peninsula, South Africa’, 
South African Journal of Geology, 
119(4) (2016), pp. 677-690. https://
doi.org/10.2989/02577619109504647
10 Meadows, M.E. & Compton, J.S. 2015. 
‘Table Mountain: Wonder of nature at 
the foot of Africa’, in S. Grab & J. Knight 
(eds.), Landscapes and landforms of 
South Africa. World Geomorphological 
landscapes (Switzerland: Springer 
International Publishing). https://doi.
org/10.1007/978-3-319-03560-4_11
11 Compton, J. ‘Table Mountain and the 
Cape Peninsula’, in C.R. Anheusser, 
M.J. Viljoen & R.P. Viljoen (eds.), 
Africa’s top geological sites (Cape Town: 
Struik Nature, 2016). 
100
Thean Potgieter & Hennie Smit
12 Harding, W.R. ‘A contribution to the 
knowledge of South African coastal 
vleis: The limnology and phytoplankton 
periodicity of Princess Vlei, Cape 
Peninsula’, Water SA, 18(2) (1992), 
pp. 121-130; Neumann, F.H.; Scott, 
L. & Bamford, M.K. ‘Climate change 
and human disturbance of fynbos 
vegetation during the late Holocene 
at Princess Vlei, Western Cape, South 
Africa’, The Holocene, 21(7) (2011), 
pp. 1137-1149. https://doi.
org/10.1177/0959683611400461
13 Thornton, J.A. & McMillan, P.H.  
‘Reconciling public opinion and water 
quality criteria in South Africa’, Water 
SA, 15(4) (1989), pp. 221-226.
14 Clark, B.M.; Bennett, B.A. & 
Lamberth, S.J. ‘A comparison of the 
ichthyofauna of two estuaries and their 
adjacent surf zones, with an assessment 
of the effects of beach-seining on the 
nursery function of estuaries for fish’, 
South African Journal of Marine Science, 
14(1) (1994), pp. 121-131. https://doi.
org/10.2989/025776194784286941
15 Thornton, J.A.; Beekman, H.; 
Boddington, G.; Dick, R.; Harding, WR.; 
Lief, M.; Morrison, I.R. & Quick, A.J.R. 
‘The ecology and management of 
Zandvlei (Cape Province, South Africa), 
an enriched shallow African estuary’, 
in A.J. McComb (ed.), Eutrophic 
estuaries and lagoons (Boca Raton: 
CRC Press, 1995).
16 South Africa 1: 50 000 sheet 3418 AB & 
AD Cape Peninsula (Cape Town: Chief 
Directorate of Surveys and Mapping, 
8th edition, 2010).
17 De Villiers, C.J. Die Britse Vloot aan 
die Kaap, 1795-1803 (unpublished 
MA thesis, University of Cape Town, 
1967), pp. 11-12. See also Percival, R. 
An account of the Cape of Good Hope 
(London: C. and R. Baldwin, 1804),  
p. 63.
18 Van Doorn, A.C.; O’Riain, M.J. & 
Swedell, L. ‘The effects of extreme 
seasonality of climate and day length 
on the activity budget and diet of 
semi-commensal Chacma baboons 
(Papio ursinus) in the Cape Peninsula 
of South Africa’, American Journal of 
Primatology, 79 (2010), pp. 104-112.
19 Cowling, R.M.; Macdonald, I.A.W. & 
Simmons, M.T. The Cape Peninsula, 
South Africa: Physiographical, biological 
and historical background to an 
extraordinary hot-spot of biodiversity’, 
Biodiversity and Conservation, 5 (1996), 
pp. 527-550. https://doi.org/10.1007/
BF00137608 
 Schulze, B.R. Climate of South Africa. 
Part 8: General survey (Pretoria: 
Department of Environmental 
Affairs, 1965).
20 South African Weather Service, 
unpublished wind data, 2017.
21 Schuman, E.H. & Martin, J.A. 
‘Climatological aspects of the coastal 
wind field at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth 
and Durban’, South African Geographical 
Journal, 73 (1991), pp. 48-51.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.19
91.9713548
22 South African Weather Service, 
unpublished wind data, 2017.
101
Wasted geography
23 Schuman, E.H. & Martin, J.A. 
‘Climatological aspects of the coastal 
wind field at Cape Town, Port Elizabeth 
and Durban’, South African Geographical 
Journal, 73 (1991), pp. 48-51.  
https://doi.org/10.1080/03736245.19
91.9713548
24 Sleigh, D. Die Buiteposte (Pretoria: 
Protea Boekhuis, 2004),  
pp. 296, 301-304; Scheffler, H. 
‘Skeepsbediening en maritieme bestuur, 
1602-1795’, in C. de Wet, L. Hattingh 
& J. Visagie (eds.), Die VOC aan die 
Kaap, 1652-1795 (Pretoria: Protea 
Boekhuis, 2016).
25 Nationaal Archief Nederland (hereafer 
NAN) VOC11222 Concept Instructie 
voor de opperhoofde van de Scheepen 
der generale Neederlandsche 
geoctroijeerde Oost Indische Comp 
zoo van hier na Indien gaande als 
van daar herwaarts komende en de 
Tafelbaaij aan Cabo de Goede Hoop 
willende aandoen (no date, probably 
mid-eighteenth century).
26 NAN VOC4826 Zeilaas-Ordre van 
Batavia over Cabo de Bona Esperance 
naar het Patria in October en November, 
25/8/1769.
27 National Archive, United Kingdom, Kew 
(hereafter NAUK) WO1/323, Baring to 
Dundas, 4/1/1795, pp. 1-2.
28 See the correspondence between 
Baring and Dundas in G.M. Theal (ed.), 
Records of the Cape Colony from 1793 
to December 1796, Vol I (London: 
Government of the Cape Colony, 1897), 
pp. 19-23.
29 Blankett to Napean, 25/1/1795, in 
M. Boucher & N. Penn, Britain at the 
Cape, 1795-1803 (Houghton: Brenthurst 
Press, 1992), p. 22.
30 Grenville to York, 1/2/1795, and 
Order from the Prince of Orange to the 
Governor of the Cape of Good Hope, 
7/2/1795, in G.W. Eybers (ed.), Select 
Constitutional Documents Illustrating 
South African History, 1795-1910 
(London: George Routledge & Sons, 
1918), pp. 1-3.
31 Allardyce, A. Memoir of the Honourable 
George Keith Elphinstone (Edinburgh: 
W. Blackwood, 1882), pp. 85-86.
32 Elphinstone to Dundas, 21/3/1795, 
in W.G. Perin (ed.), The Keith Papers. 
Selected from the Letters and Papers of 
Admiral Viscount Keith, Vol I (London: 
Navy Records Society, 1927), p. 248.
33 Allardyce, A. Memoir of the Honourable 
George Keith Elphinstone (Edinburgh: 
W. Blackwood, 1882), p. 86.
34 NAUK WO1/893 East India Company, 
Memorial of Captain James Rees 
Commodore of the Fleet of East India 
Ships which sailed from England in 
May 1795 with troops on a secret 
expedition on behalf of himself and the 
commanders and officers employed 
under him on that expedition, to the 
Court of Directors of the East India 
Company, 31/5/1797, p. 131.
35 Clarke’s Orders from the Horse Guards, 
4/5/1795, in G.M. Theal (ed.), Records of 
the Cape Colony from 1793 to December 
1796, Vol I (London: Government of the 
Cape Colony, 1897), pp. 38-39.
102
Thean Potgieter & Hennie Smit
36 NAUK WO1/323 Journal of 
G.K. Elphinstone, June 1795, p. 263.
37 Royal Collection Trust, RCIN 400990, 
George Keith Elphinstone, later 
Viscount Keith (1746-1823), painted by 





38 Cape Archive Depot (hereafter CA) 
VC75, P.W. Marnitz, Verhaal van de 
Overgaave van de Kaap de Goede Hoop 
aan de Engelshen door een Vriend der 
waarheid aldaar (handwritten copy, 
21/11/1796), pp. 33-35.
39 CA C202, Resolutiën, 27/3/1792,  
pp. 220-221; and C714, Bijlagen, Gilquin 
and Thibault to Rhenius, 27/2/1792, 
pp. 73-74.
40 CA C714, Bijlagen, Gilquin and Thibault 
to Rhenius, 27/2/1792, pp. 69-75.
41 CA C704, Bijlagen. Generale Staat van 
Ammunitie Goederen van Oorlog, 
November 1792, pp. 105-106.
42 De Jong, C. Reizen naar de Kaap de Goede 
Hoop, Ierland en Noorwegen, Vol II, 
(Haarlem: François Bohn, 1802), p. 84.
43 CA M1/3563, Plan de la Ville Du 
Cap de Bonne Esperance et de ses 
Environs, 1793 (Fortifications around 
Cape Town).
44 CA C231, Resolutiën, 11/6/1795,  
pp. 130-132.
45 Cory, G.E. The Rise of South Africa 
(London, 1910), p. 56.
46 Elphinstone Journal, in G.M. Theal 
(ed.), Records of the Cape Colony from 
1793 to December 1796, Vol I (London: 
Government of the Cape Colony, 1897), 
pp. 58-60.
47 William Fehr Collection, 
Robert Jacob Gordon (copy of the 
original received from the Castle 
Military Museum).
48 NAUK WO1/323, Journal of 
G.K. Elphinstone, June 1795,  
pp. 254-255.
49 CA C231, Elphinstone and Craig Report 
to the Council of Policy, 13/6/1795, 
attached to Resolutiën, 13-14/6/1795, 
pp. 152-156.
50 CA C231, Resolutiën, 13-14/6/1795,  
pp. 165-166.
51 CA C231, Council of Policy to 
Elphinstone and Craig 14/6/1795, 
attached to Resolutiën, 13-14/6/1795, 
pp. 167-168.
52 Council of Policy to Craig, 19/6/1795, 
in G.M. Theal (ed.), Records of the Cape 
Colony from 1793 to December 1796, 
Vol I (London: Government of the Cape 
Colony, 1897), p. 65.
53 Elphinstone to Admiralty, 17/6/1795, 
in W.G. Perin (ed.), The Keith Papers. 
Selected from the Letters and Papers of 
Admiral Viscount Keith, Vol I (London: 
Navy Records Society, 1927), p. 276.
54 Erskine, P. ‘Admiral Elphinstone’s Naval 
Task Force 1795-1796.  
The Memorabilia of the first British 
Occupation’, in Antiques in South Africa, 
12 (1983), p. 86.
103
Wasted geography
55 Elphinstone to Dundas, 17/6/1795, 
in W.G. Perin (ed.), The Keith Papers. 
Selected from the Letters and Papers of 
Admiral Viscount Keith, Vol I (London: 
Navy Records Society, 1927), p. 273.
56 Elphinstone Journal, 18/6/1795, in 
W.G. Perin (ed.), The Keith Papers. 
Selected from the Letters and Papers of 
Admiral Viscount Keith, Vol I (London: 
Navy Records Society, 1927), p. 267.
57 Elphinstone and Craig to Dundas, 
27/6/1795, in G.M. Theal (ed.), 
Records of the Cape Colony from 1793 
to December 1796, Vol I (London: 
Government of the Cape Colony, 1897), 
p. 82.
58 CA VC68, Brieven en Bijlagen,  
pp. 666-667; and C231, Resolutiën, 
2/7/1795, pp. 378-380.
59 UCT Libraries Digital Collection, 
John Bew, A map and chart of the Cape 
of Good Hope, with the Soundings in 




60 South Africa 1: 50 000 sheet 3418 AB & 
AD Cape Peninsula (Cape Town: Chief 
Directorate of Surveys and Mapping, 
8th edition, 2010).
61 CA C714, Bijlagen, Gilquin and Thibault 
to Rhenius, 27/2/1792, pp. 69-75.
62 Brenthurst Library (hereafter BL) 
MS344/3, Craig to Elphinstone, 
17/7/1795. See also Elphinstone to 
Craig, 27/7/1795, in W.G. Perin (ed.), 
The Keith Papers. Selected from the 
Letters and Papers of Admiral Viscount 
Keith, Vol I (London: Navy Records 
Society, 1927), p. 339.
63 BL, MS 344/3, Viscount Keith Papers, 
Craig to Elphinstone, 17/7/1795.
64 Elphinstone Journal, 13 and 15/7/1795, 
in W.G. Perin (ed.), The Keith Papers. 
Selected from the Letters and Papers 
of Admiral Viscount Keith, Vol I 
(London: Navy Records Society, 1927), 
pp. 334-335.
65 Elphinstone to Craig, 26/7/1795, in 
W.G. Perin (ed.), The Keith Papers. 
Selected from the Letters and Papers 
of Admiral Viscount Keith, Vol I 
(London: Navy Records Society, 1927), 
pp. 336-338.
66 BL, MS 344/8, Memorandum, Craig to 
Elphinstone, 25/7/1795. 
67 CA VC75, P.W. Marnitz, Verhaal van de 
Overgaave van de Kaap de Goede Hoop 
aan de Engelshen door een Vriend der 
waarheid aldaar (handwritten copy, 
21/11/1796), p. 72.
68 CA VC75, P.W. Marnitz, Verhaal van de 
Overgaave van de Kaap de Goede Hoop 
aan de Engelshen door een Vriend der 
waarheid aldaar (handwritten copy, 
21/11/1796), pp. 68-72.
104
Thean Potgieter & Hennie Smit
69 Elphinstone to Dundas, 18/8/1795, 
in G.M. Theal (ed.), Records of the Cape 
Colony from 1793 to December 1796, 
Vol I (London: Government of the Cape 
Colony, 1897), p. 114.
70 Ross to Scott, 14/8/1795, in M. Boucher 
& N. Penn, Britain at the Cape, 
1795-1803 (Houghton: Brenthurst 
Press, 1992), p. 43.
71 NAUK ADM51/1136, Journal of the 
Proceedings Commodore Blankett, 
see August 1795; and CA VC75, 
P.W. Marnitz, Verhaal van de Overgaave 
van de Kaap de Goede Hoop aan 
de Engelshen door een Vriend der 
waarheid aldaar (handwritten copy, 
21/11/1796), p. 303.
72 Percival, R. An account of the Cape of 
Good Hope (London: C. & R. Baldwin, 
1804), pp. 66-67.
73 Ibid. p. 64.
74 Copy of ‘Kaart van de Situatie Tussen 
Baaij Fals en de Groote Wijnbergh, 
Aan de Caap’de Goede Hoop‘, in 
H.C.V. Leibbrandt & J.E. Heeres, 
Memorien van den Gouverneur Van de 
Graaff over de Gebeurtenissen aan De 
Kaap De Goede Hoop in 1780-1806, 
pamphlet copied from the proceedings 
of the Utrecht Historisch Genootschap 
(no publisher or date, probably 1890s).
75 National Parliament Collection 17998, 
Johan Christiaan Friderici, Muyzenberg 
den VII August anno MDCCXCV.
76 CA VC76, H.D. Campagne, Memorie en 
bijzonderheden wegens overgave der 
Kaap de Goede Hoop 1795 (handwritten 
copy, 17/5/1797), pp. 52-53; and 
Neethling, C.L. Onderzoek van’t 
verbaal van A.J. Sluysken, voormalige 
commissaris van Cabo de Goede Hoop, en 
verdediging van’t gedrag der Caapsche 
burgery (place of publication not 
indicated, 1797), pp. 52-54.
77 CA VC75, P.W. Marnitz, Verhaal van de 
Overgaave van de Kaap de Goede Hoop 
aan de Engelshen door een Vriend der 
waarheid aldaar (handwritten copy, 
21/11/1796), pp. 353-357.
78 CA VC76, H.D. Campagne, Memorie en 
bijzonderheden wegens overgave der 
Kaap de Goede Hoop 1795 (handwritten 
copy, 17/5/1797), p. 73.
79 CA C231, Resolutiën (Secrete), 
12/8/1795; see Elphinstone and Craig 
to the Policy Council, 12/8/1795.
80 BL MS 344/12, Craig to Elphinstone, 
9/8/1795.
81 Allardyce, A. Memoir of the Honourable 
George Keith Elphinstone (Edinburgh: 
W. Blackwood, 1882), p. 98.
82 NAUK ADM50/64, Admirals Journals, 
Vice Admiral Elphinstone, HMS 
Monarch, 4/4/1795- 13/1/1797, 
4/9/1795.
83 CA VC76, H.D. Campagne, Memorie en 
bijzonderheden wegens overgave der 
Kaap de Goede Hoop 1795 (handwritten 
copy, 17/5/1797), pp. 140-141.
105
Wasted geography
84 CA VC75, P.W. Marnitz, Verhaal van de 
Overgaave van de Kaap de Goede Hoop 
aan de Engelshen door een Vriend der 
waarheid aldaar (handwritten copy, 
21/11/1796), p.  235.
85 Barnard verifies this account with 
reference to a number of contemporary 
sources. See Barnard, C.J. ‘Robert Jacob 
Gordon se loopbaan aan die Kaap 
(MA thesis, Stellenbosch University), 
in C. Beyers et al. (eds.), Archives Year 
Book for South African History, 13(1)
(Cape Town: Archives, 1950), p. 428.
86 Holland Rose, J. William Pitt and the 
Great War (London: G. Bell and Sons, 
1911), p. 254.
87 Erskine, P. ‘Admiral Elphinstone’s 
Naval Task Force 1795-1796. 
The Memorabilia of the first British 
Occupation’, in Antiques in South Africa, 
12 (1983), p. 88.
88 NAUK WO 1/324, Dundas to 
Elphinstone, 16/1/1796, p. 483.
89 Boshoff, W.H. & Fourie, J. ‘Explaining 
ship traffic fluctuations at the early Cape 
settlement 1652-1793’, South African 
Journal of Economic History, 23(1) 
(2008), pp. 1-27. https://doi.
org/10.1080/10113430809511206
90 Potgieter, T. ‘Verdediging van die Kaap 
teen ‘n buitelandse bedreiging, 1781 
en 1795’, in C. de Wet, L. Hattingh 
& J. Visagie (eds.), Die VOC aan die 
Kaap, 1652-1795 (Pretoria: Protea 
Boekhuis, 2016).
107
Evert Kleynhans, Department of Military History, Faculty of Military Science 
Stellenbosch University, South Africa
CHAPTER 4
A historical analysis of the influence of climate 
and terrain on the South African military operations 
in East Africa, 1940-1941
Evert Kleynhans 
Introduction
The deployment of the 1st South African Division (1st SA Div) to East Africa 
during the Second World War is the subject of a number of historical and 
popular works. The first works published on the South African deployment to 
this theatre provide a rare in-depth narrative on the campaign, and appeared 
as early as 1941, to help bolster wartime morale. These works, despite being 
overtly propagandistic, add to the discussion about the South African offensive 
operations in East Africa.1 On the other hand, some publications that followed 
barely attempted historical objectivity in their analyses of the successes and 
failures of the South African offensive operations; while others offered a unique, 
and highly doubtful, perspective on elements of the Union Defence Force’s (UDF) 
deployment.2 The unfortunate (and politically motivated) closure of the Union 
War Histories Section in 1961, after the appearance of only three official 
histories, meant that an official history of the South African deployment to East 
Africa during the Second World War, though planned, never materialised.3
In an attempt to ensure that the official histories programme of the Union War 
Histories Section would continue, the Advisory Committee on Military History 
tasked Neil Orpen and his team to complete the recording of South Africa’s 
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participation in the Second World War. The resultant publications – best 
classified as semi-official histories – largely lack original research and rely too 
heavily on the unpublished manuscripts of the Union War Histories Section.4 
The first volume of the South African Forces in World War II series appeared in 
1968, under the title East African and Abyssinian Campaigns. Though primarily 
a campaign history, Orpen’s work is the most complete publication to have 
appeared regarding the South African operations in East Africa. However, 
the book fails to effectively place the South African operations during the 
campaign in a strategic context against the backdrop of the more significant 
Allied offensive operations in the theatre.5 Some of the more recent works to 
appear on the South African operations in East Africa merely recirculate the 
ideas and concepts emanating from earlier publications, and thus add no new 
strategic or operational analysis of the campaign itself.6 A number of recently 
published academic articles and postgraduate dissertations bolster the 
available historiography and bring a new, in-depth perspective to the study of 
the South African participation in the East African campaign.7 The latest work 
to appear on the campaign is Andrew Stewart’s The First Victory: The Second 
World War and the East Africa Campaign.8 Stewart critically discusses the entire 
East African campaign and offers a detailed discussion of the operational and 
strategic levels of war during the campaign. His discussion of the South African 
offensive operations, and the impact of climate and terrain on the Allied military 
operations, remains somewhat lacking. It is, however, the most complete account 
of the East African campaign to date.
The historical impact of the East African climate and terrain on the UDF 
operations during the campaign has received little to no scholarly attention. This 
is in stark contrast to concurrent trends in international historiography, where 
the analysis of the historical impact of climate and terrain on warfare has proven 
popular, especially amongst military historians and geographers.9 There are, 
however, five works that deserve mention. Two publications, Nine Flames and 
Salute the Sappers,10cover the South African Engineer Corps (SAEC) deployment 
to the East African theatre during the war. These books help one appreciate the 
significant influence of geography on the offensive operations during the East 
African campaign, as well as the strenuous efforts of the South African engineers 
to provision the Allied Forces with sufficient water supplies during operations. 
Deon Visser first addressed the specific impact of water, especially the provision 
thereof, on South African military operations in a 2011 article.11 The following 
year he co-authored an article with Ezekiel Nyanchaga that specifically focussed 
on the SAEC water supply operations during the East African campaign.12 Both 
of these articles addressed little-known aspects of the South African campaign, 
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and Visser and Nyanchaga offered a fresh analysis of a crucial determinant to 
the military operations during the East African campaign. The most recent 
South African academic work to appear on the campaign is Elri Liebenberg’s 
The Springboks in East Africa: The role of 1 SA Survey Company (SAEC) in the 
East African Campaign of World War II, 1940-1941. The article is, however, 
fraught with military and historical inaccuracies, and adds little to the available 
historiography.13
Despite the recent analysis of the East African campaign, and various aspects 
of the UDF deployment to this theatre, several gaps remain, especially on the 
impact of climate and terrain on the South African military operations. To fill 
the identified hiatus in the historiography, this chapter has three aims: firstly, to 
discuss the distinct East African operational environment; secondly, to evaluate 
the influence of the operational environment on the planning for the campaign, 
and in particular that of the South African offensive operations; and lastly, to 
investigate the effect of the physical environment on the South African military 
deployment to East Africa throughout 1940 and 1941. In doing so, the chapter 
uncovers aspects of the South African campaign that have received little or no 
scholarly attention before.
The East African operational environment
In December 1939 and March 1940, the office of the Chief of the General Staff of 
the UDF drafted two separate military appreciations on the strategic situation in 
East Africa. These appreciations were drafted in lieu of the possible deployment 
of South African troops to Kenya to help check Italian aggression in the event of 
war. The British in particular feared that the Italian forces in East Africa could 
simultaneously overrun Sudan and Egypt, after which its forces might threaten 
the British possessions of Kenya and Tanganyika, and possibly even South Africa.14 
The military appreciations provided the South African defence planners with 
valuable information on the East African operational environment. Of particular 
importance was the detailed discussion in each appreciation about the influence 
of the topography and climate on the theatre of operations and future operations. 
The appreciations confirmed that the topography of the theatre conferred both 
a strategic and an operational advantage on the defenders of Italian East Africa, 
though they rarely used it to their benefit during the campaign. The unforgiving 
East African terrain encompassed an area of approximately 870 000 square 
kilometres, extending from the flat, featureless and almost waterless bush 
country of the Northern Frontier District (NFD) in Kenya to the coastal plains 
of Italian Somaliland and the rolling bush country and mountains of Abyssinia.15
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Figure 4.1 Map of the general relief of the East African theatre of operations16
The topography of Kenya varies considerably. The areas at altitudes below 
1 200 metres above sea level were bush country, arid and sweltering hot. 
The areas above 1 500 metres, where the climate was healthy, and where the 
political, economic and military hub of the British protectorate was situated, 
were known as the highlands. The Kenyan Highlands offered the Allied forces 
a strong defensive position from where they could protect their lines of 
communications stretching north into the NFD. The NFD, in turn, at an average 
elevation of 360 metres above sea level, bordered on southern Abyssinia 
and Italian Somaliland, and was considered very hot and arid. It comprised 
a low-lying, waterless semi-desert with very few geographically defendable 
positions. During the rainy season, this area also turned into a quagmire, 
which proved a significant obstacle to any military force trying to traverse it. 
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Lake Rudolph (Turkana), situated to the north-west of the Kenyan Highlands, 
formed the Allied left flank, while the Tana River formed the right flank of the 
Kenyan Highlands from Garissa to its mouth in the Indian Ocean. The area to 
the west of Lake Rudolph was considered very difficult country for military 
operations, though the flank was vulnerable in the event of war. The Tana River 
in the east was a serious obstacle from Garissa to its mouth, especially in wet 
weather, and it provided excellent protection to the Allied right flank. The 
coastal route from Malindi to Mombasa had two ferry crossings, which could be 
easily outflanked by Italian forces in the event of an invasion. After crossing the 
Kenyan border into southern Abyssinia, the altitude rose to 1 200 metres above 
sea level and continued rising gradually. A high range of mountains further 
traversed the spine of Italian East Africa from north to south. The mountains 
along the Abyssinian Plateau, at an average elevation of 2 750 metres above 
sea level, formed a stable defensive position with high ridges and deep valleys. 
The Abyssinian Plateau extended to the west and continued to present a firm 
defensive position to the Italian forces, especially against attacks originating 
from the Sudan or Kenya.17
Figure 4.2 Terrain typical of the Northern Frontier District in Kenya18
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Figure 4.3 South African motorised infantry traversing a stretch of waterless desert19
Regarding climate, the military appreciations concluded that East Africa 
had extreme variations in rainfall and temperature, which, in turn, fostered a 
diverse disease ecology. The proximity of East Africa to the equator, the Indian 
Ocean and the inter-tropical convergence zone (ITCZ), greatly influenced the 
climate of the theatre of operations. When combined, the extreme rains, varied 
temperatures and prevalence of disease made East Africa a challenging theatre 
in which to conduct military operations. There were two distinct rainy seasons 
in East Africa: a ‘small’ one towards the end of the year, and a ‘long’ one from 
April onwards. The rains thus limited the campaign seasons to January, February 
and March, and about the end of May to October. The rainfall was nearly always 
accompanied by thunderstorms, which naturally affected the movement of 
armed forces. In the NFD, torrential rains also turned the black cotton soil into an 
impassable morass. Despite the rain and the presence of some large rivers, water 
remained a scarce commodity in the areas below 1 200 metres above sea level 
throughout the year. Water was, however, more plentiful in a 240-kilometre belt 
to the north of the Kenya-Abyssinia border, owing to the presence of permanent 
streams originating in the Abyssinian Plateau.
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Ethiopia 7.9 30.5 56.5 80.6 90.8 70.6 113.2 123.2 77.7 70.0 33.4 7.6
Kenya 21.5 34.3 71.4 155.3 83.8 33.5 27.8 29.0 18.4 51.8 80.6 49.2
Somalia 3.0 6.7 25.0 51.0 36.1 13.6 9.3 6.3 8.2 41.4 30.4 9.4


















Figure 4.4 Average rainfall in the East Africa theatre of operations, 1939-194120
Regarding temperature, the low-lying areas of East Africa were described as arid 
and hot, with warnings against sunstroke, while the temperatures inland and in 
the highlands were moderate and healthy. At sea level, the average temperature 
varied between 26 degrees and 29 degrees; in the NFD between 21 degrees 
and 27 degrees; and from 2 400 metres above sea level it dropped to about 
16 degrees. The annual range of mean monthly temperatures was small across 
the theatre of operations and rarely differed more than 3 degrees. The diurnal 
range, however, was considerable and varied from 9 degrees at sea level to as 
much as 15 degrees in the interior on fine days.21
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Figure 4.5 A map of the average annual rainfall in the East African theatre of operations22
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Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec
Ethiopia 21.6 22.8 23.6 24.2 24.1 23.6 22.7 22.4 23.0 22.6 21.7 21.2
Kenya 25.0 26.1 26.1 25.5 25.2 23.6 23.0 23.4 24.4 25.1 25.0 24.8
Somalia 25.0 26.1 27.5 28.5 28.9 27.9 27.3 27.4 28.2 27.2 26.3 25.3



















Figure 4.6 Average temperatures in the East Africa theatre of operations, 1939-194123
In the NFD and the coastal areas, marked by sporadic rainfall and extreme 
temperatures, disease was particularly rampant. Malaria, especially prevalent 
in the NFD, necessitated the issue of adequate supplies of quinine. Due to 
high levels of salts in the soil and water, dysentery – often referred to as the 
‘Habaswein Itch’, ‘Wajir Clap’ or ‘Buna Balls’ – also caused significant health 
problems. Moreover, the preponderance of tsetse fly and horse sickness negated 
the use of animal transport for an advance across the NFD.24 The South African 
defence planners thus realised that any Allied advance into Abyssinia and Italian 
Somaliland would be tough owing to the relentless topography and the extreme 
climate of the East African theatre of operations.
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Strategic and operational planning
At a strategic meeting held in the Sudan in October 1940, the Commander-in-Chief 
of the Middle East, Lieutenant General Sir A. Wavell, decided that if a series 
of coordinated attacks were launched from Kenya and the Sudan, the Italians 
could be driven from East Africa. Before this meeting, it was established that the 
Italian forces in East Africa, despite their numerical superiority over the Allies, 
were too few for the Supreme Commander of the Italian forces in East Africa, 
Prince Amadeo of Savoy, the Duke of Aosta, to consider an advance across the 
NFD into the Kenyan highlands.25 It was agreed that the conquest of Italian 
East Africa was dependent on two key factors. Firstly, the strategic port of 
Kismayu needed to be captured before an all-out invasion of Abyssinia could be 
considered, as this would shorten the Allied lines of communication across the 
inhospitable NFD. Secondly, the coordinated attacks had to be effected between 
December and March when there was a gap in the rainy weather conditions, 
because of the severe influence of rainfall on operational mobility. By the end of 
the meeting, it was agreed that the Allied offensives in East Africa would start 
early in 1941.26 During the first week of December, Wavell met with Lieutenant 
General A.G. Cunningham and Major General W. Platt, the commanders of East 
Africa and the Sudan respectively, to decide on an overall plan of action for the 
upcoming offensive operations. It was agreed that if the Massawa-Asmara area, 
Djibouti and Addis Ababa, considered the strategic nerve centre of Italian East 
Africa, was threatened in unison, Italian resistance would crumble piecemeal. 
The success of the combined offensives, however, rested on three pillars: an 
advance from Sudan by Platt’s forces; from Kenya Cunningham had to advance 
on and capture Kismayu; and last, an internal revolt needed to be fostered 
amongst the Abyssinians, as this would harass Italian lines of communication 
and make the countryside ungovernable.27
Upon his return to Nairobi, Cunningham decided to postpone Operation Canvas, 
the offensive operation aimed at capturing Kismayu, until May/June 1941. 
His decision, contrary to Wavell’s original plan, was based on several 
considerations. First, Cunningham argued that a shortage of water supplies 
would prevent the movement of a large body of men over the waterless NFD. 
Second, Italian morale was thought to be extremely high after the capture of 
British Somaliland. Third, some of his troops were not yet fully trained for 
offensive operations. Fourth, Cunningham argued that he did not have sufficient 
motor transport at his disposal to provision his forces on the long lines of 
communications that would be created by an advance on Kismayu. Fifth, he 
was cautious of the operational weather-gap and the arrival of the dreaded 
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‘long’ rains in April, as it would detrimentally affect the planned offensives. 
Cunningham therefore decided to immediately advance on the frontier with 
Abyssinia and Somaliland and establish a defensive line. These movements were 
collectively known as the ‘cutting out’ operations and would culminate in the 
establishment of a series of administrative facilities and supply depots to secure 
sufficient stockpiles before the main Allied offensive began in 1941.28
Throughout December, Cunningham was eager to launch an attack somewhere 
along the Kenya-Somaliland border. The planned attack was significant for three 
reasons. First, an attack would reduce the vast area of no-mans-land between 
Cunningham’s forward positions and that of the Italian vanguard. Second, such 
an attack would provide Allied engineers with the opportunity to improve vital 
communication links and water sources in the NFD to support future operations. 
Last, Cunningham believed that he could gain psychological ascendancy over the 
Italian troops by attacking isolated outposts. On 16 December, elements of the 
24th Gold Coast Brigade (Bde) and 1st South African Infantry Brigade (SA Bde) 
successfully attacked and captured El Wak, situated on the Kenya/Somaliland 
border. The victory at El Wak was significant for three reasons. First, the belief 
that Italian morale was far superior to that of the Allied forces was immediately 
proven wrong. Second, after the fall of El Wak, the Italian High Command 
decided to withdraw all Italian forces to their defensive line on the Juba River in 
Somaliland. Only a handful of irregular troops were left to the west of the river 
to act as harassing troops, while two well-fortified Italian outposts remained 
at Afmadu and Kismayu. Finally, the victory at El Wak decided the pace and 
intensity of the remainder of the campaign in East Africa.29 The Allied forces’ 
thrust towards Addis Ababa was now hastened by six months after the success 
at El Wak, because Cunningham realised that it was possible to secure a firm 
foothold across the Juba River by the time the dreaded ‘long’ rains arrived.30
The influence of climate and terrain on the South African 
military operations
The nature of the South African offensive operations in East Africa varied 
considerably between the limited deployment of the 1st SA Div to southern 
Abyssinia, and that of the 1st SA Bde that served with the 11th and 12th African 
Divisions through Italian Somaliland and into central Abyssinia. In a theatre 
where topography and climate relentlessly influenced military operations, it is 
apposite to divide the South African operations into two broad categories: those 
of the highly mobile opening stage of the campaign, and the infantry slog and 
penultimate battles in the mountains of central Abyssinia. The first battle for 
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Major General G.E. Brink’s 1st SA Div was fought from 16-17 January 1941, when 
he ordered the 2nd SA Bde, under the command of Brigadier F.L.A. Buchanan, to 
occupy and hold the wells at El Yibo and El Sardu in the NFD.31 The plan was 
to envelop the Italian forces occupying the area around El Yibo by armour and 
infantry acting in a mutually supportive role. The three biggest obstacles facing 
the South African fighting patrol during the operations were the extreme heat, 
the lack of adequate maps, and a severe shortage of water.32 The capture of 
El Yibo and El Sardu was completed within three days without meeting any real 
Italian resistance. This victory helped to ensure that the frontier regions of the 
Kenyan border were cleared of the Italian presence by the end of January 1941. 
In hindsight, it was principally the lacklustre Italian resistance encountered, the 
nature of the terrain, and the distinct weather-gap during the opening salvos 
of the campaign that convinced the South Africans that the nature and speed 
of their operations called for the accepted doctrine to be abandoned in lieu of 
tactical and operational requirements. This would become a hallmark of the 
South African offensive operations during the East African campaign.33
On 31 January, the 1st SA Div started to cross the Kenyan frontier into southern 
Abyssinia. During the ensuing offensive operations, the 2nd and 5th SA Bdes, the 
latter commanded by Brigadier B.F. Armstrong, successfully captured the Italian 
strongholds at Gorai (1 February); El Gumu (1 February); Hobok (2 February); 
Banno (9 February); and Mega (18 February). During the attacks on Gorai, 
El Gumu, Hobok and Banno, in particular, the South African soldiers met 
only token resistance from the Italian colonial and irregular defenders, while 
the armoured cars showed immense courage and dash during each attack.34 
Brink’s initial offensive operations in southern Abyssinia were marked by 
a high degree of mobility, as well as mutually supportive attacks launched by 
infantry, armour and the air force. During the opening salvos of the campaign, 
the terrain encountered allowed for the varied employment of the South African 
armour and motorised infantry, owing to the ability of the vehicles to deploy 
cross-country. With few undulations in the initial terrain encountered, armour 
was often used in wide flanking movements throughout the bush. This allowed 
the South African commanders to constantly effect an envelopment and gain 
both a tactical and operational surprise by deploying their armour boldly, which 
often left the accompanying infantry with only mopping-up operations around 
the objectives. This phase of the campaign was primarily fought during the 
dry season, in the period after the ‘short’ rains’, when the South African troops 
experienced average daily temperatures ranging from 37 to 43 degrees – the 
former measured in the shade. The severe temperatures experienced, often 
fluctuated by a hot wind, had a determined effect on the offensive employment 
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of South African troops. Water consumption by men and machines increased 
exponentially in areas where it was severely limited, and naturally added strain 
on the already extended lines of communication.35




Figure 4.8 South African armoured cars advancing into southern Abyssinia37
The final operation of the 1st SA Div in February was to capture the Italian fort at 
Mega, the strongest Italian bastion left in southern Abyssinia. The fort at Mega 
was protected by experienced Blackshirt and Colonial Infantry battalions, and 
was reinforced by heavy artillery and a series of minefields. Brink was indeed 
anxious when planning for the attack on Mega, because the assault on the fort 
would be the first instance during the entire campaign where South African 
fighting skills would be matched against a predominantly white Italian force. The 
South African plan of attack on Mega was based on an operational envelopment, 
aimed at cutting the Italian line of retreat into the Abyssinian hinterland 
towards Neghelli and Yavello. Owing to the rough terrain encountered, the main 
attack on Mega was primarily an infantry affair. For the first time during the 
South African operations in this sector, the armour only acted in a support role. 
In fact, the Italians only surrendered after the South African soldiers successfully 
scaled a dominating precipice, which silenced the supporting Italian artillery, 
and a final bayonet charge. The unpredictable nature of the East African 
climate was also first experienced by the South Africans during the battle of 
Mega. When the fighting started, the average daily temperature was more than 
37 degrees. Overnight, however, the East African weather closed in and a sudden 
torrential downpour engulfed Mega and its surroundings. This ensured that the 
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South African infantrymen had to endure a very cold and uncomfortable night 
out in the open. The soldiers had to contend with severe exposure due to fighting 
in summer-issue field dress, and because their blankets were unable to reach 
them. Nevertheless, the successful South African occupation of Mega ensured 
that southern Abyssinia was effectively cleared of all forms of Italian resistance 
by the end of February 1941.38 Despite the inherent effect of the climate and 
terrain on the South African military operations, the 1st SA Div accumulated a 
number of operational and tactical victories that led to the capture of a vast 
number of Italian men and equipment. By April 1941 the mainstay of the 
1st SA  Div withdrew from the theatre and redeployed to North Africa.39
After the 1st SA Bde’s success at El Wak, the Italian forces fell back to the 
Juba River, the only natural defendable feature in Somaliland and the site of 
the main Italian defensive line in the south. Cunningham’s plan for the advance 
into Somaliland required swift, sharp action, essential for capturing adequate 
supplies and water at Afmadu, Jelib, Gobwen, Jumbo and the coastal port of 
Kismayu. The advance into Somaliland effectively started on 12 February.40 
The 1st SA Bde, commanded by Brigadier D.H. Pienaar, played a crucial role 
during the advance into Somaliland, and often operated as the vanguard of the 
Allied forces. By mid-February, owing to a rapid advance – and the fact that 
the Italian soldiers made no viable defensive stand – Afmadu, Gobwen and 
Kismayu were captured. Pienaar successfully forded the Juba River at Yonte on 
17 February, whereafter the 1st SA Bde captured Jumbo, Margherita and Jelib 
by the end of February. The fording of the Juba River is considered as one of the 
most significant events, not only of the campaign, but of the entire war fought in 
Africa. The successful crossing of the Juba River before the arrival of the dreaded 
‘long’ rains meant that the hinterland of Italian Somaliland was now open for a 
rapid advance along the tarred Strada Imperiale highway.41
The new route of advance, and the terrain encountered, drastically influenced 
the deployment of South African troops. The dense bush and open desert flats 
so characteristic of the Italian Somaliland coastal belt, and to a large extent 
conducive to mobile warfare, gave way to sweeping mountains that dominated 
southern and central Abyssinia. The South African armour, now confined to 
roads and tracks, lost their freedom of movement, and infantry operations 
gained primacy. The Allied advance was extremely rapid, and after the battlefield 
successes at the Marda Pass (21 March), Harar (25 March), and Diredawa 
(29 March), Addis Ababa was successfully occupied on 6 April. After the capture 
of the Marda Pass and the occupation of Addis Ababa, the ever-present open 
flanks completely disappeared, and the highly mobile phase of the southern 
advance was replaced by a tedious infantry slog for the mountains.42
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Figure 4.9 South African engineers successfully fording the Juba River43
The fall of Addis Ababa did not see the end of mies still occupied a series of 
well-established mountain defences at Combolcia, Dessie and Amba Alagi where 
they intended to make a final stand. The battles of Combolcia (25 April), Dessie 
(27 April), and Amba Alagi (4-19 May) were primarily infantry affairs supported 
by artillery, and were fought in some of the harshest conditions of the entire 
campaign. The South African soldiers often had to attack in driving rain and 
mist, while operating in extremely hostile terrain. For the South Africans, more 
adept at mobile operations, mountain warfare and its attendant challenges was 
something distinctly new. In spite of the defensive advantages offered by the key 
terrain, the Italian defence of the mountains was negligible, to say the least, and 
after the victory at Amba Alagi in May, the Italians sued for an armistice.44
Despite the armistice, the arrival of the dreaded ‘long rains’ detrimentally 
influenced the remaining Allied operations aimed at capturing Gondar and 
subjugating central Abyssinia. In fact, after the fall of Amba Alagi, the remaining 
Allied offensive operations were halted until the ‘long’ rains had ceased all 
together – owing to the fact that all lines of communication had been rendered 
useless by impassable stretches of mud across large tracts of the East African 
theatre. As such, the last Italian forces only surrendered at Gondar in November. 
In a mere fifty-three days, however, Cunningham’s troops advanced more 
than 2 700 kilometres from the Kenyan frontier to Addis Ababa and occupied 
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some 580 000 square kilometres in the process. They also captured more 
than 50 000 prisoners, all for the loss of 135 men killed, 310 wounded, and 
another 59 missing. The South African losses alone were 73 men killed, with 
an additional 197 battle-related casualties. At the time, these operations were 
considered a military record, with the offensive operations carried out at a pace 
seldom surpassed in history, mainly due to the at times favourable climate and 
terrain, and the feeble Italian resistance encountered.45
Figure 4.10 South African infantrymen during the battle for the mountains46
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Figure 4.11 Extreme rainfall rendered large tracts of the theatre of operations impassable47
Conclusion
The East African operational environment, shown to be complex and hybrid 
in nature, had a distinct influence on the operational deployment of the Allied 
forces throughout the campaign in East Africa. The climate and terrain of the 
East African theatre also served as crucial factors during the planning and 
execution of the South African and Allied military operations throughout the 
campaign. Owing to favourable terrain and climatic conditions, the South African 
forces were highly mobile during the opening phases of the campaign, and their 
offensive operations were underpinned by operational and tactical envelopments 
during which mutually supportive attacks by infantry, armour and the air force 
were the order of the day. As the campaign progressed from the vast expanses 
of the NFD and Somaliland to the mountainous bastions of central Abyssinia, 
the terrain and climate changed considerably, which ensured that infantry 
operations gained primacy. The two largest determinants during the military 
campaign remained access to sufficient water sources, and the ever-present 
East African rains. Despite these inherent difficulties, the South African and 
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CHAPTER 5
Military prospecting for groundwater by geology 
and geophysics: Work by 42nd geological section 
(South African engineer corps) in Africa, the 
Middle East and the Mediterranean region  
during the Second World War
Edward P.F. Rose 
Introduction
42nd Geological Section of the South African Engineer Corps (SAEC), mobilised 
during the Second World War in August 1940, was the first geological team ever 
to be raised to support operations by the British Army.1 From 1943 it became one 
of only three such teams ever raised. Moreover, it was the only geological team 
ever to be raised to support British forces through operational deployment in 
campaign areas, and the only team ever to support British forces in wartime by 
means of geophysical survey. Its function was to undertake field reconnaissance 
by geological and geophysical means in order to determine sites suitable for 
drilling boreholes to abstract potable groundwater – a secure and adequate 
water supply being essential for any concentration of troops, and supplies from 
surface sources being generally inadequate for major troop concentrations in 
arid or semi-arid regions. The manpower assigned to the unit changed slightly 
over time as a consequence of practical experience and changing military 
requirements, but by September 1943 the Section had an “establishment” that 
comprised five officers and 33 other ranks, plus a lance-corporal, a private, and 




A recent article demonstrated that between August 1940 and the end of the war, 
13 officers in total contributed to the leadership of the unit, and that they were 
nearly all exceptionally well qualified in terms of their academic achievements 
and their professional geotechnical experience.2 This article complements 
that account by describing the work done by the unit when deployed to an 
operational base in East Africa (near Nairobi, Kenya) from October 1940 to 
September 1941, and from there to a base in North Africa (near Cairo, Egypt) 
from September 1941 to the end of hostilities in September 1945 and a few 
months beyond. Detachments from the Section were to work in East Africa, 
North Africa, the Middle East, and parts of the Mediterranean region.
The principles and practice of geophysical prospecting had been established 
before the war.3 Electrical resistivity was therefore known to be a technique 
particularly useful in groundwater investigation. By passing a current into the 
ground through two electrodes and measuring potential differences between 
two other electrodes, information can be obtained on the electrical resistivity of 
the rocks through which the current is passing. From this, the nature of the rocks 
and the depths at which changes take place may be inferred: different rocks have 
different resistivities. Additionally, where appropriate, the Section surveyed by 
means of a vertical force magnetometer. Some rocks, such as sills and dykes 
intruded into a sedimentary sequence, have higher magnetic permeability than 
others, so the technique allows their presence to be detected beneath a cover of 
superficial deposits.
42nd Geological Section was mobilised at Zonderwater, some 35 kilometres east 
of the city of Pretoria, on 26 August 1940:
It was at Sonderwater [sic] that the Engineer Training Camp was 
established for the mobilizing and equipping of [South African 
Engineer Corps] units. From February to June 1940 those units which 
were already in existence were called up in turn for one month’s 
continuous training prior to being called up for full-time service. 
During this period the first full-time engineer unit, 16 Field Company, 
was formed, trained, and sailed for East Africa … From June onwards 
engineer units were called up and new units formed as fast as training 
facilities and equipment became available.4
Presumably referring to the same locality, one of the Section’s first three officers 
later noted that they were sent to Premier Mine near Cullinan, also east of 
Pretoria, for preparatory military training.5 They attended a course ‘for rapid 
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conversion in a matter of weeks into officers and gentlemen’ but conversion to 
the former was never really completed: ‘… we considered ourselves primarily 
scientists.’ Completion of the course supposedly equipped the Section to deal 
with everything from gas warfare to gunnery.
East Africa
The Section was assigned for operational service as part of the British Army’s 
Middle East Command. This had been created in August 1939 as war loomed to 
embrace the separate army commands of Egypt, Sudan, and Palestine-Jordan, 
plus Cyprus (and later Malta), but was extended in early 1940 to include British 
land forces in East Africa and British Somaliland.6 The Section’s War Diary records 
that the unit left Zonderwater by train on 26 September 1940 and embarked on 
a troopship at Durban on 27 September.7 Durban was the then Union Defence 
Force’s ‘usual port of embarkation for the north’.8 The diary records that the 
Section arrived at the port of Mombasa, in southern Kenya, on 3 October. Moving 
inland by rail, on 6 October it arrived at Nairobi, Kenya’s capital and largest 
city (figure 5.1). It was to be based near there for future operations as part of 
HQ Troops.9
Thereafter the unit was split into small detachments, usually of one officer and 
a technical non-commissioned officer, plus drivers and labourers, deployed 
in the field as and when required. It was found from field experience as 
work progressed that the Section’s electrical resistivity surveys were most 
conveniently carried out by parties of seven persons: an officer to choose the 
site for investigation; one trained technician to lay out the line of survey and 
attend to minor electrical breakdowns (such as loose connections and broken 
leads); another trained technician to take the instrument readings, calculate the 
results and plot the resistivity curves; and four “labourers” (one to move each of 
the four electrodes). Ideally there was an eighth man, for odd jobs or to relieve 




Figure 5.1 Map of East Africa for 1941, with towns mentioned in the text and main British 
campaign routes (arrowed)11
Geological mapping
Kenya’s population of European origin was then mainly concentrated in 
the pastoral highlands of the country, and tribesmen in remote areas were 
sometimes hostile to visitors. Geological survey had been restricted accordingly, 
and there was no recent geological map of the country as a whole. The Section 
duly compiled one (figure 5.2).12
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Beneath the map title, its key credits the map to ‘42nd Geological Section SAEC’. 
The bottom of the key records that the compilation was based on information 
derived from five members of the Kenya Geological Survey,13 ten Survey 
publications, and five officers of 42nd Geological Section who worked in Kenya 
between 1940 and 1941.14 ‘Geological information [was] compiled and drawn’ 
by one of the five officers: Lieutenant A. Huddleston, attached to the Section from 
the Royal West African Frontier Force and formerly employed as a geologist with 
the Gold Coast Geological Survey.15 Faintly classified above its title as ‘restricted‘, 
the map was evidently compiled in 1941, although published for more general 
use later, in 1944.
Figure 5.2 Geological map of Kenya compiled in 1940-1941 and printed as one sheet at 
scale of 1: 2 000 00016
A map at larger scale was published as four sheets.17 These too record that 
‘Geological information [was] compiled and drawn by Lieut. A Huddleston, 
attached 42nd Geological Section SAEC’, with details of the map sources used. 
Classified as ‘security’, the maps were printed by the ‘East African Survey Group’ 
in 1942, sheet 3 in April and the other sheets in November.
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From geological and geophysical surveys it became clear that Kenya’s 
hydrogeology could be described in terms of three main regions:18
1. The low-lying coastal plains (<100 metres above sea level), situated in the 
east of the country, mostly comprising Pliocene or Pleistocene to Recent 
weakly consolidated “shales”, sandstones and clays (the four units shown 
at the top of the key in figure 5.2). In this region surface water supplies in 
the dry season are essentially absent, and there are no surface features 
to guide site selection for boreholes. Geophysical surveys were therefore 
necessary, to locate permeable sandstones floored by impermeable clays 
within the subsurface sedimentary sequence.
2. The Precambrian or Basement Complex, a large western area, some 
180-360 kilometres wide and more than 300 metres above sea level, of 
well-cemented sediments intruded by granites (the six units shown at the 
bottom of the key in figure 5.2). Weathered (and so relatively permeable) 
zones could easily be detected by resistivity measurements.
3. The Cretaceous to Recent volcanic rocks (shown widespread in purple 
on figure 5.2) covering almost all of the highlands of west-central 
Kenya and crossed from north to south by the Great Rift Valley. 
Resistivity measurements in this region were successful in locating 
the decomposed and water-saturated floor of various lava flows and 
the sediments sandwiched between them, features not detected from 
surface observations.
Borehole site selection
The reconnaissance and surveys carried out by the Section included a significant 
amount of geophysical work. Electrical resistivity was the technique most 
commonly used. A handbook later illustrated resistivity curves that included 
ten examples from Kenya, three from Italian Somaliland, and one each from 
Abyssinia and the Sudan border – evidence of the Section’s operational role in 
these regions.19 Additionally, magnetometer surveys were employed at times to 
provide evidence regarding structures such as faults, and minor intrusions such 
as dykes.
The Section’s work was ‘mainly of an operational nature’, and during the 
Abyssinian and Somaliland campaigns its members worked in conjunction 
with, and ahead of, 36th Drilling Company SAEC.20 This company followed the 
Section, to sink boreholes at the sites recommended. Consequently, the Section 
has been credited with facilitating the rapid British and Commonwealth victory 
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over Italian forces.21 Specifically, by locating adequate supplies of water in the 
arid regions of northern Kenya and along the Italian Somaliland-Kenya border, 
the Section enabled the troops to move forward much more rapidly than would 
otherwise have been possible. Referring to one borehole in particular, which 
was drilled in the arid coastal plain and enabled troops to advance from the 
region east of Nairobi into Italian Somaliland and hence into Abyssinia, the 
Commander-in-Chief Kenya General Cunningham said that ‘even if the Unit 
did no more useful work it had justified its formation.’22 In total, 60 boreholes 
were drilled, with a 55 per cent success rate and an average tested yield of fresh 
water of 1 100 gallons per hour (1,4 l/s), compared with 31 per cent success for 
90 other boreholes drilled without Geological Section recommendation, with an 
average yield of 200 gallons per hour less.23
Contribution to victory
British strategy for the East African Campaign had been worked out at 
a conference in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan at the end of October 1940.24 
An unsuccessful attack eastwards into Abyssinia was launched in November, 
followed by successful attacks eastward into Eritrea initiated in January 1941, 
eastward and northward from Kenya into Italian Somaliland and Abyssinia in 
February, and south from Aden into British Somaliland in March (figure 5.1). 
Operations from Kenya were led by Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham, 
who commanded about 77 000 troops, including contingents from British 
East Africa (33 000), British West Africa (9 000) and South Africa (27 000). 
Abyssinia’s capital city, Addis Ababa, was captured in April 1941, and the main 
Italian force in the country surrendered in May, although smaller units fought on 
in isolation until November.
The Section was to be widely active in Kenya, Abyssinia, Italian Somaliland and 
British Somaliland, its principal achievements summarised as:25
1. Geological reconnaissance in central and northern Kenya and the 
subsequent location of water, which opened up a route for the 21st 
(East African) Brigade north through Marsabit (figure 5.1) and into 
Abyssinia via Mega – beginning at Isiolo in central Kenya.26
2. Geological reconnaissance west of Lake Rudolf (figure 5.1) in northern 
Kenya. This opened routes for the 25th (East African) Brigade and the 24th 
(Gold Coast) Brigade, and provided a ‘backdoor entry’ into Abyssinia – 
from Kitale to Lokitaung.27
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3. Geological reconnaissance along the 150-kilometres Berbera–Hargeisa 
road in British Somaliland (figure 5.1). Provision of water enabled 
prisoner-of-war camps for defeated Italian troops to be set up in this area.
4. Geological reconnaissance along the 320-kilometres road from Nairobi 
east to Garissa and then the port of Kismayu at the southern end of Italian 
Somaliland (figure 5.1). Location of water along this route – ending at 
Afmadu – made a speedy advance into Italian Somaliland possible.28
In addition, water points were established at Mogadishu (the major port and 
capital city of Italian Somaliland) and inland at Villagio Duca degli Abruzzi 
(figure5.1); also at eight permanent camps in Kenya and one in British Somaliland.29
After the campaign
The Section’s work in East Africa came to an end in August 1941, as hostilities 
in the region drew to a close, but its War Diary records that its second in 
command, Captain G.L. Paver, had been sent to Cairo in June to prepare for a 
new assignment: in Egypt.30 Middle East Command was reorganised at various 
times, and in August 1941 an East Africa Command was separated from it. 42nd 
Geological Section was to be retained in Middle East Command, to support 
continuing combat operations.
The Section’s operational move involved some staff changes. The officer 
commanding, Major H.F. Frommurze (at 42 years of age by far the oldest officer 
in the unit) returned to his pre-war civilian duties at the Geological Survey 
of South Africa. Captain Paver, formerly his junior colleague at the Geological 
Survey, was selected for promotion to succeed him.31
Three officers attached to the Section whilst in East Africa had successively 
transferred back to East African forces, which were being reorganised at this 
time.32 Changes within East African forces included a reorganisation of the 
Water Supply Maintenance Unit (WSMU), East African Engineers, a unit that had 
been in existence since the beginning of the war, principally to maintain existing 
water points.33 When the Geological Section left for Egypt, the WSMU took on 
new functions: the location, drilling and equipping of boreholes – functions 
previously fulfilled by the Section and 36th Drilling Company SAEC. The new 
WSMU therefore included a ‘geological [and geophysical] section’,34 ‘some of 
whose officers were formerly attached to the South African Unit.’35 When the 
WSMU evolved in January 1943 into 41st (East African) Water Supply Company, 
East African Engineers, its geological section comprised a captain, a subaltern, 
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two British non-commissioned officers, and forty African other ranks.36 The 
impact of 42nd Geological Section in East Africa thus included the legacy of 
technical expertise as well as the boreholes and geological maps that remained 
after its departure.37
North Africa 
The Section sailed to Egypt from the port of Mombasa in Kenya, and from 
September 1941 set up its base on the outskirts of Cairo in northern Egypt, 
near the River Nile and some 165 kilometres south of the Mediterranean Sea 
(figure 5.3).38 That autumn, Middle East Command was re-structured to include 
two separate Army commands: troops in the Western Desert west of the Nile 
as far as the front line became the 8th Army; and troops east of the Nile, focused 
in Syria and Palestine, became the 9th Army.39 The main part of the Geological 
Section, led by Major G.L. Paver, was primarily assigned to support the 8th Army 
and its Western Desert campaign. A detachment of the Section to support the 
9th Army was led by Captain D.J. Simpson and based at Beirut – a city that became 
the capital of Lebanon when that country gained independence from Syria 
in 1943.40
Figure 5.3 Map showing Armed Forces’ areas to which Boring Sections Royal Engineers 
were deployed during the Second World War, with contemporary national 
boundaries. Shading as for figure 5.441
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Boring Sections Royal Engineers
The Section guided the drilling of wells to provide potable groundwater for 
British troops, primarily by Boring Sections of the Royal Engineers (the ‘RE’), but 
also drilling by units of the Australian and the South African forces, and civilian 
agencies.42 The Boring Sections were widely deployed in the countries covered, at 
times, by Middle East Command (figure 5.4), their assignment (and so that of the 
Geological Section) being guided by the geologist staff officer at the Command’s 
general headquarters, in Cairo, Lieutenant (later Captain) F.W. Shotton RE.43 
War Diaries for the Boring Sections preserved in the UK’s National Archives at 
times refer to assistance from 42nd Geological Section provided to No. 1 Boring 
Section,44 and to Nos. 3,45 4,46 547 and 6.48
Figure 5.4 Deployment, by Armed Forces’ area, of Boring Sections RE, numbered 1-10 
(left-hand column), progressively raised for the British Army between the 
years 1939 and 1943 and mostly disbanded by 1946; graded shading indicates 
uncertainty as to the exact time of movement49
Egypt and Libya
According to the Section’s War Diary, Captain Paver prepared the way for the 
unit to deploy to Egypt.50 He began his journey from East Africa by train on 
27 June, continuing by sea from Mombasa to land at Suez on 11 July, finally 
arriving in Cairo by 12 July. He reported that day to the Engineer-in-Chief of 
Middle East Command; was assigned to the same branch as geologist Lieutenant 
F.W. (‘Fred’) Shotton; and visited the Geological Survey of Egypt, meeting its director 
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(Dr. Little). In the following few days he read through reports on all military 
‘boring operations’ in Egypt; went with Shotton and a Major Van Sickle (an 
experienced well-borer)51 to examine the region bordering the Cairo-Alexandria 
Road; had further discussions with Shotton on 16 July; and returned to Nairobi 
in Kenya on 21 July. The War Diary ends on 31 August with the completion of 
work in East Africa, so September appears to have been the month in which the 
Section moved to Cairo.
Subsequently, the Section’s main work in Egypt concentrated on the Western 
Desert region, from the Nile Delta west to wherever the front line was located.52 
After the war, Fred Shotton published five articles in a series that described 
details of water supply in the Middle East campaigns. The first, an account of 
the main water table of the Miocene limestone in the coastal desert of Egypt, 
made no reference to the Geological Section.53 Evidence for its activity comes 
from the second article, on perched water supplies above the main water table 
of the Western Desert. That includes reference to the Fuka Basin (figure 5.5):
the supreme example of a geo-hydrological structure being fully 
elucidated by the Army … After the shape of the Fuka basin had been 
determined by boring, the 42nd Geological Section of the South African 
Engineering Corps (O.C. Major G.L. Paver) ran a series of resistivity 
traverses across it and showed that geophysical methods could 
assist in working out the underground shape of a shallow limestone/
clay contact.54
The third article, on the construction of water-collecting galleries along the 
Mediterranean coast of Egypt and eastern Libya, was also published without 
reference to the Section.55 However, the fourth, on the development of water 
supplies from boreholes adjacent to the Cairo-Alexandria desert road in 
north-west Egypt, gave acknowledgement to ‘Major Paver and Captain Roberts’ 
of the Section, both for specific borehole information and other collaboration.56 
Clearly, the reconnaissance of July 1941 had developed into a major project, 
as the proliferation of military camps and airfields along the road – with their 
consequent demand for water supplies – made it a region of ‘extreme military 
significance.’ Paver and Roberts provided guidance for a drilling programme 
that continued into 1944.57
The fifth article focused on the desert of north-east Egypt, between the Nile 
Delta and the Suez Canal, where numerous military establishments (many of 
them large) drew heavily on the Sweet Water Canal for supplies, via filtration 
and sterilisation plants.58 However, groundwater sources were also important, 
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to provide an alternative means of supply in case the treatment works were 
put out of action by enemy aerial attack; to lessen demand on the system; and 
to shorten the pipeline distribution network. The drilling programme totalled 
over 3 000 metres. Some boreholes in this area ‘were sited by a diviner in the 
early days when the Army still countenanced such methods’, but most of the 
73 military boreholes in the area were sited by means of geological survey, many 
after ‘resistivity probes’– so work by the Geological Section.59
Figure 5.5 The Fuka Basin, north-west Egypt: Geological cross-section with indication of 
borehole positions and stratigraphical logs, with (below) electrical resistivity 
curves representing the same cross-section, showing consistency with the 
borehole data60
Shotton was in the process of assembling records concerning water supply in 
the south-east desert of Egypt, the “Red Sea hills” area, when he was recalled to 
England, in September 1943. Paver took up his duties as the geologist staff officer 
at Middle East Command, whilst still directing the work of the Geological Section, 
and completed the series of publications Shotton had initiated. Unsurprisingly, 
Paver’s articles contain more data than Shotton’s on geophysics, and more 
specific references to the work of the Section. Thus the account that Shotton 
had initiated for the south-east desert was partly illustrated by diagrams that 
illustrated the geophysical as well as geological factors influencing the selection 
of borehole sites in the region’s Precambrian formations.61 In total, 41 military 
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boreholes were emplaced in this area. As the Western Desert campaign 
westwards from Egypt merged with the North African campaign eastwards from 
Morocco and Algeria, elements of the Section moved westwards into Tunisia.62 
One officer even reached Algieria.63
The Middle East
Whilst part of the Section deployed westwards from the unit’s base near Cairo, 
other elements were deployed eastwards, into Syria and Lebanon, Palestine and 
Transjordan, Iraq and Persia.
Syria and Lebanon
For Syria and Lebanon, water supply work was begun by Major G.R.S. Stow RE.64 
Stow had served with distinction in command of Boring Sections RE, including 
the drilling of boreholes within the Fuka Basin in Egypt.65 His work was ‘carried 
on by various members of the Geological Section of the South African Engineer 
Corps, notably Capt. D.J. Simpson, Capt. G.C.L. Clarke, Lieut. R. Borchers and Lieut. 
A.O. Thom[p]son,’ assisted by local officers of the Public Works Department, and 
particularly by L. Dubertret of the local government Geological Department.66 
A geological map was compiled for the region; also an innovative water quality 
map;67 and 81 boreholes were drilled. Work was still in progress during 
September 1943.68
Electrical resistivity surveys were used:
1. to establish the presence of, and depth to, the water table in the coastal 
plain and to give some estimate of quality;
2. in the coastal plain alluvial sediments, and in the Bekkaa valley alluvial 
conglomerates, to select sites with the most porous formations beneath, in 
order to yield maximum supplies by avoiding impermeable clays;
3. to establish the presence of, and depth to, perched water tables in 
mountain limestone areas (figure 5.6);
4. to locate the presence of water-bearing fissures or porous beds in volcanic 
igneous rocks; and




Figure 5.6 Schematic geological cross-section from west to east across the 
Bourkock-Qatana region in the mountainous area south of Damascus  
in Syria69, 70
Palestine and Transjordan
For Palestine (effectively modern Israel), drilling for water was carried out to 
obtain water supplies for military camps, aerodromes, base installations and 
hospitals.71 It was also carried out, in the Sinai Desert, to provide operational 
supplies and to serve the road linking Palestine to Egypt.
Considerable information was available from civilian agencies concerning 
the groundwater resources of Palestine. The military authorities duly gained 
access to this, notably via the Water Commission of the Palestine Public 
Works Department, the Geology Department of the Hebrew University, and a 
‘Dr Loehnberg’ (a consulting hydrogeologist/geophysicist). 
Topographically, northern Palestine comprises, from west to east, a coastal plain, 
mountain uplands, and the Dead Sea rift valley that contains the River Jordan. 
The desert regions of the Negev (or “Negeb”) and Sinai lie to the south and 
south-west. Most of the military boreholes were situated on the coastal plain – a 
region then understood as of Plio-Pleistocene sands, gravels and clays resting 
upon Miocene, Eocene or (more commonly in central Palestine) Cretaceous 
limestones.72 Early hydrogeological investigations for military supplies were 
carried out by Major B.W. Leake RE, assisted by the Palestine Government 
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Geologist and Dr. Loehnberg. Subsequent geological and geophysical surveys 
for the development of new sources of groundwater were carried out under 
the field supervision of Captains D.J. Simpson and G.C.L. Clarke, and Lieutenants 
R. Borchers and A.O. Thompson, of 42nd Geological Section. Well boring was 
contracted to No.1 Australian Boring Section, Royal Air Force; Nos. 1, 5 and 7 
Boring Sections RE; and No. 104 Water Boring Section, SAEC.
Applications of geophysics in this region included: 
1. iso-resistivity mapping (for example, figure 5.7) in the Plio-Pleistocene 
deposits of the coastal plain to ensure maximum supplies and to avoid 
encountering a stratigraphical unit of impermeable clay at too shallow 
a depth; 
2. location of depth to faulting within underlying limestones in mountain 
borderland regions; 
3. location of localised or perched water tables in mountain limestone 
areas; and 
4. measurement of thickness and comparative porosity of alluvial deposits in 
dry river valleys (wadis).
The military surveys concluded that boreholes in the Plio-Pleistocene sediments 
of the coastal plain would produce yields of 10 000 gallons per hour (g.p.h.) 
[12,6 l/s] if the impermeable clay beds were avoided; bores in the mountain 
borderland could, under favourable circumstances, provide good yields from 
the underlying Cretaceous limestones; bores in the mountain uplands were 
more problematical, but yields of 1 000 g.p.h. could be obtained; water in the 
Sinai Desert was best obtained from dug wells – rather than boreholes – in wadi 
gravels, with yields of 1 000 g.p.h. and sometimes more; and the Negev area, 
although not developed, had geological structures potentially favourable for 
obtaining moderate supplies from medium to deep bores.
For the country of Transjordan (now essentially Jordan) adjacent to the east, 
development of water supplies took place in conjunction with the development 
of two main supply routes (the Aqaba-Maaan-Amman road and rail route, and 
the Haifa-Baghdad road), and at a few isolated localities.73 Well boring was 
carried out initially, in 1940, by Palestinian contract drillers, but subsequently 
by Boring Sections RE and the South African Engineer Corps: 24 boreholes in 
total.74 The Geological Section carried out geophysical surveys to guide selection 
of particular borehole sites. It also completed a comprehensive water resources 
survey for the country.
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Figure 5.7 Iso-resistivity map, at depth of 60 metre, for Plio-Pleistocene sedimentary rocks 
of Ramle (present-day Ramla) in the coastal area of central Palestine, with 
resistivity curves and stratigraphical logs for two borehole sites75
Geological investigations relating to groundwater supplies were carried out 
initially by Major Fred Shotton, and geophysical surveys made under the field 
supervision of the Section’s Captain D.J. Simpson and Lieutenant A.O. Thompson. 
Thompson also completed detailed surface water supply reconnaissance 
surveys. Three groundwater provinces were consequently distinguished in:
1. north and central parts of the country, Late Cretaceous limestones were 
the main aquifers, with yields in the order of 250-1 000 g.p.h. of good 
quality water;
2. south, earlier “Nubian Sandstone” yielded only low supplies 
(100-200 g.p.h.) of poor quality water from aquifers at considerable 
depth; and
3. extreme south, the coastal area near the port of Aqaba had a water table at 
sea level, with water of only fair quality drawn only from the top.
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Military applications of geophysics for Transjordan were primarily resistivity 
measurements in: 
1. limestone country, to locate and estimate depths to the water table and to 
elucidate sub-surface structure; 
2. Nubian Sandstone, similarly to locate and estimate depths to the water 
table and to measure the depth to underlying granitic bedrock; 
3. granitic escarpment area to the east, to measure the depth of wadi gravel 
deposits; and 
4. coastal areas, to trace the occurrence of coarse sands and gravels and to 
give information concerning salinity.
However, magnetic measurements were also made in Nubian Sandstone areas, 
to trace major faults in the underlying granitic basement and granite areas, to 
locate the presence and trend of minor intrusions (dykes).
Persia and Iraq
For Persia (now Iran) and Iraq, military development of water supplies was 
actively pursued during the war by units of the Royal Engineers, particularly 
during the period 1942-1943, in planning for a possible total evacuation of 
Allied forces in the Middle East.76 No. 7 Boring Section RE not only constructed 
boreholes, but also carried out extensive hydrogeological reconnaissance in 
Iraq and central Persia.77 Detachments of 42nd Geological Section also carried 
out extensive hydrogeological and geophysical surveys, in northern Iraq and 
in south-east Persia.78 A detachment assigned to the British 9th Army surveyed 
for groundwater in Iraq, in the region of Mosul, north to the border with Syria. 
A detachment assigned to the British 10th Army operated in Persia, in the 
south-east desert area of that country, for about three and a half months, before 
being recalled to Cairo.
All the work was directed towards the establishment of adequate water supplies 
along main routes: Haifa-Baghdad (the Iraq desert road); Baghdad-Kermanshah-
Teheran (a road route); Ahwaz-Arak-Teheran (a rail route); Isfahan-Yezd-Zahidan 
(the south-east desert road), and Zahidan-Meshed-Teheran (a road to the Union 
of Soviet Socialist Republics, “Russia”). Since the routes were mainly confined 
to alluvial plains, and only occasionally traversed mountain areas (by way of 
detritus-covered valley floors), groundwater investigations fell into two obvious 
categories: water supplies in the plains or broad valleys, and those in narrow 
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mountain defiles. Geophysical surveys were deemed to be of great assistance 
when directed towards:
1. establishing the presence of, and depth to, the main free water table in the 
valley fill deposits; 
2. locating in these deposits zones of high porosity at water-table level, so 
maximising potential abstraction; 
3. mapping the sub-surface alluvial/bedrock contact, thereby assisting 
location of favourable drilling sites at the valley sides when so required; 
4. locating faults and dykes in the bedrock; and 
5. locating high porosity zones in alluvial deposits of the Euphrates valley.
The Mediterranean region
Allied victory in North Africa was achieved in May 1943, with the surrender 
in Tunisia of the remaining German and Italian forces.79 Thereafter, greater 
attention was given to the potential development of groundwater resources on 
the Mediterranean islands of Cyprus and Malta (figure 5.3), and later in Italy 
and Greece.
Cyprus
Drilling for water on the eastern Mediterranean island of Cyprus was undertaken 
on a fairly extensive scale to secure supplies of water for military camps, defence 
areas, aerodromes and hospitals.80 This work was done in co-operation with the 
Irrigation and Water Supply Department of the Cyprus Colonial Government. 
The island’s geological and hydrogeological conditions had been fairly well 
established by this time, but the Geological Section was to generate an updated 
geological map as part of its survey work – a map used to guide emplacement of 
boreholes (figure 5.8).81
A resistivity survey of the Nicosia airfield region generated an iso-resistivity map 
‘typical of the technique of representation of the geophysical measurements 
carried out by the 42nd Geological Section …which is slightly different from 
the method of individual interpretation of depth probe curves as employed by 
previous continental geophysicists’.82 Geophysical surveys for the location of 
borehole sites for water were carried out largely under the field supervision 
of Captain G.C.L. Clarke.83 They resulted in a significant improvement in the 
proportion of boreholes yielding adequate water.84 Before November 1943, 
46 boreholes were drilled without the benefit of geophysical guidance, of 
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which 21 (46 per cent) were successful in locating adequate groundwater. After 
November 1943, with geophysical guidance, 19 holes were drilled, of which 16 
(84 per cent) were successful.
Figure 5.8 Geological map of Cyprus with location of military boreholes, compiled by 
42nd Geological Section SAEC, distinguishing boreholes drilled by government 
agencies from those drilled by Royal Engineers or by SAEC units85
Malta
Water supply has always been a problem on Malta. The largest island of a small 
archipelago situated between Tunisia and Sicily, in the central Mediterranean 
area, it experiences a Mediterranean climate of cool wet winters and hot dry 
summers. The main features of geology and of groundwater occurrence had 
been well established pre-war, but proposals to use Malta as a base to support 
the Allied invasion of Sicily (in July 1943) and operations on the Italian 
mainland (from September 1943) led to military action to enhance water 
supplies. The Director of the Geological Survey of Great Britain, Dr. E.B. (later 
“Sir Edward”) Bailey, was sent from England to Malta (via Gibraltar) in February 
1943 to provide hydrogeological advice, and was soon followed more directly 
from Egypt by a detachment of No. 3 Boring Section RE.86
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At the end of his six weeks of fieldwork on Malta, Bailey generated a report that 
discussed hydrogeology with a new degree of precision. It was already well 
known that the geology comprised a Late Miocene “Upper Coralline” limestone 
formation separated by a “Blue Clay” from underlying “Globigerina” and 
“Lower Coralline” limestones of Early Miocene/Late Oligocene age (figure 5.9). 
The Upper Coralline limestone contained a perched aquifer, whereas the main 
water table lay at about sea level within the Globigerina or Lower Coralline 
limestones. Bailey compiled a map contouring the height of the Globigerina/
Lower Coralline formation boundary to guide boring operations.
However, only one borehole was put down during the time of Bailey’s visit; 
36 more were to follow between March and August 1943. The choice of sites 
was guided by visits (in April, May and June) of geologist staff officers from 
Cairo – Captain Shotton and Major Paver – and by geological and geophysical 
investigations carried out by 42nd Geological Section.87 Paver was later to 
compile an account of Malta as one of the case histories on water supply in the 
Middle East campaigns, but, unlike others by Shotton and by himself, it was not 
published.88 It was superseded by a more extensive account, written mostly 
between September and November 1945.89
Military well drilling on Malta was re-activated in March 1944, when No. 7 Boring 
Section RE arrived from Egypt.90 The unit began boring in April, and continued 
until October. In total, 122 holes were drilled on behalf of the Civil Government 
and the War Department, 24 on behalf of the Air Ministry, and three on behalf 
of the Admiralty. To guide drilling, a detachment of one officer and 12 men from 
the Geological Section was based on Malta from March until October 1944. The 
Section revised Bailey’s structural contour map for the island, and helped to guide 
a project that effectively created ‘an entirely new water works for the Island’.91
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At the end of the North African campaign the main work of the Unit was virtually 
over as the theatre of war moved rapidly to Europe where water supply problems 
were not as important as they were in the semi-arid and desert areas of Middle 
East Command.94 However, one detachment went with the expeditionary force 
to Italy; another went on a brief visit to the Aegean; and another went to Greece.
The Italian campaign began with the Allied invasion of Sicily from North Africa 
in July 1943, followed by invasion of the Italian mainland in September.95 
Allied forces were supported throughout the campaign by a Staff Officer 
(Geology), Captain (later Major) J.V. Stephens.96 As the campaign developed, 
he was supported by another geologist as a Deputy Assistant Director of Works 
(Major W.A. Macfadyen), and Lieutenant P.A. Spens was temporarily attached 
to a Boring Section RE in order to undertake geological reconnaissance.97 
Stephens obviously had access to the expertise of 42nd Geological Section: 
his personal document file, now preserved in the Royal Engineers Museum, 
Library and Archive at Chatham, contains details of its establishment as at 
September 1943.98 Some geophysical work was undertaken in Sicily in September 
and October 1943, directed by Captain [Digby] Roberts, Officer Commanding 
No. 3 Detachment 42nd Geological Section.99 His detachment was in Sicily, 
operating with No. 1 Boring Section RE under extremely difficult conditions, 
with inadequate transport and little perceived need for its services. However, 
War Diaries for the Boring Sections RE deployed to Sicily and subsequently 
mainland Italy make no mention of Section assistance after November.100
No. 4 Boring Section RE had deployed to Greece in March 1940, but was one of the 
first units of the British and Commonwealth expeditionary force to be evacuated, 
on 24 April, before the Geological Section had arrived in the Middle East.101 
The Section’s Captain Simpson reported on a “special duty” reconnaissance to 
the Greek islands of Castel Rosso and Leros in 1943.102 However, a new British 
expeditionary force did not move to Greece until October 1944. The German 
occupation force had largely withdrawn, and the Allied force consisted mainly 
of specialist troops to help reconstruct the country’s infrastructure. These 
quickly became caught up in the civil war that had followed German withdrawal. 
An insurgent attack on a base area was fought off by South African engineer 
units that included 104th Water Boring Section, 43rd Water Treatment Section, 
and 42nd Geological Section.103 It was in Greece that the Section suffered its only 
casualty of the war: one man killed by a sniper.104 From 22 April 1945 the Allied 
force was supported by No. 2 Boring Section RE.105 This received guidance on 
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15 June 1945 from the officer commanding 42nd Geological Section, prior to 
taking over a series of tasks from 104th Water Boring Section.106 Well drilling 
operations in Greece were to continue for some months after Allied “Victory in 
Europe” had been achieved on 8 May.
Geophysics versus water divining
An article in the New York Times newspaper late in 1942 reported that dowsing 
was of significant use within the British Army, particularly in the Middle East.107 
This provoked a strong denial in December from Major-General Tickell,108 the 
Director of Works at HQ Middle East Forces, and a government denial in the UK 
Parliament. The term ‘water diviners’ was held to be demeaning to the skill of 
earth scientists.109
The dowsing allegation prompted a letter from the Director to make the 
existence and expertise of 42nd Geological Section more widely known, and to 
invite applications from geologically trained officers of the British and Indian 
armies to attend a training course in geophysical methods to be presented 
by Major Paver as officer commanding.110 At least one such course was given, 
in April to May 1943. Training was attended by eight officers with drilling 
responsibilities west of the Nile,111 and four men from units more widely 
dispersed east of the Nile.112
The date of the course coincides with that of completion of a handbook on 
the location of underground water by geological and geophysical methods.113 
Written by four members of the Section (Major Paver, Captain Simpson, Sergeant 
Clarke and Staff-Sergeant Freeman), it was published by SAEC. As explained in 
its preface, dated 30 April 1943, the handbook drew on pre-war experience in 
South Africa ‘and on nearly three years of war-time prospecting in the countries 
covered by the East African and Middle East campaigns.’ It was re-published 
on 12 April 1945, as the war drew to an end, as a supplement to one of the 
volumes of Military Engineering, the multi-volume textbook series that was to 
continue to guide the work of the British Army’s Royal Engineers.114 An opening 
chapter discusses the occurrence of underground water in relation to the 
commoner rock types and geological structures. Subsequent chapters describe 
the electrical resistivity method of geological prospecting; the interpretation 
of resistivity curves; the organisation of electrical resistivity surveys; and 
the principles and field procedure associated with surveys by magnetometer. 
Although its illustrations are all from work undertaken before April 1943, it is a 




The 42nd Geological Section made a significant and unique contribution to the 
development of water supplies in support of the British Army during the Second 
World War by deployments in East Africa, North Africa, the Middle East and 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean region. It generated coloured geological maps 
of Kenya and of Cyprus, and pioneered the British Army’s use of resistivity 
and magnetometer surveys rather than dowsing as a means of prospecting 
for groundwater. Applications of geology demonstrated by the Section and the 
few geologists to have served as such as British staff officers during the Second 
World War led to the post-war creation of posts for a small number of geologists 
and/or geophysicists within the British reserve army to maintain that expertise 
to the present day.115 The Section had a long-term as well as a timely impact.
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CHAPTER 6
“Wehrgeologenstelle 12”: Rommel’s military geology 
team in North Africa, 1941-1943
Hermann Häusler 
Introduction
In 1940 the state of the colonisation of northern Africa was as follows: Italy 
had occupied Libya, Great Britain had colonised Egypt and the Sudan, and 
France possessed Algeria, French Morocco and French West Africa. The 
Free French under De Gaulle had settled French Equatorial Africa. After Italy 
declared war on France and Great Britain, Benito Mussolini attacked Egypt in 
September 1940. British forces successfully repelled this attack and conquered 
Cyrenaica (the eastern coastal region of Libya). Following a meeting between 
Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini in January 1941, the German Armed Forces 
High Command created the Africa Corps (Afrika Korps), under the command of 
General Erwin Rommel. 
At that time the Corps consisted of three divisions: Division Brescia, Division 
Ariete, and the 5th Light Division. From April to July 1941, Wehrgeologenstelle 12 
(Military Geology Team 12, hereafter MGT 12) was deployed to the military 
geography officer of the Africa Corps. In July 1941 the German and Italian troops 
of the Africa Corps were reorganised as the Panzer Group Africa, and MGT 12 
was deployed to the engineer officer of the army staff. The Panzer Group Africa 
was reorganised as the German-Italian Panzer Army Africa, with the Africa Corps 




defeat at the Second Battle of El Alamein, the Panzer Army was redesignated 
the German-Italian Panzer Army (Deutsch-Italienische Panzerarmee, Armata 
Corazzata Italo-Tedesca). In February 1943, during the final stages of the 
Desert War, the headquarters was upgraded to Army Group Africa (Heeresgruppe 
Afrika/Gruppo d’Armate Africa) to manage the defence of Tunisia. Hans-Jürgen 
von Armin replaced Rommel as commander of the Army Group in March, and 
surrendered his forces to the Allies on 13 May 1943, thereby ending the Axis 
presence in Africa.1
Knowledge of the geology the terrain was vitally important for the mobility and 
water provisioning of the mechanised divisions, first during Rommel’s forward 
pushes through Cyrenaica and north-western Egypt, and then again during the 
retreat of the German-Italian forces to Tunisia. This chapter provides an overview 
of the scope and significance of German military geology work in North Africa, 
particularly during the first phases of the Desert War, from 1941‑1942, and with 
particular reference to German, Italian and British off‑road trafficability  maps.
Figure 6.1 The seven phases of the North African theatre of war, 1941-1943. 
Phase 1: Rommel’s first offensive in Cyrenaica (March-November 1941). 
Phase 2: British offensive in Cyrenaica (November 1941-January 1942). 
Phase 3: Rommel’s second offensive in Cyrenaica (January-May 1942). 
Phase 4: Rommel’s push to El Alamein (June 1942). 
Phase 5: Offensive of 8th British Army and retreat of Panzer Army Africa 
     (November 1942-February 1943). 
Phase 6: Allied forces land in Morocco and Algeria. 
Phase 7: Allied offensive in April/May 1943.2
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Rommel’s Wehrgeologenstelle 12 
This chapter focuses on German military geology work in the North African 
theatre of war in 1941‑1942, highlighting three phases of Rommel’s warfare(see 
figure 6.1, phases 1‑3). Phase 1 describes the team’s work during Rommel’s first 
offensive from March to November 1941; phase 2 refers to the German defence 
against the British offensive from November 1941 to January 1942; and phase 3 
describes Rommel’s second offensive from January to May 1942 (figure 6.2).
Figure 6.2 Military geology works during Rommel’s first offensive in Cyrenaica 
(March-November 1941)3
The German General Staff of the Army provided military geographic and geological 
information on northeast Africa, in particular Libya and Tunisia in 1941, and 
Egypt in 1942.4 The main goal of Wehrgeologenstelle 12 (hereafter MGT 12) was 
to prepare current information on off‑road trafficability for motorised divisions, 
to support German and Italian troops with precise information on locations 
with sufficient potable water, and to perform geological investigations to assist 
in finding locations for the positioning of defences.5
The average daily use of freshwater for a division was between 120 000 and 
150 000 litres,6 which had to be filled into containers and distributed. The 
provision of freshwater for the Africa Corps in northern Libya, with temperatures 
of 35 degrees in the shade, therefore came to about 400 cubic metres per day. It 
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was known that about 2 000 cisterns, with a total capacity of 400 000 cubic metres 
of fresh water, had once existed along the coast and in the Cyrenaica, most of 
them from Roman times. Due to the lack of information – or perhaps because 
of their destruction – it was an important task to reconnoitre functioning wells 
and calculate the actual amounts of potable water. Where wells were lacking, the 
military geology team investigated aquifers using both geophysical equipment 
and drilling. In addition, the team was equipped with chemicals to check the 
water quality.7
Off‑road trafficability maps at scales of 1:100 000 and 1:400 000, respectively, 
were based on expeditions by the military geology team using wheeled vehicles 
and reconnaissance flights. These maps differed significantly from the going 
maps provided by desert experts for the 8th British Army.
Deutsches Afrika Korps
Division Brescia Division Ariete 5th Light Division
la/Wehrgeologenstelle 12
Figure 6.3 Organigram of the German Africa Corps and its military geology team in 19418
On 11 April 1941, MGT 12, headed by Dr Leo Medard Kuckelkorn, landed with 
cars and field equipment at Derna to support Rommel’s first attack toward the 
fortress of Tobruk (figure 6.3). As in the case of military geology teams elsewhere, 
MGT 12 initially consisted of eight members: two senior geologists, one junior 
geologist, one technician, one draughtsman, one typist and two drivers. They 
were provided with four vehicles to conduct reconnaissance and groundwater 
investigations: two well equipped geology cars (one with geophysical equipment, 
and the other equipped with a drilling rig) and two cars with Benoto drilling rigs.
In 1943, a second and third military geology team (teams 6 and 8) were 
deployed in North Africa to conduct a comprehensive investigation of locations 
suitable for the water supply of the approximately 100 000 personnel involved 
in Rommel's rapid offensives with off-road motorised divisions along hundreds 
of kilometres. The military geology fieldwork of MGT 12 comprised the securing 
of water supplies in coastal areas and deserts, landscape classification for 
motorised tank divisions, and the fortification of positions. The team regularly 
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reported to the military geography officer of the Africa Corps, and later also to 
the engineering officer of Panzer Group Africa. In addition, MGT 12 was regularly 
in touch with MGT 29, the German military geology staff in Berlin-Wannsee. 
Monthly reports from March 1941 to October 1942 provide a detailed account of 
the geological team’s activities during the various stages of Rommel’s campaign 
in northern Libya and Egypt.9
Phase 1: Rommel’s first offensive: Benghazi – Derna – Tobruk – 
Bardia – Sollum
During Rommel’s first offensive, from March to November 1941 (figure 6.2), 
MGT 12 received orders to:
 ◊ prepare water supply at Bardia (14 April 1941);
 ◊ prepare water supply at an airfield west of Tobruk (16 April 1941);
 ◊ fortify and prepare water supply at Halfaya Pass, south‑west of Sollum 
(July to September 1941);
 ◊ produce a water supply map of the entire coastal region between Derna 
and Port Saïd (August to September 1941);
 ◊ prepare water supply in coastal areas between Cyrene and Derna 
(7‑19 September 1941); and
 ◊ conduct military geology reconnaissance around Bir Hacheim  
(September to October 1941).
During the last month of the offensive, the team were given additional 
instructions to:
 ◊ produce a water supply map of the coastal area from Tobruk to 
Halfaya Pass;
 ◊ produce a water supply map and card index for the area from Derna 
(Cyrenaica) to the Nile, including detailed sketches, geological profiles, 
and technical and hydrochemical data for 120 locations;
 ◊ produce a water supply map of the coastal area from Tobruk to 
Halfaya Pass; and




Phase 2: Rommel’s defence against the first British offensive: Tobruk –  
Derna – Benghazi – El Agheila
From 18 November 1941 to 20 January 1942, the British offensive from 
Marsa Matruk toward Sollum and Tobruk (figure 6.4) forced the Africa Corps 
to retreat from Cyrenaica. MGT 12 conducted operations (a) before and (b) 
during Rommel’s retreat up to the stronghold at the Marsa‑Brega position, west 
of Agheila:
a. MGT 12 operations prior to Rommel’s retreat:
 ◊ produce a final report on cisterns between Sollum and Sidi Omar;
 ◊ produce as short report on the geology of positions and mining 
between Sollum and Halfaya Pass;
 ◊ groundwater exploration around Bardia;
 ◊ study the going map of north-west Egypt based on British spoils 
of war; and
 ◊ study the possible consequences of blasting Aswan Dam.
b. MGT 12 operations during Rommel’s retreat:
 ◊ prepare water supply for troops east of Tobruk;
 ◊ conduct reconnaissance trips to improve landscape classification for 
the going map (scale 1:400 000) of the Cyrenaica;
 ◊ report on the water supply of the British Army based on spoils of war 
from 5th South African Brigade;
 ◊ road trafficability from Agheila to Marada;
 ◊ prepare landscape map and going map of surroundings of Agheila 
1:100 000;
 ◊ prepare landscape map and going map of Libya 1:300 000; and
 ◊ prepare water supply map and card index of cisterns and wells.
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Figure 6.4 Military geology activities during the British offensive in Cyrenaica 
(November 1941 to January 1942)10
In addition to reports and leaflets on military geology in the desert areas, MGT 12 
had already prepared basic information about Tunisia in January 1942 including:
 ◊ water supply maps (scale 1:200 000) of Tunisia, sheets Cap Bon, La 
Goulette, Sousse, El Djem, Sfax, Kerkerna, Mahares, Gebes, Sidi Chammakh, 
Medienne, Biserta, Tunis and Maktar;
 ◊ landscape classification and off‑road trafficability maps (scale 1:200 000)
(same sheets as above);
 ◊ water supply maps (scale 1:400 000) of Triplotania, sheets Zuara, Tripoli-
Misurata, Gadames and Giado‑Misda;
 ◊ landscape classification and off‑road trafficability maps (scale 1:400 000) 
(same sheets as water supply maps above); and




Figure 6.5 Military geology works during Rommel’s second offensive in Cyrenaica 
(January-May 1942)11
Phase 3: Rommel’s second push into the Western Desert: Agheila – Gazala – 
Tobruk – Bardia – Sollum – El Alamein
From January to May 1942 Rommel attacked the British troops and recaptured 
Cyrenaica (except for Tobruk), and in June 1942 the 5th German-Italian Tank Army 
advanced eastward and attacked El Alamein, where Rommel was stopped (figure 
6.5). From 16 January to 28 February 1942, MGT 12 prepared the following:
 ◊ landscape classification and off‑road trafficability 1:400 000, topographic 
sheet Agheila, based on field reconnaissance, geodetic measurements and 
aerial photos;
 ◊ an update of landscape classification and off‑road trafficability 1:400 000, 
topographic sheets Ajedabia, Bardia, Benghazi, Bir Hacheim, Derna 
and Marada;
 ◊ landscape classification and off‑road trafficability 1:500 000, topographic 
sheets Marsa Matruk and Cairo;
 ◊ a report on the consequences of potential destruction of Aswan Dam; and
 ◊ a report on the water supply of Cyrenaica.
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In March 1942, MGT 12:
 ◊ printed going maps (1:400 000), topographic sheets Agheila and Marada, 
Benghazi and Ajedabia, Derna,Bir Hacheim and Bardia, as well as 
1:500 000 Matruk and Cairo; and Libya at a scale of 1:3 000 000;
 ◊ updated the water card index of Libya and Egypt based on Britain spoils of 
war.; and
 ◊ enlarged topographic maps from 1:400 000 to 1:100 000, sheets Zauiet el 
Mamama and Hagfet Gelgaf, enhanced by route reconnaissance.
Phase 4
During April and May 1942, MGT 12 reported on trafficability crossing the Gebel 
south and south-west of Umm er Rzem. In addition, the water card indexes of 
Libya and Northwest Egypt were finalised. On 25 May 1942, shortly before the 
attack on Tobruk, the army high command of the 5th Tank Army distributed the 
water card index (part 1) of the military geology team to its troops – the Italian 
X (tenth) Army Corps, the Italian XX (twentieth) motorised Army Corps, the 
Italian XXX (thirtieth) Army Corps – and to the command of the Africa Corps and 
its 15th and 21st Panzer Divisions, as well as to the 90th Light Division.
The 1:400 000 water supply maps of Cyrenaica comprised the sheets Syrte, 
Agheila, Benghazi-Ajedabia, Cirene, Giovanni Berta, Derna – Bir Hacheim. To 
allow for more detail, the map sheets Gazala – Sollum West and Gazala – Sollum 
East were done at 1:100 000 scale.
After this attack, further advance of 5th German-Italian Tank Army toward Cairo 
was planned during the German-Italian offensive, which lasted from 26 May to 
22 October 1942. This is documented by detailed studies of MGT 12, because in 
addition to the 1:100 000 scale cross‑country trafficability maps of the El Alamein 
front section, the following expertises, dated August 1942, were provided:
 ◊ a current road map and a map of channels based on aerial reconnaissance 
flights on spoils of war;
 ◊ the water levels of the Nile River;
 ◊ crossing sites on the Nile in the Delta‑Barrage section, 15 kilometres 
north-west of Cairo (with map and tables, including potential locations for 
blasting the route to the Nile River);
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 ◊ cross sections of Nile River; and
 ◊ a water supply map and a water well card index of topographic 
sheet Cairo 1:500 000 were provided to the lower commands of the 
5th Panzer Army.
Following the Second Battle of El Alamein (30 August to 2 September 1942), 
the Panzer Army again retreated westward. After the Allied troops landed in 
Morocco and Algeria on 8 November 1942, the offensive toward the positions 
of the 5th Panzer Army around Tunis ended with the peace of Envidaville on 
13 May 1943. Military geology support of the German-Italian forces became less 
important during this last phase of the North African campaign.
Groundwater investigations and water supply maps
In addition to the investigation of water from cisterns, the geology team used 
resistivity measurements for identifying groundwater aquifers in the desert. 
These were then drilled with simple equipment that had been shipped from 
Berlin. Groundwater quality and salinity was tested with a special suitcase 
of chemicals, in accordance with Dr Hartwig Klut’s textbook on on‑site 
investigation of water.12 This knowledge of aquifers and confining beds enabled 
the exploitation of groundwater for the troops.
Figure 6.6 depicts an example of fluvial and eolian deposits overlying Miocene 
limestone at Agheila el Garbia. Near Agheila, in the Sirte Basin of Libya, a number 
of smaller and larger flat saline plains (sebkh) lie in the transition zone to the 
desert, mostly in shallow depressions (grarets), in which the outflowing waters 
of wadis or groundwater streams come to an end. Below the salt clay, the soil is 
damp. Lines of dunes shift across the wadi beds, while small islands stand out 
from them; at other times, large parts are completely covered by sand, with the 
result that the character of the sebkha can scarcely be recognised. Immediately 
adjacent to the sebkha sweet water is found at a shallow depth.13 The geological 
investigations at Agheila el Garbia revealed that the gravelly aquifer was overlain 
by dunes and that it was possible to exploit the fresh water source by means 
of trenches.
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Figure 6.6 Water supply from trenches in fluvial gravels and dunes at Agheila el Garbia, 
Sirte Basin, May 194114
Another aquifer type was trenched by Italian troops in gravel beds near Martuba, 
which is located southeast of Derna in the north‑western Cyrenaica (figure 6.7). 
The military geology team regularly wrote detailed listings of investigated wells 
and reported them to the army engineer of the Afrika Corps and the Panzer Army. 
All results on groundwater investigations, springs and wells were compiled in 




Figure 6.7 Water supply from slope debris at Martuba, south-east of Derna, May 194116
Figure 6.8 depicts the coastal section of this map in north-western Egypt 
between Sollum and Tobruk. Different colours indicate different sources of 
information: German sources are blue, Italian sources are green, and those of 
British origin are red. Additional comments refer to the quality of the spring 
waters and wells, and also to their capacity. The green circle marks Sidi Barrani 
(in Egypt), where the main water pipe from Bardia (Libya) ended. The note in 
green handwriting affirms that, when functioning properly, the water yielded 
500 cubic metres of slightly salty water per day, and advises that new wells 
with a capacity of 100 cubic metres/day could be dug within only three days. 
To the east of Sidi Barrani, Italian sources indicated five coastal wells yielding a 
maximum of 10 cubic metres of water per day. According to British information, 
there were four major wells, each approximately 27 metres deep, at Sidi Barrani, 
which could provide 9 cubic metres of potable water per day. Many local wells to 
the south were up to 50 metres deep, such as Sânyet Khoraishif to the southeast 
of Sidi Barrani, which yielded good fresh water, as indicated by both German and 
Italian sources.
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Figure 6.8 Water supply map Matruk at original scale 1:500 000, prepared by MGT 12 
in May 1942, with information colour-coded by source17
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Comparison of German, Italian and British maps for assessment 
of off-road trafficability in North Africa
At the beginning of the Second World War hostilities, there were only a few 
asphalt roads along the coast and sand tracks in the desert of Cyrenaica. 
The mechanised divisions therefore needed good information on off-road 
trafficability for wheeled and tracked vehicles for rapid attack and retreat, and 
the logistics of gasoline, food and water supply.
The three examples of trafficability maps and going maps discussed below all 
refer to the same area between Tobruk and Bardia. The German and Italian maps 
are at a scale of 1:400 000, and the British map at a scale of 1:500 000. Whereas 
the German trafficability map was hand‑coloured, the Italian and British maps 
were printed, and it is very interesting that the printed maps resemble each 
other significantly with respect to map design and key arrangement of the going 
classification. It cannot be ruled out that the 1:500 000‑scale British going map 
of Bardia, dating from October 1941, was a spoil of war about which MGT 12 had 
reported in November 1941. Therefore, the Axis and Allied forces had similar 
trafficability maps for their motorised divisions in North Africa.
German landscape classification for off-road trafficability
Despite Libya having been an Italian colony for decades, no trafficability 
maps were provided to the German-Italian troops in 1941. In addition to 
preparing water supply maps, including card indexes, it also fell to MGT 12 
to draw trafficability maps at 1:400 000, using aerial photographs and their 
own reconnaissance of off-road movement for potential battlegrounds for 
Rommel’s attacks and retreats. As maps could not be printed by Italian firms in 
Tripoli in time, MGT 12 produced several hand-drawn coloured copies. These 
Befahrbarkeitskarten were not going maps as such (compared to the British going 
maps – see below), but informed Rommel’s troops on landscape classes relevant 
to the movement of motorised divisions. The landscapes were predominantly 
classified by geomorphology and vegetation. 
Figure 6.9 depicts the German trafficability map 1:400 000, sheet Bardia, 
highlighting linear topographic elements, such as steeper slopes, which were 
classified as non‑passable off the roads (black triangles), or gentle slopes, 
classified as mostly passable (blank triangles). Red arrows indicated major 
through-routes. The map includes additional information on major wells 
relevant to the use of rapid brigades by the 5th Panzer Army.
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Figure 6.9 Section of the hand-coloured German trafficability map at original scale 
1:400 000, sheet Bardia, provided by MGT 1218




The legend in figure 6.10 provides rather a lot of information in a clear and succinct 
manner, indicating not only general levels of trafficability, but also more specific 
information; for example, white areas designate good trafficability; orange areas 
moderate to poor off‑road trafficability; orange areas with red hatches indicate 
steep slopes and moderate to poor trafficability; red areas would be virtually 
impassable off‑road; and yellow dots designate soft, sandy soil, only passable by 
cross-country vehicles. The short summaries provided a rapid overview of the 
major features of the terrain; for example, ‘flat, shrub‑covered, bumpy terrain, 
moderate trafficability’ (the area indicated with green dots in the southern part 
of figure 6.9).
In short, the legends of German trafficability maps were easy to read and 
understand, and provided pertinent and clear additional information pertaining 
to the movement of mechanised forces in any particular area, such as the 
condition of roads, the trafficability of rock escarpments and densely vegetated 
areas, and the effect the weather might have on trafficability of a given area (for 
example, areas shaded in purple had loamy soils and would become very difficult 
to traverse after rain). They also gave an overview on the capacity of wells, 
which was crucial for planning the water supply of the mechanised divisions in 
the absence of supplementary water supply maps or any detailed card indexes, 
which were not typed by the military geology team in large numbers.
Italian off-road trafficability maps 1:400 000
The Italian maps were produced by the Special Cartographic Service of the Italian 
Armed Forces (FF. AA. = Forze Armate) of North Africa (A.S. = Africa Settentrionale), 
and were probably printed in Tripoli. The trafficability classification of, for 
example, Italian sheet Bardia 1:400 000 (figure 6.11) and the British going map 
1:500 000 of the same sheet (figure 6.12) are identical in nearly every detail, 
except for the legend. Due to the fact that the Italian going map of this sheet was 
printed in August 1940, while the British one was printed in October 1941, it can 
be concluded that the Italian off‑road trafficability map was reproduced prior to 
Rommel’s actions in North Africa from earlier British spoils of war.
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Figure 6.11 Section of the printed Italian trafficability map at original scale 1:400 000, 
sheet Bardia, provided by the Cartographic Office of the Italian Armed Forces 
High Command of North Africa (Commando Superiore Forze Armate Africa 
Settentrionale), printed in August 194020
The Italian trafficability map was intended for mixed mechanised forces and was 
printed in both Italian and German. The legend is basically identical to that of 
the British going map 1:500 000, sheet Bardia (figure 6.13):
 ◊ Ovunque intransitabili – Allgemein unpassierbar ≈ generally impassable 
(green shading).
 ◊ Necessario riconoscere il terreno prima di effettuare il movimento. 
Velocita ridotta a Marcia bassa 13 kilometres. all`ora – Aufklärung 
notwendig vor Märschen. Dauernd Benutzung kleinerer Gänge. 
Marschgeschwindigkeit bis 13 kilometres in der Stunde ≈ reconnaissance 
essential before movement. Continuous low gear to 13 kilometres per 
hour (yellow).
 ◊ Terreno solido e buono. Qualche zone sabbiosa – 13 kilometres 
all`ora – weg gut und fest. Einige Sandplätze. 13 kilometres und mehr ≈ 




 ◊ Percorso agevole – alcuni rallentamenti dovuti a svolte ed alla 
presenza di tratti di terreno molle o di terreno roccioso. Velocita dai 
9‑19 kilometres all`ora. – Gutes Fahrgelände. Aufenthalt durch Umwege 
und weiche Sandstrecken oder Felsen. 9 bis etwa 16-19 kilometres in der 
Stunde ≈ Fair going. Delay by soft sand or rocks. 9‑19 kilometres per hour 
(orange).
 ◊ Terreno solido e buano. Nessun ostacolo. Velocita superiore 
al 16 kilometres all`ora. – Gut und fest. Keine Hindernisse. 
16 Stundenkilometer und mehr bis unbeschränkt ≈ Firm and good.  
No obstacles. 16 kilometres per hour and more; no limit (red).
 ◊ Terreno poco sicuro quando piove. – Unsicherer Weg bei nassem 
Wetter ≈ Terrain not safe in wet weather (green cross).
British going maps 1:500 000 
The British going map, sheet Bardia, crossing the Egypt-Libya border was a 
compiled map at scale 1:500 000, comprising the purple grid of the Egyptian 
topographic map 1:500 000 and the red Libyan grid of the Italian topographic 
map 1:400 000 merged with details of Italian topographic maps 1:100 000 
(figure 6.12).
Figure 6.12 (a) Section of the British going map, sheet Bardia 1:500 000, printed by 
the South African Geodetic Survey in October 1941, and (b) legend of the 
same map21
The going classification was compiled by the military engineer of the general 
headquarters of the British 8th Army (Operations Officer) and was based on the 
recommended speed for mixed mechanised forces (both wheeled and tracked 
vehicles) on desert terrain of 8-12 miles per hour. It distinguishes between 
six terrain classes, five of them differentiated by colour. Red areas indicated 
firm ground without obstacles and allowed speed calculations of 10 miles per 
hour and more. Yellow areas allowed fair going with speed up to 12 miles per 
a b
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hour; delay had to be calculated when detours and/or soft ground or boulders 
reduced the speed to 5-10 miles per hour. Red dotted areas with yellow patches 
indicated a trafficability class between red and yellow, allowing for movements 
with a speed of 8 miles per hour. Green areas basically indicate low speed with 
continuous low gear up to 8 miles per hour, and reconnaissance was essential 
before movement. The colour blue was used for landscape generally impassable 
for mixed mechanised forces and a simple cross marked areas with unsafe 
trafficability conditions during wet weather. Special map sheets relevant to the 
logistics of the Long Road Desert Group (LRDG) highlighted landing grounds 
fixed on reconnaissance by the A‑squadron of the LRDG.22 British going maps 
were classified as ‘most secret, not to be published’.
Comparative scope and importance of military geology work 
in the preparation of trafficability maps for Axis and British 
forces in North Africa
Having based forces in Egypt since 1882, the British had accumulated 
considerable knowledge and experience in desert regions. They were, therefore, 
able to assess trafficability and provide water supply for the Commonwealth 
brigades and divisions as well as the British LRDG, but these did not have 
any organisation comparable to the military geology teams of the German 
armies. Additional information on British trafficability maps suggests that the 
terrain evaluation and trafficability classes were based on the interpretation 
of geomorphological features, updated by LRDG aerial photography and route 
descriptions. The maps were printed by South African Geodetic Survey, a team of 
which was possibly deployed to the 1st South African Division of the British XXX 
(thirtieth) Corps.
The Italian trafficability map, sheet Bardia 1:400 000 (printed in August 1940) 
is largely identical to the British going map, sheet Bardia 1:500 000 (printed 
in October 1941), differing only in terms of the colouring of the trafficability 
classes. As noted before, this suggests that the Italian forces had captured 
British going maps as a spoil of war some time prior to printing their own map 
in August 1940, and from then on used overprints of the British maps. Although 
the legend is provided in Italian and German, it is not clear which brigades had 
access to these maps in August 1940. However, it is reasonable to assume that 
they were known to the high command of the Panzer Group Africa by 1941, at 
which time MGT 12 designed a new type of a landscape classification combined 
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The military geology work of Wehrgeologenstelle 12 was crucial to the 
movements of the Axis forces in North Africa during the Second World War. 
Initially deployed to Rommel’s Africa Corps, and later under the high command 
of the Panzer Army Africa, the team provided the divisions in the Western Desert 
with comprehensive and detailed information for rapid offensives and retreats.
In addition to tactical support for Rommel’s forces, the military geology team 
also had orders to prepare the next operational steps of the German-Italian army 
to reach Cairo in 1941 and to retreat to Tunisia at the end of 1942. The team also 
produced leaflets and reports on their work, and regularly communicated with 
the German military geology staff at Berlin-Wannsee.
The scope and value of their work notwithstanding, MGT 12 was short-staffed 
and received limited technical or logistical support. For two years, the small 
group of maximum ten members discharged their specialist duties amid the 
challenging conditions of Rommel’s unconventional warfare, equipped with 
only their geophysical and hydrochemical equipment, a few cars and trucks, and 
drilling rigs.
Comprehensive terrain evaluations and sound knowledge of soil and subsoil 
conditions or groundwater aside, the German-Italian forces faced a number of 
challenges that ultimately proved insurmountable. They had to contend with 
the unfamiliar and harsh desert climate, and, due to long communication lines, 
they were plagued by a constant shortage of supplies – from camouflage and 
feints, to intelligence, to fuel and ammunition. Rommel’s advance to Egypt was 
decisively halted by the British Eighth Army at the Second Battle of El Alamein 
on 11 November 1942.
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CHAPTER 7
The influence of geography on the development 
of the Second World War defences of 
Saldanha Bay harbour 
Thean Potgieter & Jacques Bezuidenhout 
Introduction
Geographically, the Cape of Good Hope – which includes the west coast of 
South Africa – has some of the most inhibiting sea conditions on the planet. 
Exposure to strong southerly winds during summer and frontal systems during 
winter causes large Atlantic Ocean swells all year round. Saldanha Bay, situated 
north‑northwest of Cape Town, is one of the finest natural harbours on the long 
and often inhospitable coastline of South Africa. However, despite its obvious 
geographical attributes and apparent value to shipping, the bay lacked fresh 
water, and consequently, it was never properly developed as a commercial 
seaport, while its obvious naval and military potential was only really exploited 
during the Second World War. 
During the days of sail, the ideal disposition of Saldanha Bay as a fine natural 
harbour on the difficult sea route to the East was well recognised. The bay 
offered a safe haven for ships experiencing emergencies at sea and many vessels 
took advantage of the ideal conditions for repairs. In times of war, it served as a 
hiding place and even saw a few naval skirmishes.
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The unique properties of Saldanha Bay and its glaringly obvious potential to 
be developed as a naval base did not go unnoticed after Britain conquered the 
Cape from the Dutch (first in 1795 and then again in 1806). However, due to 
the lack of fresh water, the bay was only properly developed as a well-fortified 
base of strategic military importance during the Second World War, when the 
Mediterranean became too dangerous for Allied shipping and they had to use the 
alternative sea route around the Cape of Good Hope for maritime communications 
between the West and East. The subsequent high concentration of shipping 
around the Cape lured German submarines to these waters to hunt for prey, 
necessitating improvements to fortifications at South African harbours, and, in 
particular, the installation of comprehensive defensive systems at Saldanha Bay.
This chapter illustrates how geographical realities dictated the development of 
these harbour defences during the Second World War.
The geography of the Saldanha Bay area
The bay was shaped by unique geological interactions that can be traced back 
to the Pan‑African orogenic event, when drifting tectonic plates merged into 
the Gondwana‑Pangea supercontinent. The most seaward part of the bay area 
is dominated by ignimbrite complexes that have pyroclastic volcanic origins. 
These units, known as the Saldanha and Postberg ignimbrite complexes, gave 
rise to the prominent hills to the north and south of the entrance to the bay. 
These resistant outcrops protected the inner part of the bay, while systematic 
erosion of shales and sandstone deposits formed the large natural inner bay.
The unique geology of the area guided the geomorphology, resulting in one of 
the finest natural deep-water harbours on the South African coastline. The bay 
has a maximum navigational length of 12 kilometres and width of 11 kilometres, 
with different parts of the bay having relatively even depth profiles. The shear 
dimensions of the bay, combined with the natural safety it provides from 
the prevailing winds and ocean swells, guarantees sheltered anchorage for 
oceangoing vessels. The topographical features that provide protection against 
weather conditions also created a good platform for military and naval defence 
of the bay.
The bay can be roughly divided into three parts, each with its own unique 
geomorphological features. These parts are the outer bay, the inner bay and the 
lagoon, as marked in figure 7.1.
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Figure 7.1 A Google Earth image that indicates the outer, inner and lagoon parts of 
Saldanha Bay, as well as other geographical features mentioned in the text. 
N = Northern headland; S = Southern headland; H = Hoedjies Point; 
E = Elands Point.
The outer bay has an average depth of 30 metres and is bordered by large hills 
to the north and the south.1 The hills to the north (Môresonkop (87 metres), 
Malgaskop (112 metres) and Baviaansberg (72 metres) form the Saldanha 
complex; those to the south South Head Hill (111 metres), Postberg (193 metres) 
and Konstabelkopberg (188 metres)) form the Postberg complex.2 The entrance 
from the Atlantic Ocean lies between a northern and southern headland (marked 
on figure 7.1 as N and S, respectively). There are also three islands within the 
outer bay, Malgas Island (9 metres) in the north, Jutten Island (34 metres) in 
the south, and Marcus Island (8 metres) in the eastern part. Most of the outer 
bay is exposed to the ocean and therefore affected by high wave action from the 
predominantly south‑westerly swells. Eroded ignimbrite outcrops and boulders 
line the shores of the outer bay. There are sandy beaches on either side of outer 
bay, one in the north (North Bay beach) and one in the south (Jutten Bay beach).
The inner bay has an average depth of 13 metres and is considerably more 
protected from the Atlantic Ocean swells.3 The passage from the outer bay to 
the inner bay runs between Hoedjies Point to the north and Elands Point to 
the south (marked in figure 7.1 as H and E, respectively). Marcus Island lies 
between these two points on the boundary of the inner and the outer bay, and 
is now connected to Hoedjies Point by an artificial pier. The shores of the inner 
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bay are mainly lined with sandy beaches with occasional granite protrusions. 
The Saldanha (120 metres) and Hoedjieskop (71 metres) hills dominate 
the northern part of the inner bay.4 The southern part of the inner bay gives 
way to a passage between the Postberg complex and Langebaan Point, as the 
entry to a southern lagoon. Skaap Island (16 metres) lies in the middle of this 
passageway. The smaller outcrop of Meeu Island (9 metres) lies just to the west 
of Skaap Island. 
The inner bay also provides protected anchorage from the prevailing southerly 
and northerly seasonal winds of the area. The south‑western coastline of 
South Africa experiences dry southerly winds during spring and summer. These 
summer winds can reach gale‑force strength and often blow for protracted 
periods. Severe winter storms that are linked to cold frontal low‑pressure 
systems result in strong northerly winds.5 The winds associated with these 
frontal systems can gust up to storm strength and higher. The hills to the north 
and the islands to the south of the inner bay thus provide shelter from the 
seasonal winds.
The Langebaan Lagoon, a shallow stretch of water south of Skaap Island, 
constitutes the third part of Saldanha Bay. Most of this area is a saltwater 
wetland, with large sand banks that are exposed during low tides. However, the 
northern part of the lagoon is deeper, making it possible for smaller oceangoing 
vessels to navigate the tidal channels.
Except for a few streams that only flow during the height of the rainy season, 
there are no fresh surface water river inlets into any part of the lagoon or the 
bay. The meagre rainfall in the area mostly emanates from cold frontal systems 
that move in from the west, mainly during winter. The average annual rainfall 
is 270 millimetres, of which 217 millimetres falls in winter and 53 millimetres 
during summer.6 The granite bedrock that lines the inner bay is a poor aquifer, 
and underground and surface water dries up quickly during the warm summer 
months when rainfall is low. The combination of low rainfall, hot summers and 
sandy top soils results in a semi‑arid climate for the area. The cold Benguela 
current that brings Antarctic water up the coast further inhibits precipitation 
and humidity; however, the cold, nutrient‑rich current provides a wealth of food 
for many marine species, and, in turn, an abundance of seafood for people.
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Saldanha before the outbreak of the Second World War
Before the First World War (1914-1918), a thorough analysis was made of 
fortifications at South African harbours and of the coastal artillery requirements 
along the South African coast. New fortifications were created, while existing 
fortifications at important bases and ports such as Durban, Simon’s Town 
and Cape Town were substantially upgraded. However, the development of 
Saldanha Bay as a port remained stymied by insufficient fresh water supply.
During the First World War, Major J.G.W. Leipoldt, a South African intelligence 
officer, surveyed the Saldanha Bay area to establish whether it might be of value 
to an enemy. Leipoldt, however, suggested that an enemy would first have to 
secure water supply from the Berg River, some 30 kilometres distant, for this 
to become a possibility.7 Hence, while improvements to the system of coastal 
fortifications and fixed defences around the South African coast continued 
during the First World War, this did not include the creation of coastal defences 
at Saldanha Bay.
On the eve of the Second World War, the Union Defence Force again set about 
upgrading fortifications at Durban, Cape Town and Simon’s Town.8 However, 
despite the fact that the creation of coastal defences in Saldanha Bay to secure 
it as a relief anchorage had featured in the British Admiralty’s war plans for a 
number of years, no action was taken before the outbreak of the Second World 
War in 1939.
South Africa and the Second World War
After the Union of South Africa declared war against Germany on 6 September 1939, 
emphasis was placed on the importance of South Africa to the Allied war effort. 
As South African land, air and naval forces had to support commonwealth forces 
in other theatres of war and had to constantly watch over the coastal trade 
routes, the Union Defence Force expanded drastically during the first two years 
of the war. 
The history of an indigenous South African Navy dates back to 1922, when, 
the South African Naval Service (SANS) was created with three small ships. 
However, due to budget cuts during the Depression years, the ships and their 
crews were paid off (in 1933-1934) and only a skeleton staff remained. This was 
still the position at the outbreak of the Second World War in 1939, when the 
country’s utterly neglected naval establishment had to suddenly prepare for war. 
The South African Division of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve (RNVR(SA)) was 
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mobilised for service with the SANS and the Royal Navy, and additional staff was 
recruited. As no purpose-built warships were available, ships from the country’s 
fishing fleet and merchant ships had to be converted for naval use. The small 
oceangoing navy thus created for the defence of the Union’s ports and coastline 
was restructured into the Seaward Defence Force (SDF) in October 1939, with 
428 personnel (including 47 officers), 17 vessels in service, and a few shore 
establishments.9 The SDF and the RNVR(SA) were still separate entities, but 
following discussions between the Union government and the British Admiralty 
it was agreed that they should be amalgamated into the South African Naval 
Forces (SANF) on 1 August 1942.10
Soon after the outbreak of the Second World War, the intelligence picture 
indicated that real threats existed around the South African coast. This was 
illustrated by the sortie of the German pocket battleship Graf Spee into the 
South Atlantic, while German commerce raiders operated in the Atlantic and 
Indian Oceans and mined the South African coast, and the U‑boat threat was 
omnipresent. These factors triggered a great expansion of South African coastal 
artillery, and by December 1941 a variety of coast artillery guns, ranging from 
quick-firing 6-pounder guns to heavy 9,2-inch guns, were installed at Walvis Bay, 
Saldanha Bay, Robben Island, Cape Town, Simon’s Town, Port Elizabeth, 
East London and Durban. The biggest, the 9,2-inch guns, were deployed at 
the Apostle Battery at Llandudno, the Lions Battery above Simon’s Town, on 
Robben Island, and at the Da Gama Battery in Durban.11
After France fell to Nazi Germany in May 1940, Italy entered the war on the 
side of the Axis powers. Having previously invaded Ethiopia in October 1935 
and captured Addis Ababa in May 1936, the Italians now attacked British 
positions in Egypt, Sudan, Kenya and British Somaliland, setting in motion an 
Allied campaign to expel them from Ethiopia. South African forces were heavily 
engaged in this campaign, up to the surrender of the main Italian force in 1941.12 
In North Africa, the so-called Western Desert campaign also commenced after 
the Italian invasion of Egypt in September 1940. When the British succeeded 
in pushing the Italian forces back, Nazi Germany responded to Mussolini’s 
request for assistance by sending the Afrika Korps, under the command of 
General Erwin Rommel, to their aid. The Axis forces under Rommel then pushed 
the British back to Egypt, and various large‑scale desert offensives ensued, with 
South African land, air and naval forces becoming heavily involved.
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Vessels of the small South African naval establishment were despatched to the 
Mediterranean following an urgent request from the British Admiralty to the 
South African government in November 1940 for anti-submarine patrol vessels. 
The South African Seaward Defence Force (SDF) responded by despatching 
four converted whalers (the HMSAS Southern Floe, HMSAS Southern Isles, 
HMSAS Southern Maid, and HMSAS Southern Sea) to the Mediterranean.13 
Rear Admiral Hallifax (Director of the SDF) notified the Admiralty of this on 
22 November, and Commander-in-Chief (C-in-C) of the Mediterranean Fleet, 
Admiral A.B. Cunningham promptly requested that the vessels sail for Alexandria 
as soon as possible.14 On 15 December 1940 the small flotilla of four converted 
whalers – now designated the 22nd South African Anti‑Submarine Group – under 
the command of Lieutenant Commander A.F. Trew left Durban and sailed for 
the Mediterranean.15
As a result of the war in North Africa and intensive fighting in the Mediterranean, 
the latter was no longer safe for much of the Allied shipping. As a result the Cape 
sea route assumed critical importance and commercial, as well as naval traffic 
visiting South African ports multiplied (for example, the number of warships 
visiting Cape Town rose from ten in 1938-1939 to 306 in 1942-1943).16 
South African ports, port infrastructure and dry docks were now of strategic 
importance to the war effort. Although the ports provided storage space and 
were crucial for replenishment and repair work, they had limited capacity and 
soon became saturated. These infrastructure limitations made the creation of 
additional facilities imperative, and in 1941 South Africa, in consultation with 
Britain, started expanding the port facilities of Cape Town, Durban and East 
London. In addition, the two governments agreed to share the cost of developing 
a port at Saldanha Bay for both military and naval purposes.17
In the meanwhile, the Allied situation in the Far East deteriorated drastically 
after Japan joined the War at the end of 1941 and quickly captured a number 
of British bases (Hong Kong fell on 25 December 1941 and Singapore on 
15 February 1942). It immediately impacted on the strategic importance and 
defence of South Africa. Although the Union Defence Force had expanded 
drastically and South African air and naval forces kept continuous watch 
over the coastal trade routes, South Africa itself and its ports were still very 
vulnerable to a large-scale attack. Extensive Japanese operations over an 
enormous geographical area substantially increased the threat, and the British 
War Cabinet regarded attacks on South African ports by Japanese naval vessels 
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and carrier-borne aircraft as well as mine-laying by Japanese vessels a distinct 
possibility. Some elements of the South African population even feared a 
Japanese invasion.18
As for the German threat, increased traffic around the coast implied more 
target opportunities, resulting in increased submarine activities in the Southern 
Oceans between October 1942 and February 1945. It reached a peak in 
October 1942, when thirteen ships were sunk in four days. It is estimated that, 
within a 1 000 miles of the South African coast, 133 merchantmen were sunk 
and six damaged by U‑boats, a further twenty were captured or sank by surface 
raiders, while mines accounted for two ships sunk and two damaged – a total of 
163.19 As far as naval vessels are concerned, one was lost in a submarine attack 
and one suffered mine damage. About 400 survivors were rescued at sea by 
South African naval vessels.20
Submarine activities had to be countered with increased anti‑submarine patrols, 
the introduction of a group convoy system and improved air reconnaissance. 
Anti-submarine protection at sea was provided by vessels from the SANF and 
available Royal Navy units, as well as British and South African maritime air 
patrols. However, as the SANF had a limited number of minesweepers and 
anti-submarine vessels (converted trawlers and whalers) in service, the inherent 
danger to shipping that rounded South Africa or had to wait in the roadstead 
was obvious.21 Convoys were common, and it is estimated that during the War 
about 400 convoys, with approximately 50 000 ships and six million men on 
board, visited South African ports, while about 13 000 of these ships underwent 
repairs in South Africa’s harbours.22
In terms of the fight against submarines, only two submarines were destroyed: 
one off Cape Town by HMS Active, and one in the South Atlantic by a Catalina 
aircraft (see below). Japanese submarines, operating off the east coast of Africa, 
sank 21 ships in the Mozambican Channel during June and July 1942 (one was 
sank only 115 miles from Durban).23
The influence of geology and geography on the creation of 
fixed defences at Saldanha Bay
By early 1942, the sheer volume of shipping on the Cape sea route, resulting 
from the war in the Mediterranean and Japanese entry into the war, was causing 
considerable congestion at South African ports. At peak periods, more than fifty 
ships (the highest count was eighty) regularly awaited berths in the roadstead 
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outside Cape Town and Durban, leaving them vulnerable to submarine attack. 
The development of proper harbour defences for Saldanha Bay, which would 
allow the bay to be used as a relief anchorage and a convoy assembly point, thus 
became an issue of the highest importance and immediate concern.24
Virtually surrounded by land and offering large anchorage with calm waters, 
Saldanha Bay could accommodate many ships. It also was ideally located along 
the South African coast, could be made submarine‑proof, and was earmarked as 
a convoy assembly point. However, the defensive arrangements and associated 
base facilities at the bay had to be created from scratch. There was already a 
shore base in Saldanha Bay, and during 1941 preparatory work had progressed 
on fixed fortifications to protect the entrance to the bay. Placing coastal batteries 
on higher ground had obvious military advantages, and the close proximity of 
the Noordkop and Baviaansberg to the entrance of the bay made them ideal for 
this purpose.
The Noord Battery (also known as Noord Bay Battery) was developed on 
Noordkop, commonly known as Malgaskop. The main function of Noord Battery 
was close defence, while it was also the examination battery. In line with the 
approach taken for creating the so-called ‘emergency coast batteries’ along 
the coast of England in 1940, this battery was armed with two breech-loading 
BL 6-inch (152 millimetres) Mk XI 50-calibre, high-velocity British naval guns 
on P5 naval mountings modified for service ashore.25 These guns, supplied 
by the Royal Navy Dockyard in Simon’s Town, were mounted and operational 
by 15 June 1942. The 6-inch Mk XI guns came from obsolete naval vessels. 
They were first mounted in 1906 as secondary armament on pre-dreadnoughts 
battleships, but later served as the primary armament of many armoured and 
light cruisers.26 Mounted on board ships with an elevation of 15 degrees, they 
had a range of about 13 000 metres, but mounting them as coastal defence gun 
ashore made a higher elevation possible (22,5 degrees), giving them a maximum 
range of 16 000 metres.27
Another 6-inch battery, the Baviaan’s Battery, was created on Baviaansberg, 
west-southwest of the Noord Battery. This battery had a dual role of close defence 
and counter‑bombardment, and replaced the original examination battery.28 
In January 1943 the two guns at Noord Battery were moved to Baviaan’s Battery. 
The Noord Battery was then armed with even older, and obsolete, breech-loading 
BL 6-inch Mk VII naval guns on P3 mountings.29 The 6-inch Mark VII guns 
dates from 1899 and was first mounted on the Formidable‑class battleships 
commissioned in September 1901. The guns were also mounted on numerous 
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battleships, cruisers and monitors as both primary and secondary armament. 
They were mounted as coast defence guns across the British Empire from 
the First World War to the 1950s, with a maximum range of 14 450 metres at 
an elevation of 20 degrees.30 During the First World War some of these guns 
were even mounted onto travelling carriages and used by the British Army as 
field guns.
The entrance to Saldanha Bay was narrowest between Hoedjies Point and 
Eilands Point, with Marcus Island situated between these points. From a 
defensive perspective, it was therefore necessary to also place batteries to cover 
the narrowest part of the entrance to the anchorage of Saldanha Bay from north 
to south. In addition to the heavier Noord and Baviaans batteries, two batteries, 
each armed with two 12-pounder quick firing guns, were therefore created in 
the entrance between October and December 1942. These were the Hoedjies 
Battery (also known as Hoetjies Battery), located at Hoedjies Point, and the 
Eilands Battery, on Schier Island (commonly referred to as Elands Battery).31 
Their main armament was the QF 12‑pounder 12‑cwt gun, a common and 
versatile 3-inch (76,2 millimetres) naval gun that first saw service in 1894 and 
remained in use until the middle of the 20th century. Mounted on a pedestal 
secured to the ground, these guns were a common sight at harbour defences, and 
at 40 per cent elevation they had a maximum range of around 10 740 metres.32 
The 12‑pounder batteries would provide protection for the anticipated defensive 
boom. They were also referred to as ‘anti-motor torpedo boat’ batteries, and 
although it was highly unlikely that an enemy would approach Saldanha Bay by 
motor torpedo boat, due to distance and other factors, they could engage any 
target (such as U-boats on the surface) closer inshore.
In addition, six coast artillery searchlights were also installed – two each at the 
12-pounder batteries and two below Noord Battery. These searchlights were 
positioned close to sea level to assist with the detection and identification of 
vessels, as they would be outlined against the backdrop of the opposite shoreline. 
Pairs of searchlights were installed in each location in order to illuminate 
possible targets at the crossing of the beams, which then provided the guns with 
an accurate target position.
In terms of staff, the South African coastal artillery establishments around the 
Cape was initially manned by the SA Permanent Garrison Artillery (manning 
Fort Wynyard Battery in Cape Town and the fixed defences in Simon’s Bay) 
supplemented by volunteers from the Cape Garrison Artillery. In February 1940 
they were renamed the Cape Peninsula Artillery Brigade, and staff serving at 
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the fixed defences of Simon’s Bay, Table Bay (including Robben Island), and 
Saldanha Bay were initially part of this unit.33
Women were integral to South African coastal artillery during the War. The first 
members of the Women’s Auxiliary Army Service were posted to 2 Heavy Battery 
at Simon’s Town in August 1940. From September 1941 women were trained as 
range takers as part of an elite artillery unit, the Artillery Specialists Women’s 
Auxiliary Army Service (ASWAAS). They staffed control instruments at batteries 
and were the only female combatants serving in South African forces during 
the Second World War. Of the 485 women that served in the ASWAAS during 
the War, eighteen were commissioned, 31 rose to the rank of staff sergeant 
and 49 became sergeants, while their colleagues served as lance bombardiers 
or bombardiers.34
From 1943 the newly created South African Women Auxiliary Naval Service 
(SWANS) took over some of these duties, and after April 1944 SWANS trained 
in controlled mining operations staffed the control and detection equipment at 
Saldanha Bay. SWANS were responsible for the anti-submarine fixed defences, 
asdics (sonar anti-submarine detection) and other watch duties (which included 
visual and hydrophone watches).35 In an official report, the SWANS were praised 
for the 'tremendous contribution’ they made to 'ensure the safety of our harbours’ 
as the only 'female personnel … in all the Allied navies … entrusted with such 
responsible work – anywhere in the world.’ Appreciation was also expressed 
for their ‘sporting ability’ and ‘prowess’ in arranging concerts, parties, dances 
and such.”36
Creating anti-submarine defences at Saldanha Bay
The creation of anti‑submarine underwater defences at Saldanha Bay 
emanated from the work of a sub‑committee of the British War Cabinet on 
Defence Arrangements for the Indian Ocean Area. Early in 1942 the committee 
recommended that the underwater defence arrangements at the most important 
South African ports be improved, and that the military and naval development of 
Saldanha Bay be accelerated in line with the increasing threat.37
The threat seemed imminent. Attacks had occurred on shipping in Sydney 
Harbour and Diego Suarez late in May, and the Allies were aware of the presence 
of a Japanese surface raider and submarines (which might carry midget 
submarines) off the east coast of Africa, at the height of Durban and Lourenço 
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Marques, during June and July.38 Due to its location and importance as a port, 
Durban was considered specifically vulnerable, but other ports also required 
enhanced protection
.
Figure 7.2 Members of the South African Women Auxiliary Naval Service (SWANS) at 
Saldanha Bay during Second World War (collage of pictures in the collection 
of the South African Navy Museum in Simon’s Town)
Underwater indicator loops and harbour defence asdics (sonar anti‑submarine 
detection) were installed at Cape Town, Durban and Saldanha Bay between 
1942 and 1943. The work was preceded by surveys to locate the most suitable 
areas for placing the loops in the approaches to these harbours, as well as the 
building of control huts and creation of other infrastructure. Nearly 140 miles of 
cable were used off Durban to lay seven loops (extending roughly from the Bluff 
to Umhlanga Rocks), each with three parallel lines four miles in length, and each 
connected to a control station up to eight miles distant. Four three‑legged loops, 
each about four miles long, were laid off Melkbosstrand and around Robben 
Island to Clifton Beach to cover the approaches to Cape Town harbour. Seven 
short loops were also laid off Port Elizabeth and became operational in 1944.39 
197
The influence of geography on the development of the Second World War defences 
Underwater indicator loops were long sections of cable laid on the seafloor at 
the entrances or in the approaches to harbours with the purpose of detecting 
enemy submarines by means of magnetic sensing. A submarine passing over 
such a stationery loop of wire produced an induced current in the loop. Even if a 
submarine was degaussed, it would still have sufficient magnetism to produce a 
small current in a loop – enough to be detected.40
The complete plan for the anti‑submarine defences at Saldanha Bay included 
the installation of an anti‑submarine and anti‑torpedo boom barrage or defence 
system and harbour defence asdics, substantial lengths of armoured cable for 
anti‑submarine underwater indicator loops in the approaches to the bay, a 
controlled minefield (the only in South African waters), as well as the shore 
stations and warehouse facilities required to support these installations and 
operations. It was very expensive, requiring much infrastructure, substantial 
technical equipment and large quantities of stores, not to mention specially fitted 
vessels and highly trained personnel to manage and staff the whole system.41
Although a controlled minefield was recommended for several South African 
ports, only one was laid, at the entrance of Saldanha Bay. Earmarked as a convoy 
assembly point, the bay was a sizable, land-locked harbour where a large 
anchorage could be protected by a relatively small and sheltered minefield. 
Plans were made in 1942 and the controlled minefield and loops were laid early 
in 1943 by HMS Manchester City and HMS Spindrif. The latter vessel, originally a 
trawler commissioned by the German Navy, was captured by the Royal Navy in 
1940 and converted into a controlled minelayer. As the SANF took responsibility 
for the controlled minefield, she was handed over to the SANF in July 1943 and 
became HMSAS Spindrift.42
The minefield and loops were located north-south between Hoedjies Point and 
Eilands Point, the narrowest point in the entrance to Saldanha Bay. Three mine 
loops protected the northern section (from Hoedjies Point to Marcus Island) 
and five the southern section (between Marcus Island and Eilands Point). There 
were twelve mines in each loop. Three overlapping guard loops (each 1,3 miles 
long) were laid approximately a mile seaward of the minefield as the first line 
of detection of an intruding submarine. The cables of all eleven loops ran to 
the control station on the east side of North Bay.43 The mine loops technically 
functioned in a similar way to the indicator loops, but were smaller in scale.44
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Figure 7.3 Map indicating the location of fortifications at the entrance to Saldanha Bay 
during the Second World War (compiled by J. Bezuidenhout)
In April 1942 it was decided that Saldanha Bay also required anti-torpedo and 
anti‑submarine boom defences and nets between Hoedjies Point and Eilands 
Point. The boom defence vessels HMS Barcross and HMS Barbrake arrived in 
Saldanha from Britain in September 1942 and January 1943 respectively. These 
ships, and HMS Fernmoor (a merchant ship converted into a boom‑carrying 
vessel), had to lay and maintain the boom defences across the entrance to the 
bay.45 The Barcross and Barbrake were transferred to the SANF in January and 
February 1943 (now with the prefix HMSAS to their names) and continued their 
boom defence duties at Saldanha Bay.46
In the original design, the boom defence system had a gate that could be moved 
to open and close. However, as this would require two additional vessels, it 
was substituted by a permanent opening. Three booms were staggered in 
sections, so that a torpedo fired from seaward could not pass through. The 
section between Hoedjies Point and Marcus Island had one boom, while the 
entrance was north‑south between Marcus Island and Eilands Point, as this 
section had two overlapping booms.47 To support these underwater defences, 
the Saldanha Bay coastal defensive system also received a mobile coast‑watch 
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radar to provide early warning of any unidentified or unknown surface targets. 
The radar installation (and the signal function) was operated by a special signals 
detachment, while the indicator loops were manned by the SANF.48
Figure 7.4 HMSAS Barcross at work laying and servicing anti-torpedo boom defences at 
Saldanha Bay (South African Navy Museum Simon’s Town)
A control building for the large‑scale underwater indicator loops planned for the 
sea approaches off the entrance of Saldanha Bay was erected at the perimeters 
of the entrance to Saldanha Bay in 1942. However, these loops were never 
installed. In the early stages of the project, there were insufficient vessels and 
equipment available to lay them, and by 1943 the entrance to Saldanha Bay was 
already well defended (with a controlled minefield, anti-torpedo nets, smaller 
mine loops, asdics, a radar installation and various coastal batteries), while the 
importance of the bay declined from late that same year due to progress in the 
war against submarines in the Battle of the Atlantic.
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Figure 7.5 An anti-torpedo net being secured to spherical floats at Saldanha
Notes on Second World War operations in and around 
Saldanha Bay
Of the many potential threats to shipping around the South African coast during 
the Second World War, submarines posed the greatest menace. To counter 
submarine activities, vessels from the SANF and the Royal Navy engaged in 
continuous anti‑submarine patrols and convoy duty, while from the air, the sea 
route was patrolled by a variety of aircraft of the South African Air Force (SAAF) 
and the Royal Air Force (RAF). The first PBY Catalina flying boats operated from 
Saldanha Bay at the end of October 1942, and a flying boat base was established 
at the old whaling station at Donkergat.49 The Langebaan Lagoon, in the southern 
part of the bay, is a 15 kilometres long wetland protected from Atlantic swells 
by the Postberg peninsula. The lagoon stretches from north to south, which 
aligns its length with the prevailing wind of the area, making it an ideal runway 
for seaplanes.
From February 1943 onwards, RAF Squadron 262 started operating Catalina 
flying boats from the Congella Base in Durban, and as they later also conducted 
operations from Langebaan,50 the Congella Air Station Langebaan Detachment 
resulted in the creation of the current Langebaanweg Air Force Base.51 
It switched to Sunderland aircraft during 194552 and as this squadron almost 
entirely consisted of SAAF personnel, it was renumbered 35 Squadron, SAAF on 
15 February 1945.53
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The PBY Catalina, is arguably the most legendary ‘flying boat’ of the 
Second World War. Also used to spot and destroy German U-boats, 3 200 of these 
craft were built between 1939 and 1945, making it is possibly the most prolific 
amphibious aircraft in history. They were quite big aircraft, with a wing span of 
13,7 metres, length of 19,5 metres, height of 5,65 metres, maximum weight of 
16 067 kilograms and powered by two 1 200-hp Pratt & Whitney Twin Wasp 
R-1830 engines. They were armed with two machine guns in glass ‘blisters’ and 
three depth charges underneath each wing. But what made them so valuable as 
submarine hunters was a normal range of 3 782 kilometres and a remarkable 
maximum range of 4 960 kilometres.54
At 04:20 on 11 March 1944, three Catalinas took off from Langebaan, flying 
southwards in search of three U‑boats suspected of rounding the Cape. A U‑boat 
was spotted on the surface about 939 kilometres off Langebaan (at 41.28S and 
17.40E), and one of the Catalinas (under the command of Flight Lieutenant 
F.J. Roddick) immediately attacked with her guns and dropped five depth charges 
on the U-boat. However, the port wing, float mechanism and starboard engine 
of the Catalina were severely damaged by fire from the 20 millimetres and 
37 millimetres anti-aircraft guns of the U-boat, and she had to return to base. 
The U‑boat submerged, but resurfaced – probably due to damage sustained in 
the attack – as a second Catalina (commanded by Wing Commander E.S.S. Nash) 
arrived on the scene at 11:33. Nash immediately dropped all six his depth charges 
from a height of only 25 metres.55 The U‑boat quickly sank with all hands.56 
It later transpired that the boat, the UIT 22, was a former Italian submarine (the 
Alpino Bagnolini of 1 166 tons) carrying raw materials to Germany from the Far 
East, and had not been actively hunting for prey around the South African coast.57
For the service men and women at Saldanha Bay, the war passed without 
major military operations and life became rather monotonous, with the 
notable exception of two ‘incidents’ – both of which proved to be false alarms. 
The first caused quite some excitement on the evening of 1 June 1944, when 
SWANs Labuschagne, Klonus and MacFarlane reported two crossings on the 
indicator loops and blew two lines of the controlled minefield. Searchlights 
were immediately switched on and the examination vessel searched the area, 
but there was no sign of wreckage. The bottom was also searched afterwards 
with echo sounding and ground sweeping, but no evidence of a submarine was 
found.58 It was the only time that a controlled minefield was ‘fired in anger’ by 
female watch keepers and they were praised for the ‘efficient manner in which 
they carried out their duties.’59 In the second incident, on 11 January 1945, an 
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unidentified ship approaching the entrance to the bay failed to react to requests 
about her identity, prompting the Noord Battery to fire a ‘bring to’ round at the 
ship. The vessel, however, was soon identified as a British merchantman, and 
she was allowed to continue her voyage.
Figure 7.6 The submarine UIT-22 at Bordeaux, 14 February 194360
Figure 7.7 The UIT-22 under attack by Wing Commander Nash’s Catalina61
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Figure 7.8 Google Earth image indicating where UIT-22 was sunk, 939 kilometres south of 
Langebaan (Compiled by J. Bezuidenhout)
As the war drew to a close and the threat to the South African coast diminished, 
the Baviaans and Hoedjies Batteries were placed under care and maintenance in 
October 1944, and the Eilands Battery in May 1945. The minefield at the entrance 
to Saldanha Bay was blown on 6 April 1945 (and the record indicates that no-one 
on the boats in the area who came to witness the event went without fish).62
Some of the coastal artillery batteries that were placed under care and 
maintenance during the later stages of the war were revived and placed under 
a new dispensation early in 1946. The Saldanha Bay batteries (Noord Bay, 
Baviaans, Hoedjies and Eiland) became 8 Heavy Battery, under the command of 
Major E.L. Brereton‑Stiles, only to be placed under care and maintenance again 
in March 1947.63
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Probably the most positive impact of the Second World War on Saldanha Bay 
was not of a military nature. For centuries, the development of the bay and the 
small towns along its shores had been hampered by a lack of fresh water. The 
situation changed dramatically when the Union Defence Force created a pipeline 
to the Berg River in order to satisfy the wartime fresh-water needs. The first 
piped fresh water reached Saldanha in February 1943.64
Concluding remarks
Saldanha Bay is located on the south‑west coast of South Africa, just over 
100 kilometres north of Cape Town, on one of the major sea routes between 
Europe, Atlantic America and the East. The geomorphology of the area offers 
protection from the prevailing winds and the Atlantic Ocean swells and provides 
sheltered anchorage in a large area of the bay. These and other natural geological 
and geographical features of Saldanha Bay make it an ideal harbour, and have 
endowed the bay with an interesting military‑strategic history spanning more 
than three centuries.
Though the military‑strategic importance of the bay was recognised at an 
early stage, it was never fully developed as a port due to a shortage of fresh 
water, and further development only occurred when a sufficient supply of fresh 
water became available during the Second World War. From a military‑strategic 
point of view, Saldanha Bay reached the zenith of its importance during the 
Second World War, when it was extensively fortified to serve as a safe assembly 
point for large convoys. The two hills on the northern coastline close to the 
entrance of the bay formed the nucleus of the harbour’s defence system, with 
two smaller batteries close the shoreline, as well as an extensive anti‑submarine 
and boom defence system across the entrance. The decision to extensively fortify 
Saldanha Bay and use it as a location for large convoys to assemble was facilitated 
by its unique geomorphological attributes. Due to these factors it was possible to 
develop impregnable anti‑submarine defences in the narrow entrance to the bay 
and create coastal fortifications that effectively covered the entrance to the bay. 
The result was that for a short time during the Second World War Saldanha Bay 
was indeed a point of strategic importance to the war effort. 
The fresh water pipeline from the Berg River also boosted the socio‑economic 
development of Saldanha Bay in the post-Second World War era. For the first time 
the bay had a sufficient supply of fresh water to sustain a growing population 
and encourage economic development. Over the ensuing decades, the bay area 
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has seen significant development, including harbours for fishing and small craft, 
marinas for leisure activities, general cargo berths, as well as a massive iron ore 
jetty and oil terminal.
The Second World War naval base in Saldanha Bay became a training base of the 
South African Navy. Although the bay is of scant military-strategic importance 
within the strategic context of the early twenty-first century, its unique 
attributes remain.
Figure 7.9 At Noord Battery two rusted and out-of-service 6-inch naval guns still guard 
the entrance to Saldanha Bay more than seventy years after the end of the 
Second World War (Photo by J. Bezuidenhout)
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CHAPTER 8
The Cuvelai-Etosha basin: An environmental and 
climatic linkage to the operations of the warring 
parties in the 1966-1989 war for 
Namibian independence 
Loide Shaamhula & Martin Hipondoka 
Introduction
The South West African People’s Organisation (SWAPO) was established in 1960 
against the South African rule in Namibia.1 When the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) condoned South Africa’s mandate over Namibia in July 1966, it ignited 
SWAPO to activate its militant enterprise, whilst South Africa was emboldened 
to keep a firm grip on the territory. Within a month, the first battle between 
the South African Defence Force (SADF) and the People’s Liberation Army of 
Namibia (PLAN), SWAPO’s military wing, took place at Omugulugwombashe,2 
a forested area on the western fringes of the Cuvelai Basin. This war lasted 
for 23 years and ushered in the general elections under the auspices of the 
United Nations and subsequently Namibia’s independence in March 1990, with 
the SWAPO government in power.
The centre of gravity of this war stretched over an area known as the 
Cuvelai‑Etosha Basin (figure 8.1). The basin covers an area in excess of 
100 000 kilometres2 straddling southern Angola and northern Namibia.3 While 
some pivotal battles took place on the periphery of the basin, both the maiden and 
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final battles of this war took place in this area. Literature on military geography 
stresses the importance of knowledge of the terrain of the battleground for the 
success of any military operation. The location, size and shape of a land mass 
have a great influence on any military operation.4 At a local level, the timing of 
the military engagement, weather and terrain have more impact than any other 
physical factor. Securing positional advantage in terms of terrain, deposition of 
resources, riverbanks, hilltops and forests is also underscored as an advantage 
to warring parties during combat.5
Two types of location, absolute and relative, are crucial to military operations. 
While absolute location offers distinct advantages to military geographers, the 
use of relative location is preferred. Relative location is considered the most 
important, as it allows for the determination of spatial relationships between 
locations of interest.6 Relative location not only provides specific geographical 
detail about possible battle fields, but also vital information about aspects such 
as transportation and roads, the most appropriate type of weapons to use, and 
communication requirements and water sources, all of which are crucial for 
operational planning and battle preparation.7 However, both absolute and relative 
locations are critical in operational planning; for example, the sequencing and 
prioritising of events based on travelling time and the efforts required to reach 
the objectives of the operation.8 Therefore, knowledge of the location, terrain, 
vegetation, climatic conditions and topography aspects that determine the ease 
of movement, observation and engagement during an operation, or which may 
shield from enemy fire are essential. The movement of troops, whether on foot 
or horseback, or in motorised vehicles, can be hindered by topography and 
environmental and soil conditions. Bedrock type and strength are important 
factors in the construction of defences. The availability of water supplies can 
influence the location of military installations, while mountainous terrain can 
provide cover to forces or small groups of operatives. In addition, atmospheric 
conditions, such as temperature, precipitation, winds and relative humidity, 
along with daylight hours and darkness, strongly affect the timing and conduct 
of combat operations and support.9
A study was conducted to evaluate the impact of the environmental and 
climatic conditions of the Cuvelai-Etosha Basin on the military operations of 
the belligerents during the war for Namibian independence from 1966‑1989. 
In particular, the research focused on the timing of publically documented 
military engagements between the warring parties in relation to aspects such 
as droughts, floods and seasonality within the Cuvelai‑Etosha Basin during that 
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period. This narrow focus on environmental and climatic factors necessitated 
a tunnel‑vision approach. While political and diplomatic ramifications are vital 
in shaping military postures and deployments, environmental and climatic 
factors have a direct impact on military field operations. Knowledge of the 
environmental and climatic setting of a theatre of war is critical for adaptive 
military operations.
Study area
The Cuvelai-Etosha Basin is a transboundary landscape dominated by a wetland 
system with a vast, self-sustaining hinterland of forest, woodland and long 
grass in some places.10 The Cuvelai drainage system originates in the southern 
Angolan highlands and extends across the featureless plains of northern 
Namibia, resulting in shallow ephemeral watercourses, locally known as iishana 
(sign. oshana; figure 8.2).11
Major floods (called efundja) from local rainfall and floodwater from Angola 
contribute to seasonal formation of a wide network of iishana, which converge 
in the Omadhiya Lakes/Lake Oponono system to form a single stream that 
dewaters into the endorheic Etosha Pan. While there is often an abundance 
of water in the Cuvelai-Etosha Basin during the rainy season, most iishana are 
dry for the greater part of the year. The area dries up as water is either lost to 
evapotranspiration or by seeping into the soil. In Namibia, the basin is home 
to approximately 40 per cent of the population, making it the most densely 
populated region in the country (with an average of 10 people per square 
kilometre).12
The basin extends from the subtropical northern area to the semi‑arid zone 
in the south. Its climate is influenced by the inter‑tropical convergence zone 
(ITCZ), a low-pressure belt of moist air that shifts southwards to the Tropic of 
Capricorn during late October and November, and returns northward across the 
northern part of Namibia in late January through to April. The Cuvelai therefore 
experiences the same subtropical weather systems that prevail over much of 
southern Africa, with summer rainfall, occurring between late November and 
March, and a dry winter season that peaks between the months of June and 
September. The average annual rainfall in the northern part of the basin is in 
excess of 900 millimetres, more than double the average of 400 millimetres in 
the south. February and March are the wettest months; however, rainfall is highly 
variable in space and time.13 The available but incomplete records for the period 
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1966‑1989 reveal that floods occurred on twelve occasions, with three years 
of drought and four years of normal rainfall in between (figure 8.3).14 Winter 
temperatures drop to around 10 degrees in the southern part of the basin, while 
daily maximum temperatures during summer may rise to 40 degrees.15, 16





Figure 8.2 (a): Landsat 5 image of iishana during the wet season (April 17, 2010).  
(b): Landsat 5 image of iishana during the dry season (August 5, 1992).  
(c): Ground view at site 1 (upper left corner of image b) during the wet season 
(March 2017). The partly submerged grazing animals in the background show 
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Research methodology
Secondary sources comprising four journal articles, four books (table 8.1), 
fifteen articles from The Namibian newspaper, and one online resource19 were 
examined for evidence of targeted military engagements. 
Table 8.1 Journal articles and books consulted for locations and nature of engagements
Baxter, P. SAAF’s Border War: The South African Air Force in Combat, 1966-1989 
(Warwick: Helion & Company Limited, 2012).
BR Lord. ‘Operation Askari. A sub-commander’s retrospective view of the Operation’, 
Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 22(4) (1992), pp. 1-12.
Namakalu, O. Armed Liberation Struggle. Some accounts of PLAN’s combat operations 
(Windhoek: Gamsberg Macmillan Publishers, 2004).
Oosthuizen, G.J. ‘The South African Defence Force and Operation Hooper, Southeast 
Angola, December 1987 to March 1988, Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of 
Military Studies, 42(2) (2014), pp. 84-116. 
Oosthuizen, G.J. ‘The South African Defence Force versus SWAPO and its allies: 
Operation Askari, 1983-1984’, A Journal of Historical and Human Sciences for 
Southern Africa, 50 (2005), pp. 3-14. 
Scholtz, L. The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2013).
Van Rensburg, W. SWA/Namibian Border War. Major Military & Political Incidents: 
1959-1989 (Durban: Just Done Productions Publishing, 2013).
Warwick, R. ‘Operation Savannah: A measure of SADF decline, resourcefulness and 
modernisation’, Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 40(3) (2012), 
pp. 354-397.
Using content analysis, the data was categorised, sorted and evaluated for valid 
inferences by interpreting and coding textual material.20 The database captured 
the nature of battles (for example, which side was on the offensive), as well as 
the location, date and where applicable, the name of the operation. The duration 
of the operation was also recorded, but was not factored into the analysis. This 
implies that a fifteen‑minute battle and an engagement that stretched over days 
were both entered as a single entry, based on the date the engagement occurred 
or commenced; and each engagement was therefore considered as a single 
event. A combination of site descriptions and dates of engagement was useful 
for avoiding duplication. 
In order to allow for spatial analysis using a Geographic Information System 
(GIS), data were manually geocoded based on the provided site description. Two 
main sources – a database of localities (over 12 000 entries) culled from the 
2011 Namibian Census and Google Earth – were used to derive coordinates in 
degree decimals.21 Due to the vagueness of some site descriptions (for example, 
“25 kilometres south-west of Oshivelo”), the derived coordinates inevitably 
217
The Cuvelai-Etosha basin
captured general localities. Other locations (such as the Elundu military base, 
for example) allowed for much more refined geocoding. The geocoding accuracy 
is therefore relative to localities, and not exact GPS positioning. Misspelt 
or ambiguous place names (for example, Chana Omadane) and inadequate 
information (for example, southern Angola) were some of the limiting factors to 
successfully geocoding corresponding events.
Following the data cleaning, spatial analysis was carried out using the ArcGIS 
10,3 package. A 20 kilometres buffer zone was arbitrarily set around the basin 
margin to delimit the study area, in consideration of warring parties’ mobility 
into and from the basin. The intersect tool was used to extract events falling 
within the study area. The frequency of military engagement per unit area, based 
on the geocoded data, was generated by means of kernel density estimation. 
The default search radius, based on the spatial configuration and number of 
input points, was employed to correct spatial outliers, which have a tendency to 
make the search radius unreasonably large.22 Each of the derived kernel density 
calculations was classified using the standard deviation and rounded off to the 
nearest integer (for the first entries and SADF offensives) or the nearest tenth.
Results and discussion
A total of 602 military engagements were recorded between 1966 and 1989, of 
which 512 (85 per cent) were successfully geocoded to a locality level. Military 
engagements that occurred in the study area comprised 75 per cent (n=383) of 
the geocoded subset. PLAN was on the attack on 209 occasions (55 per cent), 
while 39 (10 per cent) of the events were attributed to SADF offensives. Because 
the SADF offensives often lasted from weeks to months, recording the beginning 
of the operation as a single event masked a critical component in these tallies; 
nonetheless, discrete and documented battles that occurred during an operation 
were recorded as such, and thus featured as separate entries in these figures. 
The remainder (135 or 35 per cent) of these military engagements were not 
evidently clear about who was on the attack. Figure 8.4 shows the spatial 
distribution and prevalence of military engagements between the warring 
parties in the study area. 
There is a clear pattern to the spatial distribution of these military engagements. 
Attacks by PLAN were localised mainly on the Namibian side of the basin, 
whereas the SADF launched most of their offensives on the Angolan side. This 
corroborates the assertion that, following a concerted yet futile attempt in the 
1970s to root PLAN out of Namibia, the SADF mounted several operations in 
Angola as a pro-active measure aimed at pushing back and thwarting the military 
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movement and activities of their adversaries in Namibia.23 The distribution of 
incidents attributed to either party mirrors this pattern, with higher incidences 
occurring on the Namibian side of the basin.
After the beginning of the war in 1966-1975, there was a lull in publically 
documented military engagements in the study area (figure 8.5). This may be 
attributed to the fact that neither party initially appeared to be quite ready for 
war. SWAPO’s headquarters were based in Zambia, and their forces tracking vast 
distances on foot from there to the Cuvelai-Etosha Basin was physically straining 
and logistically challenging.24 The geographical battle ground therefore shifted to 
the Caprivi strip (now the Zambezi region) during that period, due to its close 
proximity to Zambia.25 Modern weaponry for PLAN was also inadequate, to the 
extent that, in some instances, they resorted to engaging their opponent with 
knives, bows and arrows – hunting weapons that could be put to discreet use, 
unlike gunfire, which might alert their opponent and betray their presence.26
Figure 8.4 Frequency density of military engagements in the Cuvelai-Etosha Basin: 
(a) PLAN on the offensive; (b) SADF on the offensive; (c) Either party on the offensive, 
with clashes and skirmishes. Note: Class intervals are based on the respective standard 
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Figure 8.5 Level and intensity of military engagement of the warring parties (1966-1989)
The SADF faced challenges of its own. Its troops comprised largely fresh, young 
conscripts, newly graduated from high school and lacking in field experience, 
particularly in an unfamiliar landscape.27 There were also logistical issues. The 
army’s primary armored vehicles, for example, were powered by inflammable 
petrol instead of diesel, which was risky in the wooden savanna. The air force 
was similarly strained; some of the warplanes, for instance, had insufficient 
fuel tank capacity to cover the vast spaces of southern Africa.28 Moreover, heavy 
reliance on military hardware dating back to the Second World War negatively 
impacted the performance and shooting range of their weaponry.29
SWAPO relocated its headquarters to Angola following its independence in 
1975, and PLAN was able to upscale its military operations, as the subsequent 
attacks in the study area shows (figure 8.6). Military engagements between 
the warring parties increased gradually, reaching a peak in 1979. During that 
period, PLAN consolidated an underground network of logistical support from 
the local population, while the SADF abandoned its exclusivity practices and sole 
reliance on white conscripts and reservists for troops. The decline in military 
engagements in the study area during the early 1980s may be attributed to 
several factors, including a number of SADF incursions into Angola and two 
consecutive years of drought conditions during that period (figure 8.2). The 
lowest level of military engagement from 1975 onwards was recorded in 1983. 
Thereafter, military activities intensified for a second time, reaching a final 
climax in 1987. Unlike in the case of drought conditions, which coincided with 
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reduced combat, there is no indication that floods had any significant impact on 
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Figure 8.6 Level and frequency of military engagement by months 
Aggregating the data by months and, by extension, seasons, revealed that the 
two warring parties had distinct preferences in waging the offensive. PLAN 
preferred to attack during March, one of the two wettest months, when the water 
level is likely to be at its highest, while the SADF favoured October, at the end of 
the dry season, for offensives (figure 8.7). This mismatch in terms of timing may 
be directly rooted in environmental and climatic factors. During the wet season, 
much of the Cuvelai-Etosha Basin is characterised by lush groundcover and heavy 
tree foliage suited to concealment; and in years of good rainfall, large expanses of 
waterlogged depressions and flowing iishana are prevalent (figure 8.2). Vehicular 
navigation in muddy terrain would therefore become a limiting factor during 
the rainy season. In addition, high levels of lethargic, distress and disease, such 
as malaria, are common during that period.31 Whilst these conditions affected 
everyone, non-natives were particularly vulnerable. Moreover, PLAN was also 
less dependent on mechanised mobility than the SADF.32 SWAPO turned these 
logistical and environmental challenges into opportunities, with PLAN evolving 
to actively strike when the SADF was least mobile.33 Another advantage to PLAN 
of striking during the rainy season was that frequent rainstorms obliterated 
their tracks, further reducing the effectiveness of SADF follow-ups and already 
strained patrols.34 All in all, 60 per cent of PLAN attacks were carried out during 
the rainy season (figure 8.7).
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Conversely, the onset of the dry season posed more significant environmental 
challenges to PLAN than to the SADF, whose offensives were mostly launched at 
the end of the dry season (60 per cent). PLAN’s movements were customarily 
made on foot, in an environment that became water‑deficient during the dry 
season.35 The SADF took due cognisance of this critical challenge facing their 
opponent and increased the pressure by ambushing PLAN at, or planting land 
mines around, the scant water sources across the basin.36 At the same time, with 
trees shedding their leaves, the forest offered little cover and PLAN’s camouflage 
uniforms with their grass-green and yellowish-brown blotches no longer 
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Figure 8.7 Level and frequency of military engagement by seasons
As an adaptive mechanism, the majority of PLAN soldiers left the battlefield at 
the onset of the dry season for refresher training aimed at advancing combat 
skills and performance.38 This arrangement translated into high concentrations 
of PLAN troops in bases in Angola. This, coupled to enhanced motorised mobility 
during the dry months, presented the SADF with ideal environmental and climatic 
settings for launching large-scale offensive operations into Angola during that 
time of the year.39, 40 When conducted in consecutive years, these dry season 
operations in Angola bore the hallmarks of pre-emptive strikes by disrupting 
or thwarting PLAN’s ability to mount meaningful attacks in Namibia during 
the subsequent rainy seasons. The SADF could expect a salutary net outcome 
from this war of attrition – which, ironically, is also an integral component of 
guerrilla warfare.
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Conclusion
This chapter focused on the impact of the environmental and climatic factors 
in the Cuvelai-Etosha Basin with respect to the publically documented military 
engagements between the SADF and PLAN during the struggle for Namibian 
independence from 1966‑1989. A lack of publically documented military 
encounters in the study area during the first years of the war was attributed to 
logistical challenges on both sides, but by 1975, the Cuvelai-Etosha Basin again 
became the theatre of war. The ensuing progressive combat in the basin reached 
a peak in 1979. During the period that followed, a combination of SADF military 
operations in Angola and two consecutive years of drought (1980 and 1981) 
may have contributed to a decline in military engagement until 1983 (when it 
reached the lowest level after 1979). The conflict came to a climax in 1987.
While drought conditions in the study area coincided with fewer military 
engagements between the warring parties, no discernible trend emerged 
with regard to floods. PLAN took the offensive during the rainy season, taking 
advantage of the lush ground cover, dense vegetation for concealment, and 
inundated terrain – with the concomitant reduced mechanised mobility of the 
SADF. For their part, the SADF launched their attacks at the end of the dry season 
to exploit the challenges faced by their opponents in having to cross great 
distances on foot with limited water sources and few concealment options.
Access to primary sources on both sides would afford further insights with 
respect to the identification of relevant environmental and climatic factors and 
the implementation of mitigation measures for adaptive military operations.
Acknowledgements 
Access to resources at the Namibian National Archives, the SWAPO Party School, 
The Namibian Newspaper, and the University of Namibia is acknowledged 
with gratitude. Invaluable support and input were received from a number 
of individuals, including Vilho Shigwedha and the late Simon Lumbu, who 
made direct comments on the earlier draft of this manuscript. We also thank 




1 Scholtz, L. The SADF in the Border War 
1966-1989 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 
2013), p. 28.
2 Ibid.
3 Mendelsohn, J.; Jarvis, A.; Roberts, C. & 
Robertson, T. Atlas of Namibia:  
A portrait of the land and its 
people (Windhoek: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers, 2009).
4 Collins, J.M. Military Geography 
for Professionals and the Public 
(Washington: Potomac Books, Inc, 
1998), p. 20; US Department of the 
Army. FM 5-33 Terrain Analysis (1990).
5 Galgano, F. & Palka, E.J. Modern Military 





9 Lord, B.R. ‘Operation Askari. 
A sub-commander’s retrospective view 
of the Operation’, Scientia Militaria, 
22(4) (1992), pp. 1-12.
10 Ibid. 
11 Mendelsohn J.; Jarvis, A. & 
Robertson, T. A Profile and Atlas of the 
Cuvelai-Etosha Basin. Published for 
the Sustainable and Integrated Water 
Resources Management Project in the 
Cuvelai-Etosha Basin of the Ministry of 
Agriculture, Water & Forestry (2013).
12 Mendelsohn, J. & Weber, B. The Cuvelai 
Basin: Its water and its people in Angola 
and Namibia (Windhoek: Development, 
2011), p. 40.
13 Röder, A. ‘Assessing urban growth and 
rural land use transformations in a 
cross-border situation in Northern 
Namibia and Southern Angola’, Land Use 
Policy, 42 (2015), pp. 340-354.
14 Nambala, S.V.V. Sila oshimpwiyu evi, evi 
li ku sile wo oshimpwiyu [Take care of 
the land and the land will take care of 
you] (Windhoek: Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Namibia Publications (1996).
15 Mendelsohn, J. & Weber, B. The 
Cuvelai-Basin: Its water and its people 
in Angola and Namibia (Windhoek: 
Development, 2011), p. 33, 40.
16 Mendelsohn, J., Jarvis, A. & 
Robertson, T. A Profile and Atlas of the 
Cuvelai-Etosha Basin. Published for 
the Sustainable and Integrated Water 
Resources Management Project in the 
Cuvelai-Etosha Basin of the Ministry 
of Agriculture, Water & Forestry 
(2013) p. 50.
17 Hipondoka, M.H.T. Ground 
view images. 2017. https://doi.
org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2014.08.008
18 Mendelsohn, J.; Jarvis, A.; Roberts, C. & 
Robertson, T. Atlas of Namibia:  
A portrait of the land and its 
people (Windhoek: Jonathan Ball 
Publishers (2009).
224
Loide Shaamhula & Martin Hipondoka
19 Thomas, E.R. ‘Annals of wars we 
don’t know about: The South 





[Accessed 20 April 2017].
20 De Vos, A.S., Strydom, H., Fouche, C.B. & 
Delport, C.S. Research at Grassroots for 
Social Science and Human professions 
(Pretoria: Van Schaik Publishers, 2011).
21 Namibia Statistics Agency (NSA). 
An atlas of Namibia’s population: 
monitoring and understanding its 
characteristics, (Windhoek: 2010).
22 Silverman, B.W. Density Estimation for 
Statistics and Data Analysis (New York: 
Chapman and Hall, 1986).
23 Breytenbach, J. The Buffalo Soldiers: 
The Story of South Africa's 32-Battalion, 
1975-1993 (Alberton: Galago 
Publishing, 2012).
24 Nujoma, S. Where Others Wavered:  
The autobiography of Sam Nujoma 
(London: Panaf Books, 2001); Scholtz, L. 
The SADF in the Border War 1966-1989 
(Cape Town: Tafelberg, 2013); 
Shityuwete, H. Never follow the wolf:  
The autobiography of a Namibian 




27 Alexander, M. The Cassinga Raid 
(unpublished MA thesis, UNISA, 2003); 
De Kock, E. A Long Night's Damage: 
Working for the Apartheid State 
(Saxonwold: Contra Press, 1983).
28 Baxter, P. SAAF’s Border War:  
The South African Air Force in Combat, 
1966-1989 (Warwick: Helion & 
Company Limited, 2012).
29 Ibid. p. 1.
30 Nujoma, S. Where Others Wavered: 
The autobiography of Sam Nujoma 
(London: Panaf Books, 2001), pp. 39-40; 
Scholtz, L. The SADF in the Border War 
1966-1989 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 
2013), p. 28.
31 Ibid.
32 Van Rensburg, W. SWA/Namibian 
Border War. Major Military & Political 
Incidents: 1959‑1989 (Durban: Just 
Done Productions Publishing, 2013).
33 Geldenhuys, J. We Were There. Winning 
the War for Southern Africa (Pretoria: 
Kraal Publishers, 2012).
34 Ibid. p. 7.
35 Ekandjo, P. The Jungle Fighter.  
The People’s Liberation Army of Namibia 
“PLAN” perspective (Windhoek: 
Gamberg Macmillan Publishers, 2014); 
Namakalu, O. Armed Liberation Struggle. 
Some accounts of PLAN’s combat 
operations (Windhoek: Gamberg 




37 Shityuwete, H. Never follow the wolf:  
The autobiography of a Namibian 
freedom fighter (London: Kliptown, 
1991), p. 15.
38 Namakalu, O. Armed Liberation Struggle. 
Some accounts of PLAN’s combat 
operations (Windhoek: Gamberg 
Macmillan Publishers, 2004), p. 16.
39 Ibid.
40 Scholtz, L. The SADF in the Border War 
1966-1989 (Cape Town: Tafelberg, 
2013), p. 100.
